The fighting season is rapidly ramping up to make this the bloodiest yet, which makes it the perfect time for President Karzai to go to Washington for a little face time with the Commander in Chief. What is to be accomplished during this meeting is easy to predict: Not one damn thing. This article in the Washington Post explains why – here is a quote from it: “‘We don’t have a plan yet,’ worries the senior military official.” With the operation to clear Kandahar on hold, that’s a huge problem.
The Taliban have declared a major offensive targeting ISAF, the Afghan government, ANSF, and all internationals. The offensive is named al Faath (victory) and it is scheduled to start tomorrow. Threats of this nature have come often in the past but this one is being taken seriously by Afghan security forces and internationals working outside the wire. But taking things seriously has not, as far as we can tell, resulted in changes to the daily routine of the Afghan Security Forces.
This is a pity because a more proactive approach is obviously required and I’ll explain how that could work using the recent attack on the governor and provincial council in the previously peaceful city of Zaranj, which is the Capital of Nimroz Province.
On the 5th of May at approximately 0930 a squad of nine Taliban fighters in two Toyota Corollas attacked the Nimroz Provincial Council office and the Governors compound. They attacked sequentially in what appeared to be a well planned raid. All nine attackers were dressed in ANA uniforms, armed with AK47 assault rifles, and carried at least one hand grenade. All nine were wearing suicide vests.
Mullah John Binns called from his compound in Zaranj that day announcing “the villains made a determined assault on the governors compound but were thwarted by reconnaissance failure and stout walls”. That was an exceptionally long statement from John so I perked up asking for details. He said he’s send a report and hung up. Our company, Central Asia Development Group, (CADG) was the only USAID contractor working in Nimroz province. The closest ISAF base was in the Helmand province but we knew Zaranj was one of the safest cities in Afghanistan and had no problems operating in such a remote location.
The raid force, who may or may not have been Taliban, armed opposition groups being prolific in the country, had failed to confirm their target reconnaissance. They were forced to stop and dismount well short of their objective because most of the roads into the objective had been cut (by us) so we could installation drainage pipes as part of a civic works project. Our road work created a counter-mobility barrier blocking their ingress from the south which was the direction of the villains, mounted in two Toyota Carolas approached.
Five attackers from the first vehicle moved past this gate and stopped outside the entrance gate of the Provincial Council office where they engaged ANP (Afghan National Police) who were responding from the Governors compound to the south. There were also ANP units arriving to the north of the attackers on the street pictured above.
One of the villains detonated his suicide vest to clear the security stationed at the gate of the Provincial Council’s office complex. The remaining villains rushed inside the compound firing into the council offices from the outer windows.
At least one ANP guard was inside the building returning fire and many of the council members also started to return fire with their sidearms. One of the attackers was killed during this portion of the attack. The attackers then threw in a hand grenade (which detonated under a stairwell sending the frag back at the attackers) and turned their attention to the Governors compound.
Now things start to get really crazy. If you look at the google map above, you can see where the second corolla pulled up and emptied out four more fighters. The second vehicle was stopped well short of the Governors compound by a recently installed road block that I believe the Marines had recommended and paid for as part of a security assessment they made when Nimroz fell under their area of operations in 2009. By the time both assault teams linked up there was organized effective fire coming at them from the Governors compound to the south and ANP troops arriving from the north.
Their second vehicle – which was probably rigged as a vehicle born IED was unable to make it into the fight and retreated, so the raiding party was stuck and had to come up with a way to close the final 300 meters. They did what all suicide vest wearing raiding parties do – they started breaching the walls of compounds adjacent to the Governors place by throwing themselves against the wall and detonating.
As the raid force breached each wall they moved into the compounds looking for a way to the Governors office. They did not fire at the compound owners or their families. Once in the first compound and out of the line of fire of the ANP, another attacker blew himself up at the doorway of an adjacent compound.
At this point the assault squad is down to four men and they had a mighty big wall to get through. Obviously these guys were not disposed to alternative courses of action – I guess when you strap on a suicide vest everything around you looks like a target. So hey diddle diddle straight up the middle they went.
The attackers never made it into the governors compound and the fighting ended with the suicide of the last surviving attacker. This attack was typical for the various armed insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The planning seemed to be good the execution was amateurish with poor gun handling, poor grenade handling, poor marksmanship, and no branch or squeal planning being the defining characteristics. As soon as the attackers found themselves cornered or stymied by an unanticipated obstacle they blew themselves up.
The attackers were reported to be younger males, not Afghan in appearance, with red faces and Pakistani-style shoes. Some witnesses believed them to be Pakistani, others Iranian. They were wearing ANA uniforms and all nine had Suicide -IED vests, AK47s and at least one had a grenade.
There are several theories amongst the more credible local nationals (LNs) who are familiar with all the facts of the attack. One theory is that this was an attack staged by Quetta Shura Taliban. The Nimroz Governor had recently been in the media pointing out that Zaranj had not had one Taliban incident in the past year.
Another theory held by many if the attack was perpetrated by Iranian elements trying to further destabilize Afghanistan. There is has also been a recent war of words between Iran and Afghanistan regarding water rights and a hydro-electric project. Several locals reported that Iranian closed the Milak/Zaranj border crossing the day of the attack and the day before.
One thing is certain and that is it is easy – really easy to preempt these kinds of attacks with the proper deployment of ISAF troops. Everyone of these attacks occurs during the morning hours. Everyone of them involve bad guys wearing ANA or ANP uniforms and suicide vests being delivered to the objective by small private cars. All it would take to stop these kinds of attacks would be deploying joint military/ANP patrols in the neighborhoods but here is the catch – MRAPS won’t work. They are too big, the people inside cannot see, smell, hear, or feel anything outside of the massive iron MRAP. Plus the damn things would tear out the electrical wires in 97% of the suburban streets in Afghanistan.
Preempting Taliban attacks in the cities and larger towns means Americans and Afghans riding around in the LTV’s (light tactical vehicle to the military; pick up truck to the rest of us) where they can see, hear and observe the local environment while applying the rule of opposites. This they can do in theory but not in practice because of “force protection” rules laid out from on high.
So tomorrow is al Faath day which may or may not bring some more of these attacks. I’m in Jalalabad and too worried about it but you know what would really make an impression? Seeing the Afghan and US Army out in force tomorrow morning manning checkpoints and driving around the neighborhoods looking for things which are exactly opposite to what they expect to see. If we are supposedly focused on the population then the population should actually see us being focused on them and being proactive during times when the villains are up to mischief. Flooding Jalalabad with a few hundred of the 7 to 8 thousand troops in residence outside the city would do wonders for the morale of the population we are supposed to be protecting. But the chances of that happening are zero. The concepts of “COIN” and “population centric” operations all you want but it means nothing to the population. Actions always speak louder than words.
16 Replies to “Happy al-Faath Day”
In the “have and have not” pictures you presented, I sense a community that knows what is happening, yet only looks forward to tomorrow’s daily job offers, wherein one might repair a wall, or dig a ditch for pipe, or replace a window, maybe wash away blood on the ground while retrieving body parts missed.
They smile for your camera, hide their women, and wander about knowing that outside of one’s religion, hope exists in those statements only foreigners seem to offer.
Pack up you stuff and come home: The game has been over for some time, if ever it could have started with these so called Commanders in Chief we’ve recently elected!
Look at those walls; recall our people who claim to think “outside the box” in their speeches…real humor!
Yes RJ the blame is all due to having sent those extra troops. Things were going swell before Obama made that blunder.
No John, the majority of the blame for that blunder lies with the Democrat controlled Congress starting in 2006. Obama just doubled down on the already bad.
As a land locked nation with an obvious lack of viable logistical routes the force size for Afghanistan should never have gone beyond twenty to thirty thousand troops. Or the maximum that can be supported entirely by air using only the Air Forces transport fleet.
Some of the post 2006 to 2008 blame is W’s, the buck does stop there. And some of the blame lies with the enemy, who after all, does have a say in the matter. That’s why they’re called the enemy…
Tim: I’ve seen those kind of small unit tactics (and bad shooting) before and I’ve never been in uniform or in real combat (DC drug wars don’t count). They appear to be “learning” their tactics from First Person Shooter video games. Maybe this isn’t such a bad thing? There are no re-spawns in real life…
Jalalabad has a US brigade HQ, a US bn, at least one ANA bn and a US PRT yet the Taliban seem able to plant bombs in the city. Kandahar has 20,000 odd NATO employees yet the city is close to being under the control of the Taliban.
NATO troops do not bring security except to the ground they are standing on.
Please don’t give anyone ideas about putting US troops in Zaranj. They aren’t needed and the last thing we need is more EOF incidents.
1. Principles of COIN seem damnably hard to implement.
2. My association with them was: “Oh, that’s what we did three years ago. This is what we’re doing now….”
3. The military leadership is cautious. Don’t want to field troops without goggles, body armor, protected vehicles.
4. Casualties don’t play well with their superiors, inside the beltway or with the US public at large.
5. We need a uniformed, trained, flagged opponent -just like ourselves -but inferior and able to be defeated with minimal losses.
6. Adding to the difficulty, Congress and high level Department of Defense leadership want demonstrable progress.
7. The thousand tiny victories and maintenance of stability are useless politically to #6.
8. Think COIN ops are not compatible with a 2011 departure.
9. People who think that departure is contingent on the situation in AF are naive.
10. We have a long tradition of declaring victory, packing our trash and leaving -regardless of the situation on the ground.
11. By the time people got around to calling Vietnam a defeat, all the principals were dead or approaching senescence. The Pols may not know how to manage a war, but they are aware of that fact.
12. Still think we should play to our real strength and buy the SOB’s off.
When our commander in chief, the great lawyer/warrior/sophist Obama-Mao places up for confirmation a woman (perhaps just a simple lesbian, nothing more per S. Freud’s perspectives) whose greatest claim to fame is the “denial” of ROTC at Harvard; don’t we kinda get (somewhat), after the “tail wags the dog” feelings; that those in “our” military uniforms could just possibly be “simple fleas” on this “big dog” (the evil US), to be shoved around as necessary to get this animal to do what that “wonderfully so smart and very cerebral” former community organizer demands to be done?
Are we to lament, as presented in your pictures, the obvious “stupidity” of those simple minded, religious freaks within Islam, those Muslims who choose to blow themselves up for Allah…or do we take the time to notice “our expenditures and mounting debts” when transversing through every American airport prior to removing our shoes and submitting to full body scans?
Who is really stupid here? Those dumb looking Afghans standing around waiting to get hired to repair the bomb damage for those few rich people or government, as seen in your pictures for this posting…?
Are you so sure?
This is really what’s important: Diversity, gays, no profiling…and you want to be an American military warrior defending these people who presently lead us?
As Holder ponders where to bring to trial the “mastermind” of 9/11, great warrior of words that he be…you want your kid to wander down some street in the land of “walls” so that Bill Clinton can ask us to pay his wife’s debts? What about those 3 SEALS who were acquitted; their defense costs?
It’s no wonder our troops are creating hardened compounds in those two countries instead of walking the beat all the time with the natives.
Our elected leaders don’t have “their backs” at all!
Vote these bums out of office, sooner, rather than later!
Excellent post, as usual. The play-by-play analysis of the raid was really interesting. On question for you, though: In the two pictures of the failed attempts to breach that last wall, there are a ton of strikes on the wall, some very far from the blast point. Are these bullet strikes, or frag from the suicide vests?
I always look forward to hearing your insights, as there is virtually no word from the streets of Afghanistan these days. Stay safe, and thanks!
Those are from frag (mostly ball bearings) packed into the vests.
The Financial Times is reporting today that the cost for “security” for each truck on the Kandahar to Kabul road is now at least 1000 dollars Is this accurate ? How much of this might be going to the Taliban ?
For obvious reasons I can’t answer firsthand but…
I’ve seen similar amounts mentioned for the same route over the last couple of years. I think there might even be something on it buried back in Tim’s archieves.
I would think that how much goes to the Talib depends entirely on who owns (provides security, sets up shakedown points) each particular stretch of that road and who they are allied with. There are many owners.
Regardless, it is safe to say that we have been paying the Talib to protect our supply lines from the Talib, for quite a while now.
babatim thanks for posting the report.And a big thank you to Tim of Panjwayi for writing and shearing his thoughts. With Iran so close by,should they move up more ANA/ANP or would this make more thing tense.?
Nobody wants to be the President Who Lost Afghanistan. Thats why Obama did what he did despite all evidence that it won’t ever work. Bush f’ed up in Afghanistan hugely in favor of the big lie in Iraq. He fumbled whatever small window of opportunity we may have had there.
“When our commander in chief, the great lawyer/warrior/sophist Obama-”
Grow up. I’m gonna bet you didn’t have much to say about the Chickenhawk in Chief and incompetent corporate today Bush. he had no problem at all with the massive loss of life his policies caused on either side. He was a desertrer in time of war even though his daddy got him a cushy NG seat.
hat tip to Aaron at Internet Haganah
Not sure if this confirms my “video game training” comment or not, but it sure looks that way.
Jarhead50: Are you sure you can’t find some far left commie blog you can infest with that feces?
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