Jalala-Not So Bad and Not So Good

Security incident rates around Afghanistan are skyrocketing and this year it appears that Jalalabad is, for the first time,  going to get its fair share of attention.  This unfortunate fact is forcing outside the wire implementers to spend an inordinate amount of time tea drinking and jaw jacking with various local officials and ISAF people in order to get a handle on  just how safe we are.  My assessment?  We’re in for a bad summer, but not as bad a summer as the few internationals working outside the FOB’s  in the south.  There are two reasons for this; the first is most of us working outside the wire in the east have been here a long time and have developed networks to local people who provide both warning and protection.  The second thing going in our favor  is that the attacks are amateurish and stupid; even if we were being targeted, the chances of being caught in an effective attack are minimal.  This is clearly not the case in the southern region of Afghanistan where al Qaeda operatives are lending technical expertise and the Quetta Shura is able to funnel in ample amounts of money and munitions.

The suicide VBIED attack outside Darlaman Palace in Kabul earlier in the month demonstrated how bad it can get when the Taliban score a semi professionally constructed vehicle borne IED and get it into the city of Kabul.  Four Americans and one Canadian soldier were killed in that attack (along with scores of Afghan civilians which nobody seems to be too upset about), but the Taliban do not have the ability to build car bombs of that nature (reportedly 1600 pounds of military grade explosives) in large numbers.

Here is the story board of incidents from the last 10 days in Jalalabad – previously an island of calm and safety in Eastern Afghanistan:

Last Tuesday morning I looked out from my office window to see the clear signature of a tanker attack on the Jbad truck by-pass.  It turned out to be a magnetic mine- the trucker disconnected from the fuel tanker and pulled away allowing the Jalalabad Fire Department to extingish the blaze in less than 15 minutes - note the brand spanking new fire rig in the background
18 MAY: A magnetic mine detonates on the rear of a fuel tanker. The driver disconnected his truck from the fuel tanker and pulled away allowing the Jalalabad Fire Department to extinguish the blaze in less than 15 minutes - note the brand spanking new fire rig in the background. The Jalalabad FD is getting good at this which is most fortunate as they are going to get much more practice very soon
This is what local magnetic IED's look like.  They are big, obvious, not too powerful and it is hard to imagine that they were attached to the fule truck for very long without being spotted.   My guess is these things are being attached to the rear truck of these fule convoys at the customs station about 4 miles to the east.
This is what locally fabricated magnetic IED's look like. They are big, obvious, not too powerful and it is hard to imagine that they were attached to the fuel truck for very long without being spotted. My guess was these things are being attached to the rear truck of fuel convoys at the customs station about 4 miles to the east. But it may be they are all being placed on trucks by motorcycle borne villains. The last picture tells that story and it is pretty gruesome - so close this post if you are eating a meal or reading this around the kids because you have to get past the last picture for more insightful commentary.
The local people spontainoulsly cheer when they see new fire trucks like this one roll through the streets
The local people spontaneously cheer when they see new fire trucks like this one roll through the streets. This proof that given unlimited time and unlimited amounts of OPM (other peoples money) that the State Department can, in a little less than a decade, actually do something worthy of mention despite confining themselves to FOBs or the super plush embassy compound.
20 May The morning statrted with a bang - a small IED detonated at around 0700 beside the main road running through downtown Jalalabad.  This was yet another in a string of nusiance attacks which cause little damage and rarely any injuries
20 MAY The morning statrted with a bang - a small IED detonated at around 0700 beside the main road running through downtown Jalalabad. This was yet another in a string of nusiance attacks which cause little damage or injury.
20 May - Minutes after the IED went off downtown another low order explosion occured just outside the ISAF base at the Jalalabad Airfield.  The exposive were in a van and several more low order explosions went off as the van burned. The driver bailed out and escaped.
20 MAY - Minutes after the IED went off downtown another low order explosion occured just outside the ISAF base at the Jalalabad Airfield. The exposives were in a van heading east from the Pakistan border - several more low order explosions went off as the van burned. The driver bailed out and escaped.
20 May - A bunch of crates full of bananas spilled out of the burning van as the driver abruptly pulled off the road and bailed out - look at what was underneath the bananas - old crappy nasty Soviet ordnance.  The Sov's used TNT based explosives for their military - we use C4 and other much more stable explosives for ours.  Old soviet rounds tend to have rust all over them and to leach out a clear chemical smelling fluid called Nitro Glycerine (I know how much more stupid and irresponsible can you be) which is unstable and prone to ignite at the most inoppurtune times.
Crates full of bananas spilled out of the burning van as the driver abruptly pulled off the road and bailed out - look at what was underneath the bananas - old crappy nasty Soviet ordnance. The Sov's used TNT based explosives for their military - we use C4 and other much more stable explosives for ours. Old soviet rounds tend to have rust all over them and to leach out a clear chemical smelling fluid called Nitroglycerin which is unstable and prone to ignite at the most inopportune times.
23 May - A small explosion occured during the evening at the Nangarhar Customs lot which is a mile or so to the east of the Jalalabad Airfield - this appears to be another magnetic mine.
23 MAY - A small explosion occured during the evening at the Nangarhar Customs lot which is a mile or so to the east of the Jalalabad Airfield - this appears to be another magnetic mine.
24 May - a low order detnation occurs as a clearly marked NGO vehicle is driving on this main road just outside of Jalalabad.  The blast ruptures the vehicle radiator and it costs to a stop
24 MAY - a low order detonation occurs as a clearly marked NGO vehicle is driving on this main road just outside of Jalalabad. The blast ruptured the vehicles radiator and it coasted to a stop down the road
It turns out the explosion was a small amount of HME (home made explosives) placed under a Mk7 anti tank mine which did not have a fuse.  It was also a remotly controlled bomb - this is the transmitter.  Had the Mk7 function proerly that white truck woud have done about 7 Chetta flips in the air before crashing back to earth.
It turns out the explosion was a small amount of HME (home made explosives) placed under a Mk7 anti tank mine which did not have a fuse. It was also a remotely controlled bomb - this is the transmitter. Had the Mk7 functioned properly the NGO truck would have done about 7 Cheetah flips in the air before crashing back to earth.
25 May - Another limpet mine attack on a fule truck traveling the Jalalabad trauck by-pass
25 MAY - Another limpet mine attack on a fuel truck traveling the Jalalabad truck by-pass. This time the truck didn't catch on fire.

28 MAY - Moments before blowing themselves up the dynamic motorcycle duo correctly placed a mine on this truck some four miles west of their final act of sabatoge
28 MAY - Two men on a motorcycle attach a limpit mine to this truck at around 1000 in the morning - the mine functions shortly after it is attached to the fuel trailer.
28 May - Two men on a motorcycle attach a limpet mine to the back of this truck but.......
28 May - The armed two man hit team attach a limpet mine to the back of this truck about 5 minutes later but.......
The mine functions upon placement turning the villians into crispy critters
The mine functions upon placement turning the villians into crispy critters
D'OH!!!!
D'OH!!!!

Allow me to provide some expert analysis; here it is…..ready?  I have no idea what the hell this is all about.  Normally tanker attacks are conducted to cover up fuel thefts but all these tankers were full.  Normally IED’s are directed at some sort of target but for the last three months the IED’s going off in Jalalabad (with two exceptions covered in previous posts) have been small scale nuisance attacks designed to limit damage and casualties.  So I have no idea what to make of it.  All the local officials we talk to are adamant that the internationals working reconstruction projects are as safe now as they have always been.  They contend the failed anti tank mine attack on locals driving a clearly marked NGO vehicle (and it is stupid to be in a vehicle which is marked with international NGO logos and stickers of an AK47 with a read circle and line drawn through it showing the occupants are unarmed and proud of it) was a simple mistake.

Just last night I saw a report from Jalalabad (I am in Dubai on R&R) that two vehicles had a collision right outside the main gate to the Jalalabad Airfield; both drivers were brought in for questioning  and one of the drivers went back outside the gate to get his  paperwork and took off running into the night.  Upon inspection his vehicle was full of military grade explosives.

There are two things in play which probably account for the disturbing spike in incidents around Jalalabad.  The first is Kandahar.  The Governor of Nanagarhar Province is the honorable Agha Gul Sherzzai who is the head of a powerful Kandahar family and who fought with the US back in 2001 to rid Kandahar of Taliban.  He was moved to Nangarhar Province in 2005 by President Karzai who then moved his brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai (AWK)  up to be the head of the provincial council in Kandahar.  Those of you who have been paying any attention at all to Afghanistan can instantly read between the lines.  For the rest of you read this in order to break the code.

The second factor in play is ISAF – despite all the talk of ‘focusing on the population” and “population centric warfare” ISAF in general and the American army specifically are doing nothing of the sort.  The Americans have a unit on the border crossing at Torkham but those guys just sit on the road all day doing nothing and they  go back to the FOB every evening.  They inspect nothing, they mentor nobody, they serve little purpose outside of providing  an armed American presence at that crossing.  The Americans have “rule of law specialists” who are fobbits – they do sortie out to the Nangarhar ANP HQ about two to three times a month so they can drink tea and play grab ass with their ANP counterparts but what is the point?  What the hell can you accomplish in a three hour visit?

Until our actions on the ground include teaming up with the ANP; embedding into their units and patrolling with them  we will continue to see tons and tons of explosives rolling across the border daily and guess what happens next?  This happens – Afghan insurgents learn to destroy key U.S. armored vehicle.   I have written at least a dozen times on the folly of trying to answer tactical problems with technology.  Now even the McClatchey news service has figured that out. Maybe given more time and unlimited amounts of OPM the brass will figure this out too.  They need to relearn the timeless military lesson that you lose more troops trying to protect them with a passive operational posture and “advanced” technology then you do using aggressive offensive action.  If we’re here to fight, lets fight – if  not lets go home – its that simple.

15 Replies to “Jalala-Not So Bad and Not So Good”

  1. Hi,

    Since I’m totaly new to your blog, there are lot of acronyms that I don’t understand and need to guess them from the context.
    Is there any chance that you could write sometime a short dictionary-alike post? E.g. OPN, IED (found that already at G.) etc? If not, that’s ok, will just learn more 🙂

  2. Interesting about the harassing attacks. I wonder if that is an indication that the attackers might be locals that purposely ‘screw up’ attacks. Meaning they have to attack if they do not want the heat from the Taliban, but they also don’t want to be too effective and hurt friends and family. Or better yet, they don’t want to scare off the cash cows called USAID and others who are dolling out the projects and business?

    Tim Said- “Maybe given more time and unlimited amounts of OPM the brass will figure this out too. They need to relearn the timeless military lesson that you lose more troops trying to protect them with a passive operational posture and advanced technology then you do using aggressive offensive action.”

    What is interesting with the history of warfare is that the things that usually determined a tipping point or turn around in a war, were very basic concepts. The themes I keep stumbling upon is that in order to defeat someone, you need to match them or copy them, you need to have more courage than them, you need to be more pragmatic than they are, and you need to find a technological advantage that will give you the edge over the enemy. And all of that stuff requires a leader to drive the whole process and insure a learning organization is in place, and continuous improvement is happening.

    My latest favorite war fighter innovator, was none other than John Coffee Hays of Texas Rangers fame. He copied the Comanche’s tactics (horsemanship, stampeding, tracking, survival) and identified their tactical weaknesses during the Indian Wars(killing chiefs, stampeding horses, charging), he had extreme courage and commitment, was a leader of men that helped put the Rangers on the map, used his Indian scouts to ‘find and know his enemy’, and most of all, used a technological advance called the repeating pistol to dish out some serious damage upon his foes. Without him and his Rangers, Colt firearms probably would have never existed because these were the guys that first used the repeating pistol in combat and gave the thing value. In fact, it made the pistol a must have to survive in the west.

    Going back to what Tim said. Are we copying the Taliban, and exploiting their weaknesses?(out Taliban the Taliban) Are we using scouts(interps or former Taliban) to understand and locate the Taliban? Are we more courageous than the Taliban in our fighting, and do we have leaders who are driving that kind of fight? And do we have a technological advantage?

    The other question I have is why are we not using more weapons that have a further reach than the enemy? The law of weapons in warfare is to always use weapons that are more powerful, more accurate and have further reach than your enemy’s weapons. For this fight, all the troops should be carrying 7.62 based weapons.(logistics would be simpler too–M 240’s) There are plenty of platforms to shoot that caliber out of, but to me, we should at least be matching if not exceeding the weapons the Taliban are using against us(lee enfields, PKMs, Dragunovs, etc.) The M-4 is great for the close up stuff. I think the the LMT 308 would be a good start as infantry weapon, and the British seem to think so as well. The G3 or FAL would work too. The M14 works too. Just get a higher caliber weapon in the hands of the grunts. Put optics on the things too, and there is plenty of stuff to use out there to make our grunts more lethal and accurate with their fires.

    The other one is weight. Why are we overburdening our troops with all that junk they carry? Our guys are having to chase combatants down who are wearing running shoes and man dresses. They might be armed with an Ak and a couple of mags, and that’s it. In turn, we have loaded our troops with equipment and armor that slows them down and contributes to the enemy being able to run away to fight another day. Worse yet, try running up a mountain with all that junk on, and then you start to understand the logic behind the Taliban kit. Mobility, mobility, mobility. It’s like walking versus riding a horse in the wild west, and mobility is key in warfare.

    Mobility also applies to our MRAPs versus the motorcycle or pickup the Taliban uses. The enemy knows to pick escape routes that will not allow for a military vehicle to travel on. They will also pick escape routes that will slow down troops that are overburdened with kit. Our love affair with heavy bulky vehicles, and heavy over burdened troops, is ultimately what is creating a tactical disadvantage.

    Most importantly, what do the troops think? Let them figure out what is needed, and allow them to lighten up and get more lethal. Battlefield innovation only happens, if those out in the field have the ultimate in freedom to decide what is best to defeat an enemy. Troops get pretty innovative after they have see some of their buddies killed or wounded, and soon all of their mental energies are focused on the best way to find and kill the enemy. We should never hinder that drive and innovation.

    To be heavily kitted up or having smaller caliber weapons might have worked in Iraq–because it is flat with lots of cities that are built up. But in Afghanistan, being light and mobile yet having bigger caliber weapons, could be a game changer in this fight. Especially if the Taliban are such poor shots and have such crappy weapons. That and we need to out Taliban the Taliban in all areas– governance, local support, weapons, tactics, strategy etc. We have plenty of technological advances to draw from, we just need to get back to the basics of warfare and learn from the past and from our current fight.

    As for the other key component to this war–politics, I will only say what everyone else has been saying. If Afghans have no respect for their government, do not trust the government, or worse yet, hate their government for what it has done, then all of the other stuff related to the war is kind of a non-point. Why would a police officer or soldier want to fight for or support such a thing? Especially if the very people they are defending, despises that government? The question I have, and I am not qualified to answer, is what kind of governance and government would the people of Afghanistan want or need? The political/diplomatic portion of this war, is very important, because the Taliban shadow government is doing all they can to prove they are a better idea than the Afghan government.

    1. Why are we overburdening our troops with all that junk they carry?

      You know why. Fear. Fear of being crucified, court-martialed and cashiered for not requiring all your troopies to wear and carry every freaking pound of Personal Protective Equipment every second they are outside the wire. Somebody might get hurt!

      Too few Americans believe there is anything or anybody in Afghanistan worth dying for to tolerate many casualties or accept much risk. Some ballsy Captain authorizes his guys to shed their anchors and run down bad guys, what happens? His guys catch bad guys, maybe, but who really cares anymore, and who back in the rear even learns of such successes? Or his guys get shot up and the media jumps on it and he’s toast.

    2. Good post Matt. You hit on just about every one of the major problems OEF seems to be facing.

      Regarding weaponry, I was talking to a former Green Beret buddy of mine about 5.56 vs 7.62 weapons, and he said that for both of his tours in Iraq he was actually very happy to use 5.56. He said the round does its job very well if it hits bone, and that it is MUCH lighter than 7.62 NATO ammo. Furthermore, 7.62 weapons are significantly heavier than weapons chambered for 5.56, and while your points about mobility are excellent, the other gear just isn’t going away anytime soon. Adding the extra pounds of 7.62 equipment and ammo would reduce mobility of infantrymen even further.

      The solutions to the tactical problems are there, waiting to be discovered, but it will take freedom for company- and field-grade officers to innovate for us to discover them. There seems to be relatively little aggressive action being taken by our forces these days, at least none that we hear about. As David Petraeus said, the CG “sets the tone” for the troops under his command. I was thrilled when McChrystal said he wanted to turn the Officer’s Club patio in Kabul (?, might have been Kandahar) into a rifle range, but since then I’ve seen nothing but regulations: minimum 4 MRAPs to a convoy, must wear eye protection off the FOBs, tight restrictions on use of airpower, etc. etc. While these may have been instituted for good reasons, and may even be beneficial, it is contrary to the American way of warfare. We have always prized innovation on the battlefield, and it has rewarded us with victory in almost every war we’ve fought.

      Tim, you summed it up perfectly: If we’re here to fight, lets fight if not lets go home its that simple. Well, we’re there, so let’s get to it and set our warriors loose.

  3. Afghan insurgents learn to destroy key U.S. armored vehicle link goes to O Brother Where Art Thou link.

    http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/11/05/78443/afghan-insurgents-learn-to-destroy.html

    I used to be a tanker. MRAP’s piss me off. Force Protection Taxi’s for Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles. Good for Route Clearance and Counter Mine, poor for Motorized Riflemen. Somewhat mobile pillboxes.

    Close with and destroy the enemy by firepower, maneuver and shock

    We don’t seem to do that very much anymore.

  4. ‘If we’re here to fight, lets fight if not lets go home its that simple.” Agreed.

  5. If I were one of the bad guys, I would gather up my best fighters, my smartest true believers and have all of us line up to feed off of the drug business (they gonna need even more muscle, etc.); waiting for the “rich” Americans and their coerced friends to leave this part of the world, my world not theirs.

    I would send the young and very stupid true believers and those that owed us old guys favors to do some attempts at killing others and general disruption of everyday life.

    Meanwhile, I would watch my television to see how the American media tells me all will be ok and that the Americans are more worried over hurting some fish, some birds, some beach plants, and every now and then one of their soldiers over here, in my home country where life moves on as we have known it and desire it to be so.

    I would watch Obama-Mao do his lawyer dances of bobbing and weaving through a vast forest of words as he organized all those who believed America was a bad, bad country.

    Stupid Americans…Obama is in Chicago, not at Arlington saying thanks in person to those who guaranteed America’s safety and continuation!

  6. Full tankers – logistics.

    Slow escalation – it’s still early.

    Watch where the pro’s and the crew-served go.

    Towr Kham – Chamen.

    Nuristan is a floodgate.

    Burn Razmak to the ground, they moved.

    Bobs Roberts got to Kandahar faster the 3rd/10th did. In 1880, on foot.

    PARRALLEL
    LINES,
    R

  7. aww it’s the sopranos sending a message. They wish a piece of the trucking contract. Karzai INC.

  8. what to make of it ??? a demand for higher security fees is being negotiated. BETTER PAY UP SUCKER

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