In October of 2005 Petraeus returned from his second tour in Iraq to take command of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He took charge of the team that was writing what would eventually become the >U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, released on December 15, 2006.

FM 3-24 revolutionized how we fought the war in Iraq. The 5 additional surge brigades to bolster the existing 15 in Iraq weren’t just sent to do the same thing; there was a radical change in strategy. No more were we going to stay on our bases and only head out on raids (oversimplified but generally accurate). We moved our troops off the bases to live among the people (again oversimplified but generally accurate). We stopped “commuting to work.”

Not only did this lead to a more successful prosecution of the war, it also made our troops safer. Here is one of the key insights from 3-24:

1-149 SOMETIMES, THE MORE YOU PROTECT YOUR FORCE, THE LESS SECURE YOU MAY BE. Ultimate success in COIN (counterinsurgency) is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained…These practices endure access to the intelligence needed to drive operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the populace that help establish real legitimacy.

In other words, get off the bases and be among the people. Get to know them personally. Know your area of operations backwards and forwards; economics, religious sects, clans, tribes, ancient rivalries, who owns every store and shop, what holidays the celebrate and how, who the village/clan/tribal leaders are, local politics, on and on. Yes kinetics are important. It’s just that alone firepower cannot win.

Petraeus’ team wrote about just this in FM 3-24

7-7 …Effective commanders know the people, topography, economy, history, and culture of their area of operations (AO). They know every village, road, field, population group, tribal leader, and ancient grievance within it…

7-8 Another part of analyzing a COIN (counterinsurgency) mission involves assuming responsibility for everyone in the AO. This means that leaders feel the pulse of the local populace, understand their motivations and care about what they want and need. Genuine compassion and empathy for the population provide an effective weapon against insurgents.

You can’t do this if your emphasis is on “force protection,” and indeed as stated above such an emphasis is counterproductive, as counterintuitive as that may sound. Now, I understand that it’s easy for me to sit here and type these words, never having served myself. And I’m not an original thinker here; all I’m doing is relaying what other more learned and experienced men and women have said.

Earning the trust of the people is critical to beating an insurgency. As Lt. Col. (Dr.) David Kilcullen wrote in FM 3-24

A-60 …Whatever else is done, the focus must remain on gaining and maintaining the support of the population. With their support, victory is assured; without it, COIN efforts cannot succeed.

My .02

Big dude on the far left looks like he’s got an M-16 with a shorty stock, Eotech Halo Sight, some custom hardware but I can’t see a barrel past the hand guard. fuzzy pic or is that a big honkin’ 6.5?

And army guy next to Brandon seems to be sporting an AR pistol.

Nice CQB kit.

We saw consistent reporting over the past two years that the warlords of the north were re-arming. That was reflected in a drop in the amount of weapons being collected in the joint UN Afghan government disarming and demobilize program which had been considered a success up till that point.

Now you see a climb in AOG (armed opposition group) incidents combined with high levels of armed criminality plaguing all the northern Provinces. The villagers up there will tell any international who cares to listen that it is grossly unfair to let the Pashtun in the south benefit from a booming poppy crop while simultaneously trying to disarm them. They will point to the criminality and AOG incident rate as proof that their early cooperation with the UN/AF Gov program has left them at the mercy of their traditional enemies who have grown stronger and now enjoy unlimited access to money and weapons. These feeling are aggravated by the snails pace of reconstruction, then further aggravated by a central government who most people feel are more lawless than the old Taliban and one which offers them no protection or services.

Add to that mix the feeling that Karzai is trying to marginalize their leaders – specifically Gen Dostum and his Lieutenants and what you have is a recipe for Civil War. It is impossible for us – security guys like me I should say – to gauge how serious a problem this is. Only the Embassy and our Intelligence agencies would be able to know that and I hope they do.

Amongst the international community working here the conventional wisdom is that the leaders in the north are using these grievances as leverage for getting more money and attention from both Kabul and the donor nations. I’m pretty sure we are reading the tea leaves correctly on this issue but if we aren’t….things could go very wrong very fast.

A security company owner explained that a vast array of security companies competed for the trade along the main route south of Kabul, some of it commercial traffic and some supplying Western bases, usually charging about $1,000 (£665) a lorry. Convoys are typically of 40-50 lorries but sometimes up to 100.

“I won’t name the company, but they are from the Panjshir Valley [in north Afghanistan]. But they have a very good relation with the Taleban. The Taleban come and move with the convoy. They sit in the front vehicle of the convoy to ensure security,” said the company chief.

Never have thought to find this kind of input on current affairs in Afghanistan. Regards for giving us a chance to see it with Your eyes. If You do have the time and will to explain the current state of relations between the North and South parts of the country and their respective residents, please kindly do so.
How had the death of Ahmad Shah Massud affect the north? Anyone that can stand up for his man as he did? With the Taliban creeping back (if such) how are the norh folks reacting?