The Yellow

In Marine Corps officer schools “The Yellow” is the school solution for tactical problems normally handed out in the form of an operation order or an annex to an operation order on yellow paper. Having written at great length about the problems we see with both the military and reconstruction efforts I’d now like to take a shot at proposing a solution which has merit. We are currently failing, and failing miserably, at bringing a secure environment to the people of Afghanistan which is the first and most important step in any counterinsurgency conflict. There are two reasons for our current performance; the first is that the government of Afghanistan is so dysfunctional and corrupt that it is more a problem than a solution. The second factor is our insistence of operating from large forward operating bases (FOB’s) and commuting to the fight instead of living amongst the people to whom we are supposed to be delivering security.

The new Pentagon directive on Irregular Warfare mentions civ-mil teams but does not define them which one suspects will involve experimenting before a solid table of organization is written. There is a model, arrived at through a marriage of convenience, which is capable of delivering enough boots on the ground to bring security and rapid infrastructure development to the Afghan population. That model was a Un Ops sub contractor / SF A-Team operation which informally cooperated with each other in Shinkay back in 2006.

The old road builders from UN Ops were heavily armed and used good
The old road builders from UN Ops were heavily armed and used good armored vehicles for their force protection. You can buy 50 of those large "Tapia's" for the price of one MRAP

This was one of the most volatile areas of Afghanistan back in 2006 and remains so to this day. Yet the small SF A-team and the equally small numbers of ANZAC and Canadian engineers were able to work effectively in that environment without taking casualties. By cooperating with each other their sum was greater than the parts of their respective groups. They showed what can be done by small groups of men living amongst the people and are a good model to emulate countrywide.

That is James the Kiwi learning how to crew a 120mm mortar.  At night when the A-team was active UN Ops contractors would help the two soldiers who remained in the team house with all fire missions
That's James the Kiwi learning how to crew a 120mm mortar. At night when the A-team was active UN Ops contractors would help the two soldiers who remained in the team house with all fire missions. That level of cooperation between military units and contractors was routine in the early phases of the Afghan campaign.

There is much speculation in the press about bringing in more combat troops as well as trying to arm tribal fighters (Lashgar’s) in hopes that they will assist ISAF and the Afghan government in their fight against Armed Opposition Groups (AOG.) One thing that can be predicted with absolute certainty is that without internationals in the field mentoring these Lashgars they will be of little use or effectiveness. The same holds true with the Afghan police. All the multimillion dollar training centers in the world will not deliver an effective Afghan police force the only way is to mentor them. Direct, daily mentoring by international military personnel is the reason why the Afghan Army is doing so well and perceived by the people as the only functional, effective government force in the country. There are also many stories in the press on the growing problem of poverty. One of the major factors affecting this poverty is unemployment. There is not a district in Afghanistan which does not have an on the shelf plan to fix its irrigation systems. Irrigation, bridge and road work is a labor intensive process here due to the lack of modern machinery or training.

Practicing a react drill on the A-team compound.  The SF guys had steel target plates scattered throughout the desert which made for good practice
Armed UN contractors practicing a react drill on the A-team compound. The SF guys had steel target plates scattered throughout the desert which made for good practice

A Civ-mil team built around an infantry rifle squad, augmented with armed contractors housed in a local compound could be a catalyst for stability and growth. The military team would focus on bringing security to the district by training and mentoring both Lashkar’s and local police. The civilian half of the team would focus on simple infrastructure projects like roads, irrigation, micro hydro power plants and bridges. They would need to be able to both approve and fund those projects at their level using cash in order to get these projects rapidly off the ground and ensure they are done correctly. These teams would be working with the local tribal elders and district administrators who are often one and the same. They can bring two key elements into the equation for winning over the population and that is a permanent long term presence in the districts which would act as a visible sign of commitment to the Afghan people. Long term presence on the ground coupled with visible signs that we are committed to bringing security to the people is the very foundation of the counterinsurgency battle. Anything less is just muddling through which is what we have been doing for the past seven years.

You cannot do stuff like this on  your day off in most parts of the world
You cannot do stuff like this on your day off in most parts of the world

There are two reasons why armed contractors should form a bulk of the civ-mil teams in Afghanistan. The first is longevity. Contractors who are working a good paying gig with a decent rotation system can stay on a contract for years at a time. Having a group of former military men who have worked the same districts for year after year brings huge advantages to the military commander who employs them. Most contractors pick up enough language skill to operate without a dedicated interpreter. In the course of their duties they interact with village and district leaders daily thus getting an accurate feeling for the local “ground truth.” The other reason to use contractors is cost. You can outfit contractors with the best weapons, best commercial communications gear, and the best armored vehicles and they are still costing the American taxpayer pennies on the dollar of what it costs for an American serviceman.

It sounds counter intuitive to recommend the employment of ground troops in small units when the security situation has deteriorated significantly during the past year. In that respect it is interesting to compare the results of two Taliban ambushes last year. Both involved ambushing forces of around 250 Taliban fighters. In the first a reinforced rifle company of French paratroopers fought for an entire day to break contact and recover their casualties. In the second a platoon (minus) of 30 U.S. Marines broke the ambush decisively beating the Taliban, killing scores and sending the rest running from the field of battle. The terrain, vegetation and disposition of enemy forces were different in both battles I am not trying to imply that 30 Marines would have been able to perform the same immediate action drill in the Uzbin valley ambush. The relevant point to be made here is that aggressive tactics result in fewer casualties among the good guys and lots of causalities among the bad guys which is a good thing in all situations. Another relevant point is that small units of infantry are much more decisive when they are operating in terrain they know populated by people they know. By operating in the same district filled with people they know our front line troops will be much safer than they are commuting into the districts from large FOB’s in cumbersome armored patrols.

The use of local police outrighters to spot potential IED's was very effective.  Not too effective in this case because the ANP driver mistook the "stop there is amine" signal for a go signal
The use of local police motorcycle outriders to spot potential IED's works well unless the ANP drivers behind them mistake a "stop there is a mine" signal for a "go" signal. In this case the motorcycle rider was injured severely because he was running back towards the blast frantically signaling them to stop. This was the only time the boys from UN Ops suffered an IED strike although they found and destroyed mines targeting them almost daily using motorcycle outriders. The US military currently uses technology I won't discuss to do the same thing with dismal results. Technology will not now nor every replace sound tactics and sound tactics are much cheaper in both lives and treasure.

As I write this post yet another round of recriminations is flying about concerning civilian casualties. The latest incident occurred up the road from us in Laghman Province at the village of Masamut. A known Taliban leader, Gul Pacha, was in his compound entertaining another Taliban commander when an American direct action team flew in and the joint.   Hard. The military claims to have killed 39 Taliban. The villagers say they killed many Taliban but also 13 villagers. There are wounded villagers in the provincial hospital who are telling reporters that they grabbed their rifles and rushed outside their homes when they heard neighbors screaming and were shot as they left their compounds. That makes all the sense in the world to me it is expected that Pashtun males will arm themselves and try to defend their neighbor when he is attacked. Under the code of Pashtunwali they have no choice but to act. It is also expected that any armed male within view of the cordon force will be shot. In the report linked above one of the villagers observes that they should have surrounded the suspect’s house and given the surrounding families a chance to leave before attacking which again makes perfect sense to me. The SF community will tell you that doing this ruins the element of surprise. But look at the price we are paying to generate “surprise” we do not need. If we already had a civ-mil team working that district of Laghman they could have grabbed their Lashkar and ANA protégées, surrounded the compound and had the village elders get the Taliban commanders to come out. If they refused our SF direct action boys could still assault them at their leisure – they control the when, where and how in their deliberate assault. Or they can use standoff munitions controlled by FAC’s at the scene.

It often seems to those of us on the outside looking in that we use the high speed direct action mission because we have a lot of guys here who are highly trained to do high speed direct action missions. The units who do these missions are our varsity team highly trained, highly capable and very lethal. Guys like that should be out in the countryside living amongst the people like we do. They would be better tasked if they traveled around the districts augmenting the training dispensed by resident civ-mil teams. It will not take long for problem districts to emerge and that is where we should send our door kickers because we cannot continue to whack a dozen innocent Afghans just to take out a low level “commander” who can be easily and instantly replaced.

I am certain that my friends who remain on active duty view photos of New Zealand civilians crewing 120mm mortars with a degree of alarm. As a former infantry officer I can’t say that I would be any different. Crewing mortars in shorts and tee shirts is not the way we learned how to do these sorts of things. Yet we are in a long war that is going to tax our collective will and stamina. It is time to start experimenting with formations that can make a difference, quickly and cheaply, in the populated areas of Afghanistan. Allowing small units to be scattered about in areas where there is little mutual support is not a technique senior officers are comfortable with. It goes against everything they have learned about employing their men in battle and it is these men who must answer to the families of the soldiers and Marines who will be lost in this fight. But we have to try something new, micro management from on high is plaguing our operations and continuing to cause unacceptable levels of civilian casualties. It is time to turn the sergeants and Lieutenants lose to use their judgment and to develop their area of operations. Not all will measure up to the task but most will.   We have never had better, more experienced junior leadership in our military it is time to place our trust and confidence in them they have earned it.

Approaching the Tipping Point

The Fab Folk continue to work like demons to maximize their time on the ground. Yesterday they had successful test shots with their fabricated internet antennas to both a local NGO and the Nangarhar Public Hospital. They work every evening setting up the XO laptops they have sent in and early each morning they meet for a couple of hours to learn Pashto. Their teacher comes from the local school and is a life-long resident of the local village. He tells me that, despite the very mild winter we have had to date, that poverty is driving people to desperate measures. Frequently voices call out to him from the shadows at night “we are Taliban give us your wallet, watch and cell phone.” They are not Taliban but men he has known for years. I asked why this was happening because our understanding of Pashtun culture would prohibit such gross criminality inside one’s own community. “Yes this is true but we are now so poor that the elders do not ask young men where they got this or where they got that they praise them instead for bringing anything of value which will ease their poverty.” This is just a hint at the amount of tension under the surface of a population located in one of the more affluent portions of Afghanistan. Across the river at Little Barabad (official name) or Tutikas (the villagers do not like the official name) the villagers cut down their large shade tree which served as the communal meeting place and picnic site. The wood is not for them – it was sold to a “rich man” to generate cash to buy medicine for several of the children.

Keith working with local school boys establishing a internet link to their school with a custom antenna they built in the fab lab
Keith working with local school boys establishing a internet link to their school with a custom antenna they built in the fab lab

We have been running the road to Kabul a lot as of late taking people to and from the Airport in Kabul. A couple of days ago we took Dr. Dave and Dr. Art Mendoza back to Kabul for their flight home and saw the aftermath of a big fight the night before. We were warned prior to leaving by another security firm (we share all intel at all times in the field) that there had been much fighting outside Gamberi and sure enough when we got to the point in the road where the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) had set up on the shoulders we saw this:

Looking east from the ANP position
Looking east from the ANP position - this is the same position mentioned in my last post

Apparently a group of Armed Opposition Group (AOG) fighters sneaked up the draw between the ANA and ANP positions and shot up the truck above with small arms and RPG’s. They then fired at both the ANP positions to their west and the ANA positions to their east before withdrawing across the Kabul River. The ANA and ANP spent the next hour or so firing at each other. By the time we rolled past the ANA had taken their casualties and withdrawn leaving the poor police to sit in their shallow little holes to suck up all the rain we have been getting of late.

We are convinced that somebody in Laghaman Province is running an RPG gunners school because we see reports of RPG-only attacks on police posts along this portion of the road every 4 to 5 weeks. Normally they volley 10 rounds in rapid succession and withdraw causing little to no damage. But we know there is at least one RPG mechanic out there (most likely in Laghaman) who can really put some English on his rockets and make very difficult shots consistently. I bet he has a group of students he is working with and what better way to train them then to take on the softest of soft targets like the silly deployment of ANA and ANP forces five feet off the main road? You could tell just by looking at them they had no fire plans, no fire control measures, and probably no plan at all. What they need is not more PowerPoint lectures from DynCorp contractors they need mentors with them in the field and there are not enough here.

The same truck viewed from the ANA postion - note how close the two were to each other
The same truck viewed from the ANA position - note how close the two were to each other. The positions are squad size (10 guys) and they are "dug in" (if you can call it that) in a straight line with machineguns on their flanks

Yesterday I was returning from dropping off James the Marine and because I had no choice had to make the return drive alone. As I rounded the Mahipar Pass I saw a wall of trucks pulled off to the side which indicated some sort of blockage in the tunnel. I drove far enough to get a look before turning around and saw it was a U.S. Army convoy stopped right in the middle of the pass. Once the traffic stops flowing in Afghanistan it is very difficult to start it going again because all the east bound traffic will move into every nook and cranny available to their front and block the road. It takes a good hour to get them out of your way so that a convoy can move again. But I was ready checking my wallet to find 100 Euros there I turned around and headed back to the German PX at the ISAF camp outside Kabul to score some premium German beer (at only 12 euro a case) figuring if I had to drive back in the dark I might as well do so with a truck load of beer.

Sure enough when I made it back to the Mahipar Pass it was clear and I was smoothly driving for the next 45 minutes until I got outside Surobi.   Rounding a corner I saw all the trucks parked in the right lane and taking the left lane I moved far enough down to see the same convoy parked in the middle of the road. They sat there for 30 minutes and then took another 30 minutes to get moving before stopping again maybe five miles down the road. I had worked my way up to the front of the line by then and 45 minutes into this stop I approached the convoy tail gunner to ask if they would let me through. He got on the radio and in a few minutes said “no because the road to the front is blocked (by the west bound traffic) and I couldn’t make it through anyway.” I asked him what the problem was and he replied “don’t know” which is exactly the correct answer because he has no business telling me a damn thing just because I’m a lone American with a CAC card. He brushed me off without a moment’s hesitation like a real pro I like seeing that kind of heads up thinking by our troops.

The American convoy is stopped and the vehicles are stacking up behind it.  The same is true to their fron so when they start moving they will have to thread their way through the local traffice which sort of defeats the whole purpose of keeping the traffic away from them at all times.  It also makes it easier for the bad guys to target them.
The American convoy is stopped and the vehicles are stacking up behind it. The same is true to their front so when they start moving they will have to thread their way through the local traffic which defeats the whole purpose of keeping the traffic away from them at all times.

But the longer we sat the more upset the locals behind me became. Soon the sound of a thousand car horns filled the air. Over a hundred men were now standing around my vehicle trying to get the ANA troops to let them pass. As is usually the case there were several fluent English speakers amongst them and they came over to chat me up about what was happening. I was as pissed as they were and being a poltroon by nature freely admitted this. Then out of the crowd came a man with a very sick looking child and I was pressed into service to intervene on his behalf. I walked over to the tail gunner and asked if a vehicle with a medical emergency could get through. He asked how many more vehicles contain people with medical emergencies and I glanced back saw about a thousand vehicles stacked up behind me and said “probably about a thousand” which made the kid laugh. Again correct response from the tail gunner who seems like a great trooper because if you let one vehicle through the rest will follow TIA this is Afghanistan. To make a long story short it took me five hours to get back to the Taj. Several more times the American convoy stopped and each time the fluent English speaker from Leeds England came up to stand near my car. That is a very Pashtun thing to do he was watching out for me to ensure none of the drivers behind took out their frustrations on the lone American in their midst. Not that I thought this would occur but it was a nice gesture.

Very poor picture taken from right behind the American convoy which has been stopped for about 45 minutes at this point
Very poor picture taken from right behind the American convoy which has been stopped for about 45 minutes at this point. It would be much easier and safer for them to let traffic pass so that the bad guys don't set up for them with an IED or VBIED as they start to move. It would also help them with their efforts to win over the Afghan population if they started running convoys like their Afghan Army counterparts. Once used to local driving patterns they could then apply the "rule of opposites" which would give them a fighting chance at recognizing and stopping VBIED's before they attack. This convoy technique of keeping all Afghans away from US vehicles at all times has never, not once, prevented a VBIED attack but has caused the hundreds of deaths and casualties amongst innocent (if not reckless) Afghans.

The struggle of the average Afghan to find enough to eat; the continued lack of performance by the Afghan security forces and the inability of the ISAF military to operate amongst the Afghans without treating every civilian they come in contact with as a crazed jihadist killer are linked. The United States and her allies have spent billions in Afghanistan and have very little to show for it. Afghanistan is currently in a death spiral not because of a lack of aid funds but rather how those funds have been spent and allocated. Every indication we see on the ground is that more money will be thrown into the same failed programs currently being implemented; another demonstration that we have not learned any meaningful lessons.

The reason these programs won’t work is that they are off the shelf solutions designed to make the lives of bureaucrats and contracting officers easy rather than bringing assistance to the Afghans. The Department of State has spent 2.5 BILLION bringing in police trainers, jail guard trainers, and lawyers to train the judges. Now what the hell does anyone at DynCorp or PAE know about Afghan police or Afghan jurisprudence? Nothing of course but that is not why they win these large lucrative contracts it is because they already have large lucrative contracts and therefore know how to work with DS contracting officers to make their lives easier. What is the return on our investment? After the large scale jail break in Kandahar last summer investigators discovered there were over 100 illegal cell phones in the hands of inmates. When we capture important Taliban leaders and send them to the main Afghan jail at Pul-i-Charki they are often back home before the soldiers who delivered them. The Afghan police are unreliable and prone to preying on the population. The current Afghan government is more of a problem than a solution. It is being out-governed by the Taliban in the many districts under Taliban control. Who “built capacity” with these Taliban? How many billions of dollars were spent teaching the Taliban to administer justice and civil control so effectively?

Black tea (Tor Chai) is a popular drink in cold weather - the Afghans import tons from Vietnam indicating they have a little more "capacity" than they are given credit for
Black tea (Tor Chai) is a popular drink in cold weather - the Afghans import tons from Vietnam without the assistance of the US or UN indicating they have a little more"capacity" than they are given credit for

What the State department did was to use off the shelf solutions which had nothing to do with the situation in Afghanistan and everything to do with what was easy for the Department of State. After all when you spend all your time in Afghanistan locked inside a gigantic posh embassy compound how in the world would you know what the Afghans need? You are forced to work through the Afghan government and have any of you ever read one news story about the Afghan government that was not about the appalling amount of corruption found at every level in every ministry? I would say you have not but as an insider I will tell you there is one ministry the ministry of aviation is every bit as honest and effective as its international counterparts. In fact the Afghans working in that ministry are more honest than any politician to be found within 153 miles of Chicagobut I digress.

The State Department is and has been the lead agency in Afghanistan and their performance here is every bit the fiasco as their performance in Iraq. Remember that Paul Brenner was a compromise President Bush made between Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon he gave the boys at state a year to get Iraq back on its feet but Brenner used his 12 months to destroy the country and hamstring our military. He unilaterally made decisions for which we paid in American blood. The price tag for his incompetence paid by the Iraqis is probably beyond measure. Colin Powell, who foisted Brenner upon Iraq had more to do with the fiasco portion of that war than Rumsfeld but you’d have to do some serious archival research to know it because the nitwits in the MSM would not in a million years burden the people of America with good honest reporting which strayed from their preferred narrative.

That is not to say that the US Military has demonstrated the capacity, tactical flexibility, or ability to assess the situation on the ground, learn from past mistakes, and formulate a strategic framework under which all operations in Afghanistan can be conducted. They have not and we are risking another Vietnam and I am not talking about getting beaten by the rag tag assortment of Taliban and neo Taliban on the field of battle. I am talking about having the American peoples will to fight crippled by a media who are able to reveal that the Generals are spinning tales that are as stupid and uninformed as the old “five O’ Clock follies” in Saigon were back in Vietnam. Let me make this point clear I am not critical of the American (or any other ISAF) soldier who is over here doing his duty. Every one of them volunteered to join a military at war and their grit, determination to do what is right and courage are commendable. I am critical of the generals who seem unable to implement the very doctrine they tout as the answer to the counterinsurgency battle. I am not the only one who sees things this way please take the time to read this excellent piece by a retired Army Colonel who is much better writer than I am. He is calling for a massive forced retirement amongst American General Officers which would be a smart move given their lackluster performance and one with serious historical precedent.

James the Marine and I running the ring road to Khandahar back in the day.  Armed contractors are cheaper, faster and cost pennies on the dollar to deployed military forces.
James the Marine and I running the ring road to Khandahar back in the day. Armed contractors are cheaper, faster and have proven more effective at the stability operations battle than the international military forces operating in Afghanistan.

The only reason we are not at the point where the American people start to treat their military in the manner it was treated in the early seventies is that our media is even more incompetent than the Department of State or the Pentagon. If we had the same type of reporters as the ones who worked Vietnam year in and year out they would be able to throw the BS flag at every single briefing they are given because the things I hear the big Army saying about the situation here are flat out nonsense. This situation will not last much longer. The drive by media is starting to get a clue as I saw when talking with Martha Raddatz the Senior Foreign Affairs Correspondent from ABC news. The only thing stopping her from getting a really comprehensive first hand view of how silly the DS and military approach is to this conflict is her own silly corporate “force protection” rules. But she got an earful from me and spent a few hours roaming about the countryside like the thousands of other internationals who live and work here. Not that you can do that in every district or province in Afghanistan there are many where it would now be suicidal for a westerner to walk around knowing where you are safe and where you are not is the most basic function of military intelligence. Why we cannot figure that out and act accordingly is beyond me.

Here is the connection to my rambling observations. If our billions of dollars went to implement the infrastructure improvements which the Afghans at the district level have been pleading for during the last six to seven years you could instantly start employing massive amounts of idle unemployed men. But you cannot do this with the Department of Sate contracting vehicles nor through large, bloated, international companies like Louis Berger or DynCorp or PAE or KBR or any of the other current “implementers” who are receiving most of the reconstruction monies. You need a company like Louis Berger to build big things like hydro electric dams, posh embassy compounds, or international airports. You do not need Louis Berger to build roads and schools. The Afghans can do that themselves. You also don’t need the nitwits of Foggy Bottom deciding how to implement a reconstruction plan because what you get is what the average Afghan sees now. Lots of police posts, government office building and training bases being built for the very people and organizations who abuse them, steal from them and fail to protect them from other (non uniformed) criminals or the Taliban. The only way forward are civil military teams who are embedded into the community, who stay in the community and who are able to green light and supervise Afghan designed and built irrigation, road, and micro hydro projects. An excellent prototype of exactly this kind of team was working in Afghanistan back in the early days before Big Army came and put all the SF teams back inside the large FOB’s. It will be the topic of my next post.

Road and irrigation projects can employ massive amounts of manpower providing much needed pay to the average Afghan
Road and irrigation projects can employ massive amounts of manpower providing much needed pay to the average Afghan. Photo by Holly Barnes Higgins

Let me stress something my friends and that is time is running out for us in Afghanistan. Soon the MSM is going to discover they are missing a great opportunity to play in their favorite game of pin the tail on the Pentagon spokesman. They are still sore at the military for making them collectively look like a bunch of know-nothing amateurs back in 2003 during the massive military embed for the storming of Iraq.

There are several multi million dollar programs being funded to bring laptops and internet to Afghan school children.  The Fab Folk have done that at a cost of zero to the American tax payer and with a shoe string budget.  If any of you know people who award grants for this sort of thing send them to the fab Jbad web site.  These seven people accomplished more in three weeks than a hundred highly paid US AID contractors do in a year
There are several multimillion dollar programs being funded to bring laptops and internet to Afghan school children. To date they have not sent one computer and have established not one internet system. The Fab Folk have done that at a cost of zero to the American tax payer and with a shoe string budget. If any of you know people who award grants for this sort of thing send them to the fab lab Jbad web site. These seven people accomplished more in three weeks than a hundred highly paid US AID contractors do in a year. Somebody should fund them.

I asked the local headmaster what he was going to do about the highway men who lurk in the shadows around Bagrami but he said it is no longer a problem and would say no more. That means the Taliban have stepped in and are now active right behind my guesthouse. In time we will have to reach some sort of accommodation with them. We are not going to be attacked because the local people would not allow it and the Talibs, if they are here, are local people too. Plus we have excellent fields of fire, Pashin (not Pashtun) tribal fighters for guards and lots of guns and ammo. Local Talibs do not attack hard targets like us for good reason they are trying to feed their families too and will be of little use to them if they get “seriously kilt” by the Free Rangers at FOB Taj. We are probably teaching their kids in the Fab Lab; in fact I know we are. But This Is Afghanistan and if they are here it is going to cost me more damn money to be left alone. Just as in Chicago, you have to pay to play and just as in Chicago one check will not cover the entire bill if you know what I mean.

Fab Lab Surge and ABC News

The Fab Lab team has arrived and is now hard at work.  They are blogging daily and you can monitor their progress here. They’re doing cool stuff like fabricating antenna’s to share our fatpipe with the local schools and NGO’s. They’re  raising money to buy XO Laptops for every 6th grader in the local (Bagrami) school. They’re setting the local kids up with a tee shirt business to fund the Jalalabad FabLab operations and the local kids are beside themselves with opportunity that just landed on their doorstep.

Amy and her roomate Kieth from MIT - the Fab Lab advance party
Amy and her roommate Keith from Harvard – the Fab Lab advance party

We have had to run up to Kabul and back several times to get all the Fab Folk to Jalalabad. The Jalalabad to Kabul road is a vitally important supply route to both the military and the government of Afghanistan. There were several attacks on the road this past summer and there continues to be problems on it now despite the winter weather. We saw several interesting things along the route and the first was the number of French Army troops transiting from Kabul to Surobi.

French troops on the road outside of Kabul
French troops on the road outside of Kabul

Surobi is a large hamlet half way between Kabul and Jalalabad, last August the French suffered a humiliating defeat in the Uzbin valley which is just to the north of Surobi. The town has long been considered to be sympathetic if not supportive of Gulbiddin Hekmatyar and his party Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG.) We see sunburned adult males with high-water trousers, tennis shoes, and black turbans every time we pass through Surobi. They could be Sheppard’s or gold miners but it’s a safe bet their Taliban fighters hitting Surobi in for in-country R&R (rest and recreation).

The French have been serious about establishing a presence in Surobi since their first unfortunate encounter with the Taliban. They are keeping units in the field 24/7; have launched several operations which have netted some prominent local commanders (according to UN incident reporting). It’s good to see our ISAF allies taking the initiative, going on the offensive and clearing out such an important area.

But after you clear an area you have to hold it and it will be interesting to see how (or if) they do that. The operations in Surobi are not impacting the repeated attacks on the Kabul/Jalalabad road – with one exception. We’ve heard from reliable sources they tracked down and killed The Mechanic. It appears to be true too because it’s been months since we’ve seen his signature long range pin point RPG shots nailing tankers. The tankers are still getting nailed but only other portions of the road that allow ambush from rifle and machinegun range.

As noted in previous posts these occur in the Tangi valley area east of Surobi and in portions of Laghman Province below the Tangi. Both the ANP and ANA have posted small units along the road to augment the numerous permanent police posts. As you can see from the pictures below the positions they have set up are weak at best and their patrol routine, which appears to be sitting by the side of the road, is not proving very effective.

Typical ANP deployment on the Jbad - Kabul road
Typical ANP deployment on the Jbad – Kabul road
ANP machinegun crew - they are not dug in and they don't move so they are not accomplishing much
ANA machine gun crew – they are not dug in and they don’t move so they do not really accomplish much

Here is an intel report from one of the PSC’s (the private security companies in Afghanistan do a lot of intel sharing with each other.)

Laghman Province, Qarghayi District, Route 1-area of Tangy

AOG Vehicle Checkpoint 05 January 2009, between 1630-1700 hrs

A doctor who works for a NGO was returning to Jalalabad from Kabul alone in his private car, when his vehicle was forced to stop by a group of armed men. The doctor was then questioned about his work and personal behaviour. He was finally allowed to proceed unharmed when, on seeing the cassette player in the vehicle, the armed men instructed the doctor to play a cassette found in the vehicle. The cassette played was a religious tape and satisfied the requirements of those who had stopped the car. Despite reported increased security force deployments, this is the third reported instance of AOG activity on Route 1 in the Tangy area since 31 Dec 08. All three incidents have occurred in daylight hours and two have been attacks on military vehicles. These incidents should demonstrate to all the risk of travel along Route 1 between Kabul-Jalalabad at any time of day. Any international staff using Route 1 should expect further instances such as that outlined in this report and seek alternative means of travel between Jalalabad-Kabul.

Along with the above report, we have made several trips the past few days along the route. A few ANA vehicles have been pulled off the side of the road about half way back to Kabul, and the soldiers were in a defensive posture behind their vehicles, weapons pointed at the high ground. Most likely some pot shots taken at the ANA as they passed thru.

The Kabul to Jalalabad route is one of the most important in Afghanistan. The effort being expended to secure this route is currently being wasted because the troops are being deployed in poorly sited positions and being tasked to do nothing other than sit there. There is an easy fix and that would be to embed and infantry squad into the Qarghayi District ANP headquarters with a mission style order. It should sound something like this; “Sergeant you’ve got six months to work with these guys and stop any and all attempts to attack this vital route, go down there scout it out, come up with a plan and I’ll see you in five days so you can brief me on your plan. ” Winning the IED battle requires that you kill the IED makers and you can only do that if they are unmasked by the people. To reach the people with the consistency required to gain that level of cooperation requires that you leave the big armored vehicles and spend time (lots of it) among the people. I am pretty sure that if you consult the Pentagon’s counterinsurgency manual you’ll find that it says more less exactly the same thing.

It is always a good sign to see American soldiers getting a handle on the recent attacks
It is always a good sign to see American soldiers getting a handle on the recent attacks along the Jbad to Kabul road

There is hope for those of us who use the Kabul Jbad road frequently and that is the appearance of a small American patrol right in the heart of the Tangy valley visiting the local ANA checkpoint. Inshallah they will be spending some time and effort trying to help the various small unit commanders develop a more aggressive plan to secure the route. We did not encounter any problems on our numerous trips to Kabul and back. What follows is some photo blogging about the Fab Folk we are hosting and some of the things they are up to.

Dan the Reconstruction Man is back with James the Kiwi
Dan the Reconstruction Man is back with James the Kiwi – we have a lot of James’s here (James the Brit,   James the Aussie,   James the Marine, and James the German)- chatting with Dr Dave from the Synergy Strike Force
Kieth, Steve and Carl from the Fab Folk team. Carl is from South Africa, Kieth and Steve are Americans. The Taj manager Mehrab is pulling interpretur duty - he is between Steve and Carl
Keith, Steve and Carl from the Fab Folk team. Carl is from South Africa, Keith and Steve are Americans. The Taj manager Mehrab is pulling interpreter duty – he is between Steve and Carl
Miss Lucy, a former US Navy officer, getting ready to cross the Kabul river from Little Barabad
Miss Lucy, a former US Navy officer, getting ready to cross the Kabul river from Little Barabad
Here is a better shot of Lucy
Here is a better shot of Lucy
Smari and Andres - Fab Folk from Iceland
Smari and Andres – Fab Folk from Iceland
Steve and Keith getting ready to cross the river to Little Barabad
Steve and Keith getting ready to cross the river to Little Barabad
The Fab Folk took a box of stuffed animals with them to Little Barabad. Here is a great shot of the girls watching them cross the river
The Fab Folk took a box of stuffed animals with them to Little Barabad. Here is a great shot of the girls watching them cross the river
We hosted ABC News reporter Martha Raddatz at the Taj yesterday.
We hosted ABC News reporter Martha Raddatz at the Taj yesterday. She interviewed myself and Dr. Dave, the Fab Lab Folk, saw a school built by the La Jolla Rotary Club, and made the river crossing to Little Barabad. She had a big day and shot lots of tape.   More on our day with ABC in the next post.

Here’s a link to Martha’s first news story from her visit to Jalalabad.