When the war started I thought “This is simple, send a small team in a couple of LAVs (Strykers) to a town to get the security under control and establish a perimeter. Use some hunter/killer forces to weed out the guys hiding in the hills. Once security settles down, send in a medical team. Then, bring in ANA and ANP officers to embed/prop up the military teams. After the Afghans get a handle on the situation, bring in western civilians contractors to hire and train Afghan civilians in the various necessities such as construction, sewage, irrigation etc.

Once the basics are established, next comes a local doctor. Set up a school. Try to set up small CO-OP organization that puts the profits back into the towns and the people. Get the money into the hands of the Afghans so they can spend it at the local market, which makes more money for more locals!!! Slowly phase out the western contractors, then the military. Rinse, then repeat…”

Anyway, maybe it’s just my ego, but I like hearing you talk about the ideas that I thought were going to work. I honestly couldn’t understand why we were “losing” this war until I found this blog and you explained the REAL operational situation. Why the HELL would you commute from an large FOB out to the boonies, let KBR build a school, declare peace in the land and then leave. WHO THOUGHT THAT WAS GOING TO WORK?

Keep screaming Tim, someone will hear you sooner or later. Or at the very least, you can always say, “I told you so!”

Cheers,
Russ

This process, however, can also work in reverse. What is needed is separation (or competition) of national level crimes and authority from local ones, as the circuit courts and sheriffs of English kings were separate from manorial courts of the lords. In the U.S. today, our separate federal and state courts, prisons, and law enforcement systems serve much the same functions, and corruption is checked.

I know I’m explaining it badly – lawyers more skilled in the history of Western justice can explain it better. But perhaps Afghanistan could usefully take a page or two from the same book…

The heart-breaking reality is that the Administration has already written off A-stan. It was written off before January 20, actually, but elections demand posturing and the posturing demanded that Obama appear tough against terror so he made alot of noise about winning the fight in A-stan. But it was all smoke. And the surest measure of that is the pitiful amount of combat forces committed to A-stan by the Admin: a total of 68,000. Period. Can the Marines get it done in their AO? You bet. But what about the rest of A-stan? And without the kind of follow up strategy that Tim talks about, any gains will be short-lived. Which gets us back to the lack of any real commitment to win by the Admin. There won’t be any follow on improvements. Instead, there will be exit strategies and not much of that as it goes. Watch for the Admin-orchestrated media campaign to cover for our wholesale pull-out from A-stan disguised as “Afghanizing” the war, turning it over to them etc…

Better to leave today and not waste another U.S. soldier’s life than to have this charade that is not intent on victory.

Vacrna, I think to have a static military base there for the sole purpose of maneuvers would be boring for the world’s armed forces. Replacing essential infrastructure not only makes the Afghans’ lives better, but hopefully they see the good in having us over there. Roads, medical care, schools, electrical plants, water aqueducts, newspaper plants, agricultural assistance, alternate revenue sources –all things we are capable of assisting with that benefit the rebuilding of their societ, and are good for the morale of those serving. Believe me, the soldiers want to be viewed as persons who can make things better. After all, we’re trying to give them the option. But as Tim says, without the funding and implementation or the overall big picture to fund projects like the one he describes –is going to just prolong everything.

I also very much like what Sarah Chayes with Arghand.org, as well as what Greg Mortenson have been doing. You might want to check them out too. Private efforts really do work, because they work very hard on relationships.

In the small world department I lived in West Jordan from 98 – 07. My family loved the Wasatch Front and the area around your school was one of our favorites.

Thanks for the comment – I really appreciate it.

Couldn’t we simply establish some sort of military base there, performing military maneuvers to inform those thugs that the least bit of a scent of terrorist plotting results in fire up someones ass. In conjunction with that provide a secure means whereby the Afgan people are allowed to come to us. Place the onus on them to help provide safe passage and stability to recieve our help. Certainly where these conditions aren’t met, we are prepared to inflict whatever means to assure assistance. But it is THERE initiative. It seems to me that there are many areas of Afganistan, particularly the remote ones that simply wish to live out there lives as they have always done. To attmept any other way simply drives them into the fold of the Taliban. More importantly, straight into Pakistan.

America has shown its might. We can continue a real threat of retaliation if needed. Again, what is the ultimate goal here…what is the end point??