Irregular Warfare
Recently the Pentagon released a Department of Defense Directive on Irregular Warfare. This has been greeted with a few articles in the press and much discussion amongst the various players on the ground in Afghanistan. When you see documents that say “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff shall” that is a powerful piece of paper from on high and thus to be treated with a certain amount of reverence by military aficionados. There are a finite number of people in the world who can task four star generals or deputy secretaries of defense so guys like us pay attention when they publish directives. Professionals in the business study them if they were the Dead Sea Scrolls. We engage in endless discussions about meaning, intent, who wrote it, what it will mean on the ground; really boring stuff to normal folks. This comment came from a discussion thread amongst a group I correspond with regularly.
“I find it particularly interesting that DoD would come up with a “Directive of the obvious”… For all of its claims the Army as an organization doesn’t learn so quickly. I suppose that it took years of doing the same things expecting different results for the light to shine on reality. Not to be condescending in any way; I am glad to see the directive has been introduced. I hope that it grows roots quickly and flourishes… There is a full-spectrum under which many current peripheral entities can be brought to bear in order to surpass the expectations that DoD may currently have.”
I could not have said it better myself; it will be interesting to see how this directive impacts the template used by the U.S. military as it introduces more maneuver units into the country. Reports in the press indicate that the Army is planning on sending combat units in to Loghar and Wardak Provinces which are just outside of Kabul. The Marine Corps appears to be preparing at to deploy in expeditionary force strength into the south. That could mean up to three infantry regiments of Marines with all their supporting arms and logistics. That is a lot of gunfighters. They bring their own supporting arms and aircraft too which can generate overwhelming firepower with speed and precision. Nobody can take the kind of punishment Marines can generate on the fly no matter how many virgins may or may not be waiting for enemy fighters on the other side. Marine units in the south have proven that they can roll around at platoon strength and literally beat Taliban fighters like a drum even when facing ambushers who have a 10 1 advantage. Not only can they break units that size but do so without taking casualties themselves. That is pretty damn impressive performance by any standard of measurement. The Question is – does it matter?
The Taliban are controlling large swaths of Afghanistan not because they are better fighters they are beating the Karzai regime because they bring better governance in the areas they control. The people know that a Taliban tribunal will not award land and water rights based on the largest bribe. They also know that once issues of this nature are settled the dispute is officially over and the loser has no choice but to accept the ruling. Fire fights between families involved in land and water disputes are frequent and bloody affairs unless the Taliban controls the area. In those areas the losing party must accept the Taliban ruling or they will cut his head off. People tend to cooperate in a system like that.
But they don’t like it too much and would rather see a platoon of Marines or Army soldiers hanging around than a crew of religious zealots. It would be a pleasant surprise to see the Army and Marine units who flow into the country next year deployed down to the district level. I suspect that there will be tentative steps to branch out like that and these steps will involve what the new directive terms “civilian-military teams.” That will be really interesting to see and I believe strongly that small teams working at the district level can, if properly funded and deployed, make a huge difference in the battle to control the only thing that matters in Afghanistan and that’s the people. The mixing of civilian experts with the military in the current Human Terrain Team program has not gone well and I don’t care what you read in the press on the subject believe me when I say the program is an abject (multi-million dollar) failure. HTT teams can only venture off base when embedded with large American convoys and therefore seldom get out. Because their offices are on base they use the military computer networks which will not allow them to access the very Jihadist website they are supposed to be monitoring. They will not be a useful tool to any commander until they are let off base and given the freedom of action to move about their areas of responsibility, develop relationships with the tribal elders and basically gather the information the program is supposed to gather.
One hopes that is what the “civilian military teams” end up doing. Add in a few security guys, an agriculture expert or two, some construction types, and irrigation specialist and maybe a female medic and you have a little group of civilian-military warriors capable of going out daily in separate teams to do good deeds. They would all need to be armed and may well have to fight from time to time but when you are at the district level and know the district power structure every time you have to fight or take an IED strike you can go right back to the Shura with a well deserved “WTF?” “You guys promised this would stop if we came in here to help better let me know who did this and what you did to them.” Or words to that effect it is a different way to fight but could prove very effective if we give those types of tactics a chance to mature.
Getting ready for a road mission. The guy on the right is our buddy Brandon who just graduated college and is in Nangarhar teaching orphans English which he may have thought to be a good ploy for getting chicks. It's not working our for him that way yet but he's a good kid
We were able to conduct a “civilian military team” field trial a few days ago on a road mission to Kabul. The Army guys are digitized due to their current assignments. They were able to use our unarmored vehicles and we wore local hats and scarves not really making too big an effort to blend in but not looking that military either. This was a demonstration of why we prefer unarmored local vehicles for most road missions and they caught on fast. One of the Captains remarked that he never really got to see too much of the country from because the visibility out of armored humvees is so restricted. They also marveled at how we attracted absolutely no attention except for in the busy, narrow main street of Surobi. We also rolled up (at speed of course) on a French convoy which gave the boys an excellent opportunity to experience the joy of low visibility ops as the a Frenchman on a .50 cal swung the barrel towards just in case we hadn’t figured we should stop on our own. I hate that kind of thing because you never know who is behind that massive machinegun I have been shot at by both the British and American armies once in an American embassy vehicle and the other in a brand new armored truck which belonged to the ambassador of Japan. If you can get shot at in large embassy vehicles bearing diplomatic plates imagine what can happen on a lonely stretch of road outside Surobi, which to the French is a modern Waterloo. It turned out when the convoy passed us that the machinegunner was female. I don’t know if that makes it more or less likely that she would be quick on the trigger but do know that rolling through Pashtun villages with woman pointing machineguns at everyone they pass is about as stupid an idea as I have heard in a long time. Whoever thought that a good idea should join the current democratic US congress he’d find himself surrounded by like minded geniuses. You can’t buy stupidity that profound on the open market you have to elect it. At least in America you do don’t know what the France’s excuse could be.
Ah yes using local transport - always a good deal
The boys got to enjoy all the perks of using locally procured transport including the monkey drill of changing tires using the local jacks the original equipment never seems to survive the trip to Afghanistan for some reason. More importantly they got to “feel” the road to Kabul like we do and we do not consider the people using that road a threat. The military travels in convoys and do not allow the local vehicles to get near them. They do this to avoid being hit by “suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices” (VBIED’s.) But it is impossible for a turret gunner to recognize a potential VBIED, orient on it and engage it before it slams into them from the opposite lane. That’s a function of the OODA loop an infantry 101 subject understood (in theory) by every infantry officer and SNCO in America. Many gunners have thought they spotted one and engaged it killing the occupants inside. To the best of my knowledge they have never stopped a VBIED and have killed over 400 civilians who were driving aggressively but were not VBIED’s. In the south Canadian and British forces force all traffic off the road to prevent VBIED’s. That is an easy tactic for VBIED’s to beat they just pull off to the side and wait for the vehicles to draw abreast of them. In the east sometimes all the traffic will pull off to the side and sometimes it won’t it can be confusing and very tense to run up on an American convoy at speed; we always just pull over. I once saw a patrol of Humvees allowing the local traffic to intermix with them and pass like they would Afghan Army convoys that was smart because the Taliban doesn’t like killing innocent Afghans too much. Kill the wrong ones and you may find a little “badal” (pashtun concept of blood debt) action heading your way which can cost experienced leaders. Unemployment is high in Afghanistan on any given day you can see 6 to 7 thousand military aged males just hanging out around Jalalabad and the surrounding districts who would welcome a good blood feud for the sense of purpose it brings them. Plus it is something to do even the most dim witted amongst us would get tired of squatting on a wall watching the traffic go by every day no matter how much hash he was smoking.
One of the Army officers had "good glass" on his camera and took this photo which I think looks pretty damn cool - if I say so myself
Using unarmored local vehicles with light body armor and fighting kit is another option. This appears to be taking unwarranted risks but I’ll let the quote below from Col David Hackworth, lifted from an excellent article in the Small War Journal by Sgt Michael Hanson, USMC, to address that issue.
“In Vietnam, today’s most successful infantry tactics and techniques were yesterday’s heresy and madness. When these ‘overly reckless’ ideas were first introduced by farseeing innovators in 1965 and 1966, few commanders took them seriously. Most, because of parochial conventional orientation, looked upon these new concepts with contempt not unlike many reactionary English lords’ attitude toward the longbow before Crecy. But today in Vietnam, these once ‘wild schemes’ have become standard drill. These bold techniques have changed the thrust of the war from uneconomical multi brigade operations to fights that are fought almost exclusively by the squad and platoon.”
He says it better than I can it was true in Vietnam, and it is true today we need to win the people and that means being in the districts with them 24/7. We can do it and do it for pennies on the dollar we currently spend to support our forces in the field. But only if we reach back to our past and remember how to conduct independent small unit operations on a very large scale. Not by using more command and control but by pushing the decision making very low and allowing our military to focus on stability operations. Throw in some augmentation to facilitate reconstruction, medcaps, and mentoring of local officials and now you’re talking solutions. Let them live and move around like myself and the thousands of others outside the wire and you’re talking change. Change you can really believe in because it will cost billions LESS than we are spending now. That’s the kind of change I can believe in effective and cheap.
One last point and the topic of my next post America cannot bring security to the rural population of Afghanistan if every time they interact with that population they treat them as potential enemy fighters. The military believes “force protection” is the job number one and I have listened to officers wax eloquent on the subject of protecting their men and woman no matter what because this country is not worth the noble sacrifice that their young troopers would represent if they lost life or limb here. I have used all my self control to avoid kicking these idiots in the teeth which is what they deserve. That kind of thinking will lead to our defeat just as certain as day follows night. It is ridiculous and based on an inflated self centered egotism which I find alarming. Infantry officers are paid to think to think about the best way to beat those who ask for it while maintaining the cohesion and high morale amongst their troops. The job of military leaders is to spend blood, American blood, and spend it wisely in pursuit of the missions and objectives given them by their civilian masters. I know what those masters have said is our mission in Afghanistan. I also know the current American TTP (tactics, techniques and procedures) do not in any way support the mission they have been given and in fact do the exact opposite by alienating the very population we are supposed to be “winning.” I might be being a little harsh here but how else do you explain the performance of our military to date? Sure they can fight like demons against the Taliban in the south but the Taliban in the south are not the same ones who currently own every province around Kabul except Laghman which is only half Taliban. So what difference does it make killing hundreds of Taliban in the south while a majority of the population (not in the south) falls to Taliban control.
Another cool photo shot with the good glass - this is the Mahipar Pass outside Kabul
It is time for some “outside the box” thinking and last week’s demonstration we hope will lead to more discussions between the big base behind the wire military and all the other internationals in Afghanistan who feel safer at night on the streets of Kabul or Jalalabad than we do in Washington DC or Chicago. I say “Big Base Behind the Wire” because I know and correspond with men in the various embedded training teams who see things exactly the same way I do. Inshallah they will rapidly move into positions of influence God knows they have earned it by staying true to the warrior virtues which make American infantry the deadliest collection of fighters the world has ever known. And “force protection” is not one of those virtues.
Comments | 
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 12/10/2008 News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.
I like your way of thinking. Great articles. Keep it up, and watch your back.
Tim, Force Protection used to be just another element of the Principle of War, Security, and was something that commanders and their S-3’s did to protect their forces. Kosovo put our warriors in to potentially hazardous situations where they might be killed, but it was recognized at that time that there was nothing in the Balkans worth losing an American over. FP sprang up as a discipline to allow us to posture and pretend that we mean business when we put boots on the ground. Internal oppositional elements within our own polity use our casualties as PSYOP opportunities to degrade morale and reduce support for the war. Then they get all sanctimonious when they discover that every soldier doesn’t have a bullet-proof, EFP-proof vehicle to ride in, or that every soldier doesn’t have upper-arm and side panels for his IBA.
Americans aren’t raising as many sons to be warriors as we did 67 years ago. The few intact families left don’t have any spare sons to be sacrificed in far-away places for poorly explained reasons. Casualty aversion is as much a demographic factor as an ideological factor. The American people no longer trust the leadership not to squander our precious children’s lives stupidly, so the leaders keep as many fobbits imprisoned behind the wire as they can, busting people over reflective belts so they can cover their asses when somebody gets run over.
The object is not to kill Taliban, secure districts, or bring Afghanistan in to the 21st Century. The object is to get through 13 months without controversy, or anything bad that might be blamed on you.
Dear Sir,
I am a member of a Human Terrain Team and I live at a combat outpost and go out on foot patrols daily gathering useful cultural atmospherics. Please check your information. Obviously you do not have a clue what HTT members are doing or how they operate.
I know exactly what I’m talking about. I said the HTT’s cannot leave the base without being embedded in a military patrol, that they cannot access the websites they are supposed to monitor on the military system and that their ability to go out and interact with the locals is limited. What part of that did I get wrong? You said you go out on foot patrols daily. Foot patrols – are you kidding me? Do I need to get out the clue bat?
Well here it is – this country is larger than Iraq. It has more people than Iraq. These people are spread out all over this vast place because they live off livestock and substance farming. How many of those people are you going to impact by foot patrolling? How far do you go daily – 3 miles, 5 miles maybe 6? You could be making a positive impact on the few people you are interacting with daily but you are making no impact on the overall Afghanistan effort. Reaching out to the locals during combat patrols is Corporal level work – you’re getting paid more than an assistance Secretary of Defense and you’re foot patrolling.
Let me use a great scientific analogy to drive this point home. If you were a microbiologist and tested the soil near your FOB you would find anthrax. When you see anthrax in this analogy think armed Pashtun’s in opposition to the Karzai government. You report anthrax up the chain and the big guys on high say big deal – there is anthrax everywhere in Afghanistan due to centuries of pastoral herding. What counts with anthrax is being able to identify the species, family and phylum to determine if it is a virulent strain. You are persistent and bring in the experts who can identify the species, family and phylum of the anthrax you found and he determines that it is a very virulent strain and not organic to the area. Now you have peoples attention and they know how to focus their efforts to determine how the non native anthrax spores you found got there and if they are being weaponized. Then all you surveillance and patrolling efforts could be focused on looking for signatures of bio warfare, culture stock, incubators, milling equipment etc..
The point is Anthrax is not a threat to us in Afghanistan – unless it is a virulent strain which has milled down to around 3 microns and mixed with a suspension agent of some sort. Likewise the people of Afghanistan are not a threat to us unless they are a dedicated member of an armed opposition group (AOG.) You my friend are supposed to be the expert who can tell us the family, genus and phylum of the locals thus enabling the focus of effort described above. Can’t do that foot patrolling.
Do you go out without all the combat kit? Do you meet with elders on your own? Do you speak any Dari or Pashto? Do you know exactly which elders to go visit when something bad happens in one of your districts? For me the answer to all those questions is yes. You may have language skills (which is not standard with HTT’s) but the answer to my other questions for you is no. I know it is no. And if you can’t do what I can (as a one man regional security team for the Government of Japan) then what the hell is it you think you are accomplishing? Here is a tip – the elders won’t tell you a damn thing unless you invest the time to prove to them that you are really interested and want to make a difference. When they understand that the fire hose comes on and they will bombard you with information some of which will be a great use to your command and some of which will be worthless – knowing how to sort that out should be what the HTT personnel are doing. But that is graduate level stuff and you guys have yet to mature past the elementary school level. That is an analogy about the overall program – not a comment on program personnel some of whom I know well and admire greatly.
I have been on both sides of the fence – in uniform as am infantry officer and in local garb living outside the wire as a small businessman. I’ve got five years on the ground and more than just a little bit of experience with which to back my opinions. You’re part of a program that is broken and I am not the only one saying that. I think my blog speaks for itself and indicates to the casual reader that I “have a clue.” If I am missing something or if you want to join the web rings I run with please write back, but do so professionally – name calling is the sign of a weak intellect and poor command of the facts – I suffer from neither.
I don’t doubt your expertise, but am wondering about the numbers. Your proposal sounds as if it would involve significantly more boots on the ground than are currently planned for Afghanistan. If so, where will they come from?
Excellent points, and I am learning a lot from reading this blog.
Also I was kind of curious Tim, I found an article about the Hazaras and using them to police in Afghanistan. What are your thoughts about using these guys for police work over there? Graeme Wood wrote it for the New Yorker. I didn’t know if the reporter was full of it or if he did his homework on this one.
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/12/08/081208fa_fact_wood?currentPage=all
Hey Matt,
I absolutely agree that using Hazara’s or Tajiks down south is a great idea. Mr. Wood mentioned that there had been Tajik policemen in Kandahar before but that were little better than the locals. That has not been my experience when operating in the south. We always used the same crew of Tajik fighters from the Pansjhier and I they were very very good. I also liked the fact that I was with Afghans who were no more welcomed in the area than we were – all in it together if you will.
What I found strange about the article is how quickly their Canadian handlers broke contact and retreated when they had some initial success with their ambush. Breaking contact and running is dangerous, really dangerous and I wonder why they did that.
My assumption is that there was only the one Canadian mentor and he didn’t want to get in a big firefight without a wingman. Fair enough but still turning and running back to the station house is a good way to get shot. I also could not believe that after seven years there were districts in Kandahar Province that ISAF has left for the Taliban. There are 17,000 ISAF soldiers at the Kandahar Airfield and not all of them are maintainers – in fact most of the rear echelon support stuff is done by civilian contractors so what all the others are up to is a mystery to me.
Also a mystery is how the Hazara came to be Shia’s? I thought they were the remnants of the Golden Horde and they certainly had little to do with Persia after the Arabs converted them. A little mystery and not important but it has to be an interesting story.
And for Soldier’s Mom – thank you so much for the encouragement and interest you show in the FRI blog. You are right to be concerned about numbers – we have to anticipate that the numbers of deployable American combat units will decline. My idea’s would fit that scenario. I run around this country – even in contested areas – with the numerical equivalent of an American infantry squad. I am certain that American infantry platoons could travel anywhere they wanted in Afghanistan and be able to decisively punish anyone who dared take them on using their organic firepower. If deployed in dispersed formations they could also use the life support template used by the PSC’s operating in Afghanistan. Live in local compounds, eat local chow fixed by local cooks, obtain local transport to augment your mobility and you could send thousands of support troops home. We are running out of people, money and time – inshallah the leaders on high will adapt a more flexible approach soon.
Thanks, Tim, for your thoughtful, detailed response to my question. I hope that lots of the right people are reading this blog!
Tim said, “If deployed in dispersed formations they could also use the life support template used by the PSC’s operating in Afghanistan. Live in local compounds, eat local chow fixed by local cooks, obtain local transport to augment your mobility and you could send thousands of support troops home. We are running out of people, money and time – inshallah the leaders on high will adapt a more flexible approach soon.”
It’s my understanding that Afghanistan presents real logistical challenges and the Pakistani border crossings are untenable at times. It naturally follows that your statement describes a practical appraoch to the problem.
Asymmetrical warfare indeed.
Godspeed.
Thanks Tim. What is interesting about the economy right now, is that cheaper solutions for fighting this war will be looked at hard. Perhaps ‘warfare on the cheap’ will be the next big thing in today’s warfighter think groups? Can you imagine bringing in some old Rhodesian war vets to teach poor man’s COIN stuff at some of the war colleges and centers? Or how about this, if we can’t get enough troops to fight the Taliban, then let’s capture the Taliban and convert them, just like the Selous Scouts did with guerillas during the Rhodesian War? Now that is economy of force and war on the cheap! LOL Take care and Semper Fi.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Selous_Scouts
Tim San,
Some of the people working in Afghanistan have had about enough of the risk aversion that paralysis current military operations. I do understand from the military side of things that losing people is not preferred but think about it. They ‘force’ roads in areas where the locals want no part of development and does their reason for not wanting it really matter? It is STILL the AFGHANs country, right? Or do we continue to barricade ourselves in COPs and FOBs hoping that things change? If US lives are as precious is we make them out to be then why do act the way we do brining undue attention to ourselves while continuing to piss off the locals? My solution is, “Contractor COIN”. Less people more qualified and less risk adverse than military leader to get out amongst the populous and local leaders, not the higher strata ones that are lining their pockets with Uncle Sugar’s sweet milk from his teat…. and actually make a difference in Aghanistan as opposed to waging a one year war for 7 (+) years and showing no immediate signs of stability, development, (I love this buzz word that is bastardized constantly) ‘capacity’ we get things moving at a more rapid rate. The Afghans know that as long as the incursion remains manageable by the US military that we will continue to dump millions (+ or -) a couple of billion into corrupt leaders’ pockets in order for the US to feel good about ourselves. How about turning the issue over to those who don’t mind being here for the $$ and allow professionals to do what they are here to do. It would be performance based so if you don’t perform your time is done. Much less resources would be required and the bureaucracy would be minimized. Would there be some scandals? of course their would but aren’t there always? Oh, I know why it wouldn’t happen There wouldn’t be a chance to reward those serving in Kabul who do nothing but quagmire the process and have no idea that there is actually conflict going on outside of their disillusioned reality… What was I thinking? I encourage discourse regarding this topic.
Sir,
Never have thought to find this kind of input on current affairs in Afghanistan. Regards for giving us a chance to see it with Your eyes. If You do have the time and will to explain the current state of relations between the North and South parts of the country and their respective residents, please kindly do so.
How had the death of Ahmad Shah Massud affect the north? Anyone that can stand up for his man as he did? With the Taliban creeping back (if such) how are the norh folks reacting?
Taleban tax: allied supply convoys pay their enemies for safe passage
A security company owner explained that a vast array of security companies competed for the trade along the main route south of Kabul, some of it commercial traffic and some supplying Western bases, usually charging about $1,000 ( £665) a lorry. Convoys are typically of 40-50 lorries but sometimes up to 100.
I won’t name the company, but they are from the Panjshir Valley [in north Afghanistan]. But they have a very good relation with the Taleban. The Taleban come and move with the convoy. They sit in the front vehicle of the convoy to ensure security, said the company chief.
Leonid,
I think I might have addressed this in the “Traveling in the North” post but what is happening with the people up there is interesting.
We saw consistent reporting over the past two years that the warlords of the north were re-arming. That was reflected in a drop in the amount of weapons being collected in the joint UN Afghan government disarming and demobilize program which had been considered a success up till that point.
Now you see a climb in AOG (armed opposition group) incidents combined with high levels of armed criminality plaguing all the northern Provinces. The villagers up there will tell any international who cares to listen that it is grossly unfair to let the Pashtun in the south benefit from a booming poppy crop while simultaneously trying to disarm them. They will point to the criminality and AOG incident rate as proof that their early cooperation with the UN/AF Gov program has left them at the mercy of their traditional enemies who have grown stronger and now enjoy unlimited access to money and weapons. These feeling are aggravated by the snails pace of reconstruction, then further aggravated by a central government who most people feel are more lawless than the old Taliban and one which offers them no protection or services.
Add to that mix the feeling that Karzai is trying to marginalize their leaders – specifically Gen Dostum and his Lieutenants and what you have is a recipe for Civil War. It is impossible for us – security guys like me I should say – to gauge how serious a problem this is. Only the Embassy and our Intelligence agencies would be able to know that and I hope they do.
Amongst the international community working here the conventional wisdom is that the leaders in the north are using these grievances as leverage for getting more money and attention from both Kabul and the donor nations. I’m pretty sure we are reading the tea leaves correctly on this issue but if we aren’t….things could go very wrong very fast.
Interesting stuff. So would you care to speculate about what a few of these scenarios would look like, that would kick things off in Afghanistan? I know in Iraq, bombings were being used to create sectarian violence with the hopes of starting a civil war there. Will this tactic work in Afghanistan? Thanks. S/F
Interseting weapons the “army guys’ are carrying.
Big dude on the far left looks like he’s got an M-16 with a shorty stock, Eotech Halo Sight, some custom hardware but I can’t see a barrel past the hand guard. fuzzy pic or is that a big honkin’ 6.5?
And army guy next to Brandon seems to be sporting an AR pistol.
Nice CQB kit.
Fantastic post, Tim. Keep up the great work. You seem to have an excellent understanding of what the problems are in Afghanistan. Hope you don’t mind if I lend a bit of academic backing to what you say. Not from me, mind you, but then-Lt. Gen. David Petreaus.
In October of 2005 Petraeus returned from his second tour in Iraq to take command of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He took charge of the team that was writing what would eventually become the >U.S. Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, released on December 15, 2006.
FM 3-24 revolutionized how we fought the war in Iraq. The 5 additional surge brigades to bolster the existing 15 in Iraq weren’t just sent to do the same thing; there was a radical change in strategy. No more were we going to stay on our bases and only head out on raids (oversimplified but generally accurate). We moved our troops off the bases to live among the people (again oversimplified but generally accurate). We stopped “commuting to work.”
Not only did this lead to a more successful prosecution of the war, it also made our troops safer. Here is one of the key insights from 3-24:
In other words, get off the bases and be among the people. Get to know them personally. Know your area of operations backwards and forwards; economics, religious sects, clans, tribes, ancient rivalries, who owns every store and shop, what holidays the celebrate and how, who the village/clan/tribal leaders are, local politics, on and on. Yes kinetics are important. It’s just that alone firepower cannot win.
Petraeus’ team wrote about just this in FM 3-24
You can’t do this if your emphasis is on “force protection,” and indeed as stated above such an emphasis is counterproductive, as counterintuitive as that may sound. Now, I understand that it’s easy for me to sit here and type these words, never having served myself. And I’m not an original thinker here; all I’m doing is relaying what other more learned and experienced men and women have said.
Earning the trust of the people is critical to beating an insurgency. As Lt. Col. (Dr.) David Kilcullen wrote in FM 3-24
My .02
support of the population is critical. I say it is India, with their biological warfar intruding our
lives. I would like information on the purchase of warfare.
M no expert basicly a Indian civilian but yes your idea makes a lot of sense cause working at the grass roots and building friendly relations along with infastuctur and winning over the political locals at the grass roots is truly one of the best ways to win or at least slow down violence. it some what the strategy used by us to cope up with the violence created by naxals at least it seems to be the idea to me.
Thank you!