The Good Don’t Always Die Young

The Godfather of Free Range International – the man who pioneered the techniques, tactics and procedures we use to travel in remote districts was executed last week in Badakhshan Province. Dan Terry had been living in Afghanistan with his family for decades.  He was fluent in both Dari and Pashto, and despite knowing him for over 5 years, I don’t know really much more about him other than he was a humble man who was not comfortable talking about himself. I met Dan in 2005 when he was in Kabul through my physician friend Dr Keith Rose who also volunteers his expertise in Afghanistan. I learned later he was in town because he had brought in several children for free cleft palate surgery provided by the excellent CURE hospital in Kabul where they were his wife Seija head the nursing department. Dan was a religious man who used his love of God as inner strength to help lift up the poor he chose to live among – he had no interest in recounting his years of aid work for attention or pay.

When we were starting out in the security business he taught us how to operate safely, how easy it was to travel around the country (as long as you didn’t have big armored SUV’s) and how to seek food and shelter in remote districts if we ended up on foot for some reason. Dan taught how to operate as a westerner in Afghanistan; be true to your word, speak openly, greet warmly, and always smile.

om right to left Dan Terry, Dr. Keith Rose, and one of Dan's Drivers. This photo is a few years old and taken in front of the CURE hospital. Dr. Rose is one of those self funded doctors (in his case a plastic surgeon who fixes cleft palates and builds ears and noses for kids who had theirs removed by the Taliban) volunteering at the CURE hospital in Afghanistan.
One of the volunteer surgeons and Dan Terry outside the CURE hospital in 2006.

The story  about his loss broke yesterday after authorities recovered the remains of Dan and seven international doctors who had conducted an eye clinic in Nuristan Province. The team decided to take the longer, harder route back to Kabul through Badakshan Province because that part of the country is relatively free of Taliban gangs.

Press reports indicated that the local people warned Dan and Tom Little (team lead and another friend who’s been here for more than 3 decades) that the woods they were going to camp in were not safe but they went as planned telling the people they were doctors and that the Taliban would not molest them. That last fact has been true for many years in Afghanistan. Despite this precedent the Taliban claimed credit for this multiple murder but I find that hard to believe. Afghan Taliban groups don’t do that to western doctors who are traveling in harms way, unarmed and unafraid, to treat people in remote districts. At least they never have before.

Dan’s wife Seija is the director of nursing at CURE international and also makes long trips into the bad lands to bring modern midwife techniques to a population of women facing the highest childbirth mortality rate in the world. Dan and Seija, who raised their daughters in Afghanistan, worked for the United Methodist Church’s General Board of Global Ministries which is an ecumenical NGO based in Central Asia.

There are few men as selfless, patient, kind or as good as Dan Terry. So often it seems in life and especially in war that the good go first. Dan wasn’t a young man, he had lived a long life but he was, to all who knew him, a good man.

Dan was exceptionally gifted at operating outside the wire in the most remote areas of Afghanistan. He was the Godfather of Free Rangers and now we are forced to determine if the deteriorating security situation is going to allow us to or operate in the open. Clearly Dan thought he had a solid plan to get in and out of Nuristan Province. This time the plan failed and the manner in which his team was murdered portends poorly.  This is yet another indicator of how fast the security situation is changing in Afghanistan.  If there is any indication that things will turn around soon I’m not seeing it. Goodbye and God Bless to Dan and his crew…we are better people for having known you.

Getting After It

One of the Chim Chim’s dropped in for a visit last month.  He was on some sort of ISAF  inspection team which I didn’t ask too much about and told us that every-time he asked officers from the unit he was looking at what they were doing the reply was “getting after it.” They were getting after it by doing daily presence patrols and stopping every now and then to talk with the local villagers.  They then return to the FOB for the night. General Petraeus is getting ready to release a revision of the rules of engagement and early reports say he has included “you can’t commute to the battle” guidance just as he did in Iraq. That is sound tactical advice when the bad guys aren’t commuting to fight – they’re here, right now and exerting more influence then we have seen in the past.

The Taliban have been getting after the lucrative and popular DVD and CD shops all summer. This one was destroyed by about 3lbs of explosives which went off around midnight when it was empty.
The Taliban have been getting after the lucrative and popular DVD and CD shops all summer. This one was destroyed by about 3lbs of explosives which went off around midnight when it was empty.

 

As of three days ago every DVD and CD shop in Jalalabad closed their doors. These shops generate a lot of income and were very popular. Closing them all down is a big deal and the local people, as they are prone to do, blame the government and ISAF for not protecting them.

colatteral damage from the DVD shop blast - this barber shop was destroyed too.
Collateral damage from the DVD shop blast – this barber shop was destroyed too.

I know I have said this too many times before but the fact remains you can’t project security to any segment of the population from a FOB.  You cannot even protect the population living right outside the fence next to the FOB as the Taliban demonstrated last night when they plastered night letters all over the village of Base Ekmalati. A village right behind the large ISAF base in Jalalabad and the same village that I wrote about in this post about the floods.

Page one of the Base Ekmalati night letter
Page one of the Base Ekmalati night letter

Here is what the night letter said:

Military Commission of Nangarhar Province

Message of Islamic Emirates Mujahedeen’s to the brave and Mujahid Nation of Nangarhar Province

 

Allah the great has said lots of realities through his messenger Mohammad that you won’t make these Non-Muslims happy unless you convert to their religion. Every one has eye witnessed the current, devil Supper power, with of Christianity and Jewish fanaticism, thirsty of innocent blood, has invaded the Islamic land of Afghanistan, and trying to reach their hungry and starving goals, by killing innocent people, widowing thousands of women, and orphaned thousands of kids, killings tens of brides and grooms during their wedding nights, bombed/destroyed tens of Madrasas and Masjids, searching our personal belongings in our house looking Usama and Al Qaeda, but few sensation less faces who always sold their Muslim brothers blood for few Dollars are accompanying, and chanting slogans that whatever they, but long life to us.

Still Afghani sensation is alive, still there are lions, in the mountains and Jangles, however a number Mujahedeen’s has died, and wounded, but this has more reinforced Muhedeen’s moral, jailing and difficulties has convinced them more to fight for freedom, and now this feared enemy who was looking at the ground but to the sky, and the slogan for the Muslims they had was either arrest them or kill them, but now with success of Jihad, they are running around the world and seeking an escape route.

Since the enemy is facing their sure defeat, now they are trying to sparate the nation from the Mujaheddens, and discredited Mujahedeens in all different ways.

The Islamic Emirate is informing the nation that we are the guards of Islamic soil and the guard’s life and property, and with the cost of our blood we consider this our religious duty.

The brave nation be awake and remember that the enemy is in escaping position, do not let them to mislead you, and do not let them blame you as the thieves and the abductors.

Islamic Emirate Is Informing the Nation of the necessary things as follows

 

The Islamic Emirates inform the nation from the following matters.

  1. Those who abducting local and Tribal elders, and charging locals for all the different types of taxations/charities, they are not Taliban indeed, but American agents. The Islamic Emirate is seriously looking into this issue, whoever again faces the mentioned problems they should contact and inform the local Mujahedeens in there are of their problems, in case they can not reach the local Mujahedeens, they can contact the local elders or scholars, so that they can reach the Military Commission, the criminal will face severe consequences.
  2. If any one, welling to pay   charity to the Islamic Emirate, he should contact three people District Military commission and at the same time three people from Province Military commission.
  3. The Islamic Emirate is having different commission for, natural resources, Mines, NGOs, those who are working in the mentioned sectors has to refer to them, and if any one is asking them for money they are not Taliban, but the American agents, and Insha’Allah they will face the same consequences as the Americans.

To the Authorities

  1. Those who are working with the ANA/ANP, Parliament, Provincial counsel and other governmental organizations for few dollars they should immediately quite their jobs, and promise Allah that they won’t do it in the future. This will be the last warning of Mujahedeens of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan for them.
  2. Those conscienceless spies, who are spying about Muslims for few dollars we have a list of them and very soon we will publish their details, and for sure they will face severe consequences.
  3. Some slave type people who are trying to establish tribal Arbakia forces or to convince others to join these forces, the Islamic Emirate is not differentiating them from the Americans.

To The Scholars and Mullahs

  1. Dear, you are the leaders of the tribe, and the representatives of Mohammad, you better know that most Quranic verses and Adiths is ordering to stay away from non Muslims and tells to fight them, this is your Islamic duty and responsibility that you implement this order of Allah.

Those of you who know a thing or two about night letters will note that this one lacks a seal of either the commander or the organization who released it. But the abrupt closing of all the DVD shops in town indicates the bad guys have established a foothold inside the city.

I wish I could see some evidence that the American Army is getting after it too but so far, with the exception of a brief, effective offensive in Kunar I see nishta.  The Army is setting itself up for more scathing criticism like this article.  An example from the linked article:

Yet even as I was filling my notebook with details of their delusionary schemes, the base commander told me he had already been forced to put aside development. He had his hands full facing a Taliban onslaught he hadn’t expected. Throughout Afghanistan, insurgent attacks have gone up 51 percent since the official adoption of  COIN as the strategy  du jour. On this eastern front, where the commander had served six years earlier, he now faces a surge of intimidation, assassination, suicide attacks, roadside bombs, and fighters with greater technical capability than he has ever seen in Afghanistan.

The only reason we are not seeing more stories like this is the media narrative remains squarely with the Obama administration and they are not going to release too many stories ridiculing our (his) efforts on the ground. How much longer will that paradigm hold?  Saying you are focused on bringing security to the population while doing little in the way of securing the population is obviously not going to work much longer. Had the reporter (Ms. Jones) been a little more savvy about things military she may have asked the one question nobody can honestly answer and that is if you are not going to secure the population then why are all these people here and shouldn’t they be sent home?

The Taliban are out in the open, trying to tax the people, running shadow governments, putting up night letters to intimidate the people living 100 meters outside the wire of a major regional base. There is only one thing the military can do given current ground truths and one need look no further than Herschel Smith at the Captains Journal to find the yellow (school solution.)

They need to look into the eyes of every inhabitant, be inside every home, take every fingerprint and scan every iris.   Their patrols need to be ubiquitous, day and night, and they don’t need to wait on the ANA or send them into the homes first.   They need to proceed with door kicking in the middle of the night if that’s what it takes, they need to project force, and they need to do it beginning now and carrying on until every last insurgent has been captured or killed.   Killed is better than captured given the poor state of the Afghanistan system of justice (i.e., catch and release).

It is just that simple but we seem to be light-years away from doing this. Now everything hangs in the balance, all the work we have done, all the programs we are currently running, all of that is now in play and the bad guys are setting the agenda, have the initiative, and dictating the terms of the fight.  They’re the ones who are getting after it.

Losing Hearts and Minds

Ben Arnoldy at the Christen Science Monitor penned an excellent tale on reconstruction efforts going pear shaped and the consequences resulting from such folly. The report was original, focused and resulted from Ben going to the remote Badakshan Province for a couple of weeks to get the details correct.  This article is  the perfect book end to last weeks Toronto Star piece on Panjwayi  Tim and Ghost Team because it highlights the futility of traditional US AID standard operating procedures. Ben sums up the point of his article with these opening paragraphs:

On paper, the multi-pronged project revitalized a backward Afghan province, weaning it off poppy cultivation and winning Afghan hearts and minds.

However, a Monitor investigation reveals that even in spite of a few modest gains, the Afghans here were left angered over project failures, secrecy, and wasted funds.

“Now the people are hating American companies like PADCO because many times they brought millions of dollars, but didn’t do anything,” says Syed Abdul Basir Husseini, the electricity chief for Badakhshan Province. “All Badakhshanis know that it was $60 million [that America] spent,” he says, adding that they see little evidence of it.

The story of what went wrong exposes serious weaknesses in the third pillar of America’s “clear, hold, build” Afghan strategy. Among them: big-spending hastiness, unrealistic deadlines, high development staff turnover, planning divorced from ground realities, and ever-present security risks in this war-torn nation.

“In Vietnam, they were measuring success of operations in the numbers that are killed. In Afghanistan, it is how many schools you are building and how much money you spent. This is better, but as wrong,” says Lorenzo Delesgues, director of Integrity Watch Afghanistan, in Kabul. “What you need to measure is what is the impact of what you’ve done.”

I’ve talked about this so many times before that I’m sick of it so time to try something new; it’s time for a story board.

Wednesday 25 July the second "hundred year" flood in less than a year hit Jalalabad following a morning of torrential rain. This is the main road heading towards the airport.
Wednesday 25 July the second “hundred year” flood in less than a year hit Jalalabad following a morning of torrential rain. This is the main road heading towards the airport.

 

The Sarracha bridge - the new Afghan design was not passable but the ribbon bridge installed by the American PRT stood up much better than the stone bridge last year.
The Sarracha bridge – the new Afghan design was not passable but the ribbon bridge installed by the American PRT stood up much better than the stone bridge last year.

 

A modern compound like ours has no problem handling heavy rains
A modern compound like ours has no problem handling heavy rains

 

The avergae Afghan family compound has no grass or driveways so heavy rains are a real problem for them.
The average Afghan family compound has no grass or driveways so heavy rains are a real problem for them.

 

Just like last year the flood caused extensive damage and a few deaths in the villages on the east end of town. Capt A from Ghost Team, The Professor from the American NGO CHF (International) and I teamed up to try and find the source of the flooding and what could be done about it.
Just like last year the flood caused extensive damage and a few deaths in the villages on the east end of town. The next day Capt A from Ghost Team, The Professor from an American NGO and I teamed up to try and find the source of the flooding and what could be done about it.

 

Less than two hours after the monsoon started this village was under 3 meters of swiftly moving water
Less than two hours after the monsoon started this village was under 3 meters of swiftly moving water

 

Crop and road damage about 1 kilometer outside the village
Crop and road damage about 1 kilometer outside the village

 

We heard the familar sound of an IED going off and saw the signature of a fuel tanker attack near FOB Fenty.
We heard the familiar sound of an IED going off and saw the signature of a fuel tanker attack near FOB Fenty.

 

We pushed on - that's The Professor from CHF being escorted by local kids from the village
We pushed on – that’s The Professor being escorted by local kids from the village

 

The villans had hit one of the tankers sitting outside FOB Fenty with a limpet mine.
The villains had hit one of the tankers sitting outside FOB Fenty with a limpet mine.

 

All the fuel tankers traveling the Jalalabad truck by-pass now put their A-drivers on the top to thwart motorcyle mounted limpet mine bombers.
All the fuel tankers traveling the Jalalabad truck by-pass now put their A-drivers on the top to thwart motorcycle mounted limpet mine bombers.

 

These guys lack a sense of style - they're missing a chance to jock up with cool old fashioned weapons like pikes or swords for repelling motorcycle mounted knuckleheads.
These guys lack a sense of style – they’re missing a chance to jock up with cool old fashioned weapons like pikes or swords for repelling motorcycle mounted knuckleheads.

 

The problem - to the left and right is the main water canal for the municipal government. There are three points in the east of the city where the canal goes underground to alloe flash flood drainage. It is clear that there needs to be levees built to control the water which funnels through these chokepoints to cause so much devestation down stream
The problem – to the left and right is the main water canal for the municipal government. There are three points in the east of the city where the canal goes underground to allow flash flood drainage; this is one of them.  It is clear that there needs to be levees built to control the water funneling through these choke-points.

 

Local kids playing in a pool created by the flood waters
Local kids playing in a pool created by the flood waters

 

DSC_0583

As I’m writing this post I’m watching the Afghan Security Face chat room explode with information on a firefight and rioting in Kabul. The story is already on the wire – apparently a armored SUV hit a local car on the main road to the airport causing several fatalities, a crowd gathered, shots were fired and the vehicle drove back into the entrance to the US Embassy which was only a few hundred yards away. After that a firefight erupted, and unknown number of people were killed, and currently crowds are stoning any cars they suspect contain foreigners or ISAF military.  What can one say about a self inflicted wound of such severity?General rioting in the most heavily controlled area of Kabul can rapidly spread to other cities putting the lives of internationals who are out and about in grave danger. If there are any more incidents like the one unfolding in Kabul it’s going to get damn hard to stay outside the wire.

Restrepo

Last week, Kanani Fong of the blog The Kitchen Dispatch, arranged an interview for me with Tim Hetherington, who along with Sebastian Junger produced the award-winning documentary called “Restrepo”. Kanani signed onto the Restrepo team to spearhead a public relations effort, in conjunction with National Geographic, to get the film released nationwide in theaters. This is no easy task for a documentary but, as many of you know, there is a huge groundswell building in the blogosphere over this movie and it is already scheduled for runs in major cities around the country.   This is great news because the one thing Tim stressed in our interview was this is not a film just for the military, but for the general public. In the minds of the men who made it, this film is designed to show Americans who have no direct stake in this fight (which is the vast majority) what is being asked of the men and women who are bearing the brunt of battle.

reestrepoMy conversation with Tim Hetherington was really enjoyable. Our Skype connection was crystal clear and we got along like old friends. Tim and I had such a great time chatting with each other I never got around to doing any interviewing. I know that sounds strange, but we were having such a great give and take about all kinds of things that I asked very few direct questions about the film.
Both this film and the related book War by Sebastian Junger are valuable additions to the special niche in military history dealing with the effects of battle. This type of historical writing was made popular in 1976 by the historian John Keegan when he published his classic The Face of Battle. I loved that book and remember being enthralled by the descriptions of battle – especially his telling of the famous Agincourt fight where English bowmen took out the leading Knights of France. The Knights were encumbered with over 60 pounds of body armor and, when they dismounted their horses, essentially immobile and helpless. I remember talking about this book with my peers, laughing and laughing at the stupidity of going into battle wearing over 60 pounds of body armor. I guess the joke was on us, since my peers now routinely go into battle with more than 60 pounds on their backs. Thanks to ergonomic advances, they can move a little better and react slightly faster than the doomed French nobles at Agincourt….but that’s not the point is it?
Which brings me to the only real question I had for Tim, and it was an unfair one: why does it seem that the Army never tried to preempt the routine attacks on Restrepo and the other FOB’s? Apparently, they generally knew when attacks were forming and the attack positions used by the Taliban never changed, because they couldn’t change…mountains limit your options for good fields-of-fire.

I was taught that fire without maneuver was a waste of time, effort, and money. It still seems strange to me that the reaction to an attack on a FOB or the ambush of a convoy is to shoot back with long range fire, call in airstrikes and then go back to what you were doing before the Taliban started bugging you. I liked the way we used to do these things, which was to gain and maintain contact until you could maneuver on the villains and destroy them in detail. It is a poor idea to provide on-the-job training for your adversary.

Tim pointed out that the Army did run a preemptive operation which is a critical part of the film and book, called Operation Rock Avalanche, but the question really wasn’t a fair one. Both the film and book are focusing on the experience of a single platoon during an entire  combat rotation. Platoons execute orders from on-high and have little to say about operational planning. I already knew the answer to the question I was asking and found this quote later which seems to best express why the men in Restrepo fight the way they do. This quote is from The Father of Us all by Victor Davis Hanson:

“Consequently, emphasis on defense – from body armor to antiballistic missile systems – will become an ever higher priority, as ever more affluent Americans, like Greek hoplights or medieval Lords of old, grow increasingly sensitive to the casualties of war. The current weight of fifty to eighty pounds of gear that so burdens individual soldiers is not so much to provide them with additional offensive power as to achieve better communications, body protection, and survivability.”

The men in Restrepo were executing with skill and determination the orders they had been given. It is still amazing to me that guys can move and fight as well as they did, given the loads they were carrying in a high altitude, mountainous environment. Their attempts at tribal engagement did not pay off in the long run. We no longer staff FOB’s in the Korengal Valley, but these guys gave it their best shot, which comes through clearly in the book as well as in the movie.

In my opinion, it is important that this film be shown in as many theaters as possible. Most of my regular readers know this tale intimately and will appreciate the artistry in this tale about infantrymen in war. Most Americans as well as most people in the countries with troops deployed here, do not have a clue about what they collectively have asked their fellow citizens to do. The amount of responsibility placed on the shoulders of twenty-something year old (or sometimes younger) men who lead fire teams, squads, and platoons, exceeds by several orders of magnitude, the burden placed on their peers in the civilian world. Once they are home and out of the service, it may be decades before they are placed in positions of such responsibility again. Add to that the burden of survivors’ guilt, which is common to all veterans at all times and in all places, and one gets a sense of the overwhelming pressures being shouldered by these veterans at the pointed-end of the spear. Americans need to know this because when our elected leaders send these soldiers to fight for our country they do so in all our names. We owe it to all the men and women who serve in harms’ way to understand what we asked them to do.

Riding with Ghosts

Editors Note:  This article is too good not to share in its entirety. The reporter, Mitch Potter, was kind enough to give me permission to do so. Mitch contacted me through the blog and Panjwaii Tim told me he was a great guy with lots of experience and knowledge who he was happy to host. In Mitch’s honor I hereby officially change the name for Team Canada to Ghost Team. What did I say at the end of my last post?  Armed, outside the wire, experienced, contractors – this is what I was talking about.

Riding With Ghosts

Mitch Potter

KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN We are motoring down a bare-dirt back road in Kandahar Province, a road where NATO patrols never go. This way is better, explains the ghost behind the wheel, because roads without soldiers tend not to explode.

The car is soft-skinned no armour. There are no body vests. No helmets. No blast goggles. No convoy. There is a gun on board, but it is concealed to avoid undue attention. Just plain vanilla wheels with two men from Canada dressed as Afghans one, the driver, surveying the way ahead with purposeful, probing eyes, the other, a reporter, wondering what fresh hell awaits on this sweltering Friday afternoon.

Don’t worry. I know these roads better than most Afghans, says the ghost, as we cross the Tarnac River Afghan-style by driving right through it.

He is Panjwaii Tim, a 41-year-old from small-town Manitoba who cites Don Cherry and carries with him a Winnipeg Blue Bombers cap. A few years back he worked in Afghanistan the conventional way as a reservist with the Canadian Forces, a tour replete with frustrations. Too few troops. Too much territory. Too much confusion about which way forward. And just as he began to really understand this place gone. With another fresh batch of wide-eyed six-monthers in his wake. Rinse and repeat.

Now a much-savvier Panjwaii Tim is back on his own terms, not with the military but leading one of the last major Western aid groups still operating freely in Kandahar City, an outfit fast gaining a reputation for uncommon courage. A group dubbed Team Canada.

Nearly every other civilian foreigner has fled Kandahar. Some have taken refuge inside nearby NATO bases, others have retreated to comparably calmer Kabul. But not Team Canada, despite the rash of bombs and targeted killings that torment this crucial southern city. They are working under the radar to rapidly turn tens of millions of international aid dollars into jobs for thousands of Afghan men.

Fighting-age Afghan men, you understand, some of whom, in their desperation for income, would join the only other gainful employers in town the cash-paying Taliban, or, more likely, one of the corrupt private armies that Panjwaii Tim assesses bluntly as akin to the Sicilian mafia.

Never mind hearts and minds, Team Canada is about hands and bellies a largely invisible aid network on the front line, offering stay-alive sustenance to Afghans who might otherwise plant roadside bombs aimed at sending more Canadian bodies home down the Highway of Heroes.

Given the unique and risky manner in which they work  low-key, low-security Team Canada is not looking for attention.

But word is trickling out anyway in the wake of a startling, praise-filled post on the military blog Free Range International, which in April anointed Panjwaii Tim and his colleagues with the Team Canada nickname. And it dared NATO commanders to take lessons from Team Canada’s nimble ways and let at least some troops shed the suffocating armour and lumbering metal that encases them.

They are the best crew in the country, the blogger, Tim Lynch, an American contractor who does work similar to Team Canada in safer Nangahar Province, wrote in an email to the Star. They have balls the size of grapefruit.

It was through Lynch that the Star made first contact with Team Canada and, after careful negotiation, scored an invitation to meet them.

The Canadian military today requires reporters to fill out 47 pages of forms before embedding. Panjwaii Tim required only a handshake and a solemn promise on the ground rules.

We’re proud of the work we do. But you understand the stakes: this is life or death for us. No last names, no naming our NGO. No precise description of where we live. The danger is real. Do not make me regret this.

We knit our way through quiet residential streets and then suddenly nose up to the large steel gates of Ghost Central, the Team Canada compound. Two honks of the horn and a small window in the gate opens, eyes peering out. We’re here.

Not that you would know it, for nowhere are the telltale signs of a war-zone Western compound: barbed wire, Hesco blast barrier, sandbagged machine gun turrets. This is just another walled and gated compound in a city of walled, gated compounds.

Inside, however, the operation is vast, half a city block jammed with three main buildings, each with walls of its own and linked by multiple passageways, and a sprawling logistics yard.

People abound. Five to 10 Team Canada expats are in charge at any given time and there are always dozens of carefully vetted Afghan staff.

It needs to be big because this is no branch office. The compound is a full-blown national headquarters overseeing Team Canada’s operations in 14 of Afghanistan’s most precarious provinces, all backed by tens of millions in international donor aid. The money dries up at the end of September, but already Team Canada has been told by coalition diplomats in Kabul to be ready for an even larger chunk of aid cash to come, and to be ready to expand to other provinces.

One quickly discovers Team Canada is actually Team World. A third of this group calls Canada home, but others are from Britain, New Zealand, Texas, New York; some are development specialists, others ex-soldiers. All wear beards of varying lengths; most speak at least some Pashto; the fairer ones have dyed their hair dark to better blend in.

William, a New Zealander who oversees team security, leads me on a tour of the two-storey complex to identify the triage bay, the armoury and the muster area should we come under sudden attack. Along the way we see a well-equipped weight room and a few home comforts: wireless Internet hub, flat-screen TV, a Wii console.

William instructs me to prepare a bug-out bag: passport, money, phone, a change of clothes and work computer. If the call comes to run for the hills, be ready.

Twenty or so vehicles are in the compound. One of the keys to Team Canada’s impressive freedom of movement is never taking the same car (or the same road) in any discernable pattern. Almost all are older Corollas and dust-encrusted Land Cruisers, indistinguishable from the Toyotas Afghans drive.

There is also a small fleet of Chinese motorbikes. Panjwaii Tim quips that they came from the local Haji Davidson dealership. They are another means of escape if the zombie hordes’ come over the wall.

It’s gallows humour, but longer-serving members of this team vividly remember the night they actually saw the zombie hordes: June 13, 2008, when Taliban fighters blasted through the walls of Sarposa Prison on the city’s western edge, releasing all 1,200 inmates in the single largest jailbreak in modern history.

We heard the explosions and the firefight. And then a wave of escapees came running down the street toward us. It looked like Kandahar was about to fall, says Ryan, a South African. The compound was armed and ready. As the night unfolded, the escapees vanished. No contact.

In April, a massive truck-borne suicide bomb managed to penetrate the gates of another foreign compound elsewhere in the city. That blast cleared Kandahar of almost all its Westerners and left Team Canada with an agonizing decision: to stay or go.

After painstaking consideration, they stayed. At first, their stand was tentative, with an around-the-clock watch. We just became more vigilant, taking it up several notches. To say more than that would be giving away our secrets, says Panjwaii Tim.

Within days of the blast, Team Canada received a huge vote of confidence. A tribal elder with whom they had worked closely arrived unbidden with his own armed security team, standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the expats for a full week.

To know that you have friends on the Afghan side who will put their own lives on the line for you — that was a decisive moment, says Panjwaii Tim.

Things are still on a knife-edge, to some extent. We can’t let down our guard. But the way we roll, it is not just about being under the radar. A big part of it is building trust with Afghans. We’re not out there waving guns around. We’re out there putting people to work. There are tribal leaders who respect us for that and so we’re not alone, really. We have a network willing to stand up and help us help them.

The team credits Panjwaii Tim for setting the tone in its dealings with Afghans, an approach centred on two fundamental rules: first, never break a promise; second, always underpromise, then overdeliver.

Pashtun culture is really not that different from my home in Manitoba, says Tim. Where I come from everything works on a handshake. No contracts. You make a deal, you honour it period. That’s exactly how Afghans are. If you live up to the bargain you will make incredibly loyal friends.

One of the issues here is that tribal leaders hear so many promises and every six months there’s a fresh foreign face sitting down with them, ignoring the old promises that weren’t kept and making new ones. That’s not a minor thing. It wouldn’t go over very well in my town either.

The other key part of the approach is the ghostlike, under-armed way Team Canada fits into Afghan society. Nate, a 24-year-old Texan who helps liaise with international donors, tells of being stuck inside a bubble during an earlier posting in Iraq.

Every time we went out, I was surrounded by soldiers with guns. We weren’t fooling anybody. There was no ability to develop relationships with local people. The only moves you could do were with military escort. And the locals often couldn’t come to the base because of security concerns.

That is what is unique about this approach, says Nate. You won’t find another NGO with so large a budget, operating so broadly, with so low a profile. There’s nowhere near the same bureaucracy. When we want to go out and see people, we go. Granted we are very cautious. We move in soft-skinned vehicles, dressed as Afghans. But this way we have a mobility that others don’t because they’re required by their legal departments to go around in these bubbles. We aren’t.

Team Canada’s techniques took 10 years to develop, Panjwaii Tim explains, combining and refining lessens learned since 2001, when the first Westerners arrived in Afghanistan following the attacks of 9/11. To even a casual observer, they appear to be approaches NATO and other agencies would do well to emulate.

Tim notes that living within the community, working with the populace shoulder to shoulder once was a hallmark of Special Forces. Now he says he hears nothing but frustrations from the elite Canadian commandos with JTF2, who, though stationed on the outskirts of Kandahar, appear rarely to leave their base.

JTF2 is not a very happy bunch, says another Team Canada member. Every move they make needs to be approved by Ottawa, and by the time the answer comes, the opportunity is gone. So they’re stuck there.

Put on your manjammies (shalwar kameez) we’re going out, Panjwaii Tim announces from the stairwell. It’s Saturday night in Kandahar and his command is confusing because nobody goes out in this town. Not after dark.

Yet a few minutes later we are motoring down empty streets, ghosts once more. There appear to be more armed checkpoints than normal and Panjwaii Tim takes extra care, choosing a route to avoid the guns.

We approach another set of anonymous compound doors. An Afghan guard nods clearance. Seconds later, a burly Westerner bids us welcome, a hearty hug for Panjwaii Tim, a viselike yet cautious handshake for the reporter.

Here’s where the telling gets especially frustrating because though this turns out to be far and away the most interesting of the nearly 200 evenings I’ve spent in Kandahar since 2002, most of it must stay in the notebook until after this conflict is over. Our host is a private security contractor whose work is too sensitive to risk exposure while he is in the field.

But his regard for Panjwaii Tim is such that he has gathered all the precious treats in the house and assembled an astonishing rooftop party for three, replete with a case of homemade beer, Cuban cigars and, on the coal-fired grill, a mound of Alaskan king crab legs likely the only crustaceans for a thousand kilometres in any direction.

Who is this guy? We will call him John. Ex-special forces from a country we cannot name. Spent time in Iraq. And here now in Kandahar, like Panjwaii Tim, a veteran of this incredibly rarefied work that involves venturing way past the lines NATO considers certain death.

But unlike Panjwaii Tim, John’s smaller team sometimes works directly with NATO special forces in far-flung, unstable districts. Making advance contact with key tribal leaders, working deals to ensure safe meetings, setting the table for the first Western military boots on the ground. And, in some cases, actually showing special forces how to get there.

Over the evening, Tim and John compare notes, working through their mutual depth of knowledge of the Afghan players, big and small. Trading their most valued commodity, information, on who can help and who can hurt the cause.

John actually tries to hire Panjwaii Tim on this night, to steal him from Team Canada. More money, less paperwork. Tim politely declines. He likes his job.

I ask both about trade secrets how they are able to put themselves so far into danger’s way without a net. Both speak of Pashtunwali, their absolute life-or-death faith that Pashtun tribes will keep their promises.

If a leader tells you that on this day at this hour you can take this road and nothing will happen, it will be so, says John. But it works the other way as well. I once had a tribal leader tell me, If you break your word we will kill you.’ I have no doubt that also is true.

John says it’s not just a matter of Western expats saying the right words. He turns to Tim and says, You, for example, have that added X factor. I can hardly put it into words. But you put 100 other guys in front an Afghan leader saying the same things and they won’t be impressed. But you, Tim . . . the Afghans sense your authenticity and they know you are real. Whatever it is, you have it.

Tim squirms uncomfortably with the praise. Later, I ask him about the X factor. It isn’t rocket surgery, as Don Cherry would say. All it takes is hard boots-on-the-ground work and the ability to live long periods in austere environments. You need a dedication to live amongst and learn about the local community. And most of all, you need a strong corporate support network to allow this to happen in a non-bureaucratic manner. . . . That last part is essential.

Tim’s a family man. He doesn’t want you to know how many and where his kids live, but he says he would be with them in Canada today if not for his chance encounter with the smaller, earlier version of what is now Team Canada during his seven-month tour as a soldier in Panjwaii district three years ago.

I got to know Panjwaii well during my tour and if you can understand Panjwaii, you can understand the insurgency in general. But I saw the way the Team Canada operated and I wanted to operate like that too.

On the ride back that night, I notice Tim adjusting a knife sheathed beneath his shalwar kameez. An antique Bowie knife with a storied history it went to war twice before, in WWI and WWII with Tim’s grandfather and great-grandfather, both soldiers from Manitoba.

This knife is pretty well travelled. The thing is, it didn’t come home after six months. They didn’t bring it back until the job was done.

Cruising Kandahar with Team Canada is endlessly hazardous. Moving around Afghan-style means staying on maximum alert for NATO convoys. The second you spot one, pull over instantly or risk the consequences. Because they might shoot you, says Panjwaii Tim.

Stopping brings danger of another sort. Because no matter how well your head is wrapped, Kandahars can spot a non-Pashtun from great distance. And you don’t want that. Smiling or laughing, for example, is discouraged when this crew is travelling because, well, the people of Kandahar hardly ever smile.

Even the Afghan National Police can be bad news for non-military Westerners. Sometimes the ANP checkpoints are manned by 18-year-olds shaking in their boots. But there’s also the risk of criminals or insurgents posing in stolen uniforms.

Team Canada members have a nose for these things. A sixth sense that enables them to calmly motor through things that would reduce most Westerners to a jangling bundle of nerves.

The work itself is all about, well, work creating as much as possible as quickly as possible for Afghans who might otherwise be lost to the insurgency. And we see it firsthand throughout Kandahar, a city of roughly 800,000 where, at present, 2,200 Afghan men are working on low-cost, high-impact projects.

In four locations, we walk among hundreds of Afghans building sidewalks under the hot sun. At each site, one crew levels and grades by hand, while others mix and cast concrete, followed by skilled masons who finish the job. So far, Team Canada’s workers have laid 50 kilometres of sidewalk in Kandahar City.

At other sites, canal and drainage ditches are being cleaned. At one point, we visit the new Kandahar garbage dump near the Tarnac River basin, where Team Canada is overseeing the city’s entire sanitation system.

Team Canada is focusing on Afghanistan’s most problematic districts, those most recently held by the Taliban.

We’re the first ones in, explains Nate, the Texan. The idea is to be as labour-intensive as possible. If it’s a drainage ditch, for example, you might be able to dig it in a week with big machines. But instead, we use men with shovels, and that way employ several hundred for several months. As we reach the peak of the fighting season, that vulnerable population desperate for employment has an option other than to become prime recruits for insurgents.

Back at the safe house , everyone has a different way of winding down. Occasionally, some gather to watch a DVD. Movie night during our stay was especially surreal seeing Robert Downey Jr. abducted in Afghanistan in Iron Man takes a different twist when you are actually in Afghanistan. Others stayed in their rooms, using the wireless connection to Skype home to loved ones.

But every morning the routine is the same all gather around a vast circular breakfast table for a daily security update, which lately involves eyebrow-raising information about spiralling violence. One such morning the Star arrived at the table just as Panjwaii Tim was grimly warning about the consequences of gunfire: prosecution by Afghan officials. If any of you shoot an Afghan, your career is over. You are done.

Yet there are times when the guns come out. Ours occurs on Day 5, as we return from a morning surveying projects only to find a suspicious Afghan loitering in front of the gate.

I don’t know this guy. What is he doing here? This is bad, says Panjwaii Tim. He doesn’t need to say aloud what we’re both thinking suicide bomber.

A split-second later, Panjwaii Tim raises a pistol showing it to, but not pointing it directly toward, the unknown Afghan. He waves the gun menacingly, gesturing the man away from the gate. The Afghan quickly obliges.

What happens next, however, reveals more about the character of this crew. After pulling inside the compound, Panjwaii Tim puts his gun away and returns unarmed apologetic, even to ask the man’s business.

Speaking in Pashto, the man pleads for work to feed his family. And he produces a typed letter, written in English, bearing the Canadian flag. It is a testimonial from a Canadian military commander, circa 2007, attesting to the man’s efforts assisting an earlier troop rotation.

Panjwaii Tim scans the letter. Phone numbers are exchanged. Promises given. Two days later the man is building sidewalks under the watchful eyes of the Canadian ghosts.

Arbaki

President Karzai to reverse his position on using tribal militias.  The new name for these soon to be created Arbaki is Local Police Forces (LPF.) This is a plan which has been tried before without success. In Kandahar the Local Defense Initiative (LDI) forces (the original Arbaki program from a few years back) were quickly targeted and decimated by the Taliban. In Kunduz and Takar province they partnered with armed criminal gangs to exploit the population and government supplies and in Parwan Province they flat out turned Taliban.  I’m not sure what is being modified to make this cunning plan more effective than the last time around but I do know this much – the plan is going  to fail.

Alex Strick van Linschoten has coined the term “hope tactics” to describe the thinking behind arming various local cats and dogs and that sounds like a pretty good description to me.  There is only one way to do this sort of thing and that is to supervise the security forces you are creating. Without supervision and training all you can do is hope the units you create end up becoming effective and hope isn’t a plan. I’m sick of hope and also sick of seeing the same narrow list of options being tried over and over again adding yet another chapter to our legacy of failure in Afghanistan.

Living a low carbon footprint lifestyl; looks nice but smells pretty bad
Living a true low carbon footprint lifestyle in Bamiyan Province

Last night Captain America (regional manager for Ghost Team with 3 years on the ground with the US Army and four more as a contractor) rucked up to the Taj happy hour.  We talked for a long time about why we are always fighting to maintain program funding, keep our safe-houses, keep our mobility and freedom to maneuver despite consistently exceeding program goals. No reason to hash over the details of our incredibly interesting conversation but there was a portion worthy of mention. CPT  A asked if we could do vertical structures, I said we could, to which he said, “you know if we could just knock out  250 schools we’re done”.  CPT  A is currently refurbishing  every district irrigation system in Nangarhar Province. He does three districts at a time, employs around 5,000 laborers and is building proper intakes and installing concrete in main canals and karez systems so that they last. The roads into the Nangarhar districts are done, once we finish all the irrigation systems if we knock out 250 schools we can say “dudes we did what we said we were going to do and we’re taking off….good luck.”

This is what I mean about wasting money. We have spent billions building new regional ANP training centers and running new ANP officers through them yet still we get IED's planted right outside a Provincial Governors compound and nobody knows just how they got there.
This is what I mean about wasting money. We have spent millions and millions of dollars building new regional ANP training centers and running new ANP officers through them yet still we get an  IED  planted right outside a Provincial Governors compound.

CPT A was understating what needs to be done but not by much. He wrote the Provincial reconstruction plan when he here with the Army and knows more about it than anyone else on the planet. But the chances that our military and civilian leaders would recognize a successful template and slim down our efforts to switch up on the hold and build game are zero. The reason they are zero is that doing successful reconstruction is irrelevant for the thousands of military staff, civilian governmental agency personnel, and their contractors who have deployed to Afghanistan. All of them have high level security clearances, they spend their days in  inter-agency working groups designed to trim the bureaucratic red tape for efficiency and speed while reducing “stove pipes.” These people are all highly  paid experts who spend their time flying between FOB’s to brief each other or to participate in “fusion cells” designed to provide the battle commanders with useful information. But they cannot get out and about to dig up any useful information.

An incident like the attack on the DAI office in Kunduz last month gives this Classified Class weeks of work. Guys like the Skipper or CPT America, guys who get the job done day after day without any problems or hiccups – the Classified Class doesn’t even know they exist. There is no reason to track people doing their jobs as promised and without fanfare because they are not going to pop up on the classified nets. A gigantic Poppy Palace full of western aid workers getting attacked – that generates all kinds of classified message traffic and will require lots of flying around to other FOB’s to brief and participate in more emergency inter agency meetings.   Want the truth?  The Classified Class is spending millions of OPM to accomplish not one damn thing other than to feel good about how they spent their year in Afghanistan.

This is an AP photo form the attack on the US AID implementor DAI in Kunduz last month
This is an AP photo form the attack on the US AID implementing partner, DAI,  in Kunduz last month

We have no resilience in our reconstruction fight if we continue doing it the same old way. Kunduz is a perfect example; the contractor was in a large, well fortified compound with a professional international security company providing armed expat and local security experts. They faced a serious ground attack but the fortifications and armed guard force did its job by killing the attackers before they could injure any of the aid workers. But now the contractor is gone, the programs they were working on abandoned which means the security plan was designed to survive one attack and one attack only. How can one expect to get the build portion of the current clear hold and build program completed if the people doing the build leave after one attack?

As our Thursday evening happy hour drew to a close the one thing we all agreed on was that our ability to operate in the manner we do is based on the locals watching after us. The years we have spent in N2KL have resulted in most people in most places knowing who we are and what we do. Reconstruction is not hard, establishing credibility is and that takes time in countries like Afghanistan. It also takes people who can operate on their own on the economy and not just survive but continue to function if attacked. That kind of thinking is not found inside the closed loop of the classified crowd. They do not know what they do not know.  They can’t leave the FOB’s so they don’t have an accurate read on anything except what comes through the classified loop. Anyone who has dealt with that sort of information understands how limited it is.

Which bring us back to the Local Security Forces.   This “inspired” idea of using locals to provide security will fail because nobody responsible for it will get off the FOB to provide daily detailed supervision. I can’t stress enough the importance of daily, full time, supervision. The Skipper’s EOD program works because he provides daily, detailed supervision, while EOD programs elsewhere in the country languish.  CPT America is re-building the entire Provincial irrigation system because he provides daily, detailed supervision, while the same projects elsewhere in the country barely break ground. If we can’t get the various government agencies to operate off of the FOB then there is only one viable option. Armed, outside the wire, experienced, contractors.

N2KL

Spencer Ackerman  wrote a post last week at Danger Room with the disturbing title of East Afghanistan Sees Taliban as “Morally Superior” to Karzai. This assessment came from the after action slides of Col Randy George who commanded Task Force Warrior this past year. There is nothing in the article or Col George’s slides which is a surprise to anyone who has been paying attention. What is not obvious to those outside of Regional Command East is that there is the distinct possibility that change is afoot.

RC East (a.k.a. N2KL to those in the know)  is comprised of Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, and Laghaman Provinces.  It is mountainous, has over 300 kilometers of border with Pakistan and is full of isolated clannish tribes who have a long history being a pain in the ass to anyone trying to establish governance over their territory.  ISAF is restricted to moving along valley roads where ambushes are so common they have become part of the daily routine. But here is the thing; there are only so many places in these mountain from which to ambush convoys. There are only so many places from which the bad guys can attack isolated combat outposts too and we know where each and every one of those places are. As one of the OH 58 scout pilots told me the other day “when we respond to an ambush once we learn where the contact is we know exactly where the Taliban will be. They never change, they never deviate, and we see the same thing over and over and over again.”

Look at this money quote from Spencer’s article:

“As a result, those big mistakes by the Afghan government lead the locals of N2KL to rank the Taliban/al-Qaeda/Militant-Insurgent Syndicate’ fourth out of four on George’s list of how they perceive their problems. Locals consider the insurgents morally superior to the Karzai government. The insurgents provide the population something the government doesn’t, or at least doesn’t provide sufficiently: culturally appropriate access to justice, resources and Islamic identity, in George’s assessment.”

There is little that Col George or ISAF can do about that. But what they can do is to set up the conditions for success by beating the Taliban like a drum on a routine basis. Which is exactly what the commander at Camp Blessing (Kunar Province) started doing last week after the villains over reached with a large attack aimed at his battalion. Let me set the picture for you as we see it using open source security reports.

Sami the Finn sent this to me after week 26 to see what I knew about the steep drop off of activity in Kunar Province. He's been here from the start and nobody has ever seen Kunar incident rate tank like this before
Sami the Finn sent this to me after week 26 to see what I knew about the steep drop off of activity in Kunar Province. We had never seen the Kunar incident rate tank like this during a fighting season before

Sami the Finn from Indicium Consulting was the first to raise the alarm as he watched the incident rate in Kunar drop at the height of fighting season. He warned that this meant the Taliban was massing for another big attack. A quick plug if I may; Sami has been in Afghanistan for over 8 years and is the most informed analysts in the country. Anyone doing business here would benefit from utilizing his company which is highly respected among the old hands.

As the security incident rate was falling we were getting reports from Kunar that the place was awash with Pakistani Taliban and “foreigners” which could be al Qaeda or could be Jihadi tourists not that there is much difference. One project manager I know who is an Arab/American was approached by a Taliban emissary and told that if he did projects in the Korengal Valley they would provide for his security and give him a Taliban work permit. That would have been cool -I have been trying for a long time to get a scan of one of those but to date nishta. The NGO he works for wouldn’t have gone for that deal anyway.

There was another VBIED on the Beshud bridge the other day. None of the soldiers in the MRAP were injured but local bystanders did not fare well.
There was another VBIED on the Beshud bridge the other day. None of the soldiers in the MRAP were injured but local bystanders did not fare well.

We were seeing lots of smoke but no fire and had little idea what was going on but then the 101st (current battlespace owners) attacked into the Marwarwa valley and started dropping bodies. They apparently were seeing the build up of forces too and decided to preempt whatever they were up to with a battalion of paratroopers.

the incidnet rate shot up after the Americans and ANA went on the offensive but all thisfighting is pretty one sided and judging from air activity around Jalalabad pretty intense
The incident rate shot up after the Americans and ANA went on the offensive

The local people have every right to be upset about the performance of the government in Kabul. But they also have no interest in seeing any central government strong enough to meddle in their affairs.  For example, Afghans will go to great lengths to avoid having their problems brought into the legal system. Regardless of the crime be it murder or little boys stealing apples from a neighbor the Afghans know how to handle it and feel personally disgraced when the authorities step in to apply the rule of law. Their family business them becomes public and their problems known to people outside their clan which brings disgrace upon the family.  They are going to bitch about the central government no matter who is in charge and how effective it becomes. The best we can do is concentrate on making regional government functional at basic things like irrigation, sanitation, health care delivery and other municipal services.

The Skipper - a retired navy master chief, EOD type runningaround Nuristan. He respondes to all EOD calls in N2KL 24/7 because he's outside the wire in his own safe house with a mobile security crew. He's been doing this for years and the local people know and look after him because he is fast, efficent, and doesn't ask questions. He collects a lot of ordnance and isyet another example that internationals can and should be operating embeded with the population
The Skipper – a retired navy Senior Chief, EOD type running around Nuristan. He respondes to all EOD calls in N2KL 24/7 because he’s outside the wire in his own safe house and has a mobile security crew. Being able to get a call and go is key – his ISAF counterparts get a call and it takes at least four hours for them to plan and brief their mission before their allowed off base. FOB based security is not really security because they cannot respond rapidly to anything.  The Skipper has been doing this for years and the local people know and look after him because he is fast, efficient, and doesn’t ask questions. He collects a lot of ordnance and is another example that internationals can and should be operating embedded with the population

The Taliban have been operating in the open all over Nuristan and  Kunar Provinces this year as well as southern Nangarhar Province and part of Laghman too.  It doesn’t take long for them to wear out their welcome because the locals have big plans for their daughters and getting hitched to some wild eye Waziristani illiterate isn’t past of the plan. Yet the villains are out there filling in the power vacuum created by dysfunctional government and poorly trained Afghan Police.  The Taliban is in the open and exposed at exactly the wrong time. The ANA and the Americans have never been stronger and are more than capable of running the Taliban to ground if that is what they want to do. Insurgents are supposed to wait until they defeat local and international security forces before they start walking around with impunity.

This is typical - the Taliban trigger man gets a bomb to set off but it doesn't come with a motorcycle battery so he has to walk to the big city to buy one. Correctly thinking it to be a bad idea to walk around with the bomb he hides it in the median strip of the busiest road in Jalalabad hoping none of the 2 or so thousand people walkng by will take notice.
This is typical – the Taliban trigger man gets a bomb to set off but it doesn’t come with a motorcycle battery so he has to walk to the big city to buy one. Correctly thinking it to be a bad idea to walk around with the bomb he hides it in the median strip of the busiest road in Jalalabad hoping none of the thousands of people walking by will take notice.

The insurgents have unmasked themselves way too early which is a strategic blunder of the first order. In N2KL ISAF and the ANA can make them pay for that.  If they did it would be the perfect time to get the “civilian surge” off the FOB’s and out interacting daily with officials at the province and district level. I know the State Department guy and the duty FBI agent, and the US AID guys etc… are all frustrated that they are not able to operate off the bases like the NGO’s and The Skipper do.

An ABP trainer and his terp duringa rnage shoot. These trainers are from Xe which was Balckwater and is now something else I think. There are several dozen guys on the contract with some embeded American Army troops and they have a large base at the Pachir Wa Agam distrcit center. Using large regional training centers has proven to be a bust for train Afgahan police. These guys from Xe are first rate working a top of the line contract for excellent pay. They would be much more effective if they were out and about with their charges instead of being restricted to a training base.
An ABP trainer and his terp during a range shoot. These trainers are from Xe which was known as Blackwater. There are several dozen guys on the contract with some embedded American Army troops and they have a large base at the Pachir Wa Agam district center. Using large regional training centers has proven to be a bust for training Afghan police. These guys from Xe are first rate working a top of the line contract for excellent pay. They would be much more effective if they were out and about with their charges instead of being restricted to a training base.  The taxpayer would get a better return on investment and the contractors would probably enjoy the freedom of movement and break in routine.

There is little question that we are going to have to start reducing our footprint in Afghanistan. That doesn’t mean we cannot define an acceptable end state and start working towards it now while we have so many assets in-country. There are civilian experts who want to get out and start making a difference but can’t due to force protection policies. These people have the exact skill set needed to mentor regional government agencies but they cannot bring those skills to bear from the FOB. It is time to set these and a number of other people free to follow up what has started to be a little house cleaning of the local Taliban.

Jalalabad Rocks

Last Wednesday morning the local Taliban sent eight guys to attack the US Army base at Jalalabad Airfield known as FOB Fenty. They initiated the attack with a car bomb in a rarely used entry point on the southeastern side of the airfield which is well away from the Torkham to Jalalabad road. The remaining attackers tried to bum rush the damaged gate and got shot all to hell by the American soldiers who man the guard towers. Adding insult to injury there just happened to be a section of fully armed and fueled Apaches in the air and they were instantly able to pounce on the survivors of the futile charge at the damaged gate as they fled back towards a small village called Moqamkhan. A joint force of ANA and 101st Paratroopers went into the village and finished off the survivors in a short fire fight. FOB Fenty was back to normal by noon but the attack did generate plenty of news which may have been the point.

The attack on FOB Fenty has had limited impact on the local citizens or the troops stationed there. But Jalalabad has also had a series of IED attacks in the Safi Bazaar which is in the main downtown area. The word on the street is that these are bombing targeting “un-Islamic” stores but they have hit cell phone stores and a juice bar which clearly fall within the definition of being properly Islamic.These attacks are concerning but to date none of the local security forces have found a night letter which is an indicator the Taliban may not be responsible. This area of the bazaar has had its share of internecine fighting over the years with several firefights breaking out between vendors which the ANP joined in for good measure.  This could be score settling or the Taliban may feel strong enough to operate in openly in Jalalabad.

latest bombing in the Safi Bazaar targeted this ANP checkpost which is manned 24 hours a day. The villains placed a good 3lb magnetic mine on there and walked off at around 2030 at night an nobody saw a thing. That is not cool
latest bombing in the Safi Bazaar targeted this ANP check-post which is manned 24 hours a day. The villains placed a good 3lb magnetic mine on there and walked off at around 2030 at night and nobody saw a thing. Not cool.

Attacking security forces checkpoints is a standard Taliban tactic but their ability to do so in Jalalabad is not a new development.  Their targeting has gotten better  which is concerning.

This was placed under the passenger side of a Toyota corolla belonging to a Colonel in the National Directerate of Security. Although magnetic there is not enough metal under a passanger seat to attach it securly so the villains used tape which the Colonel saw the next morning which is why he checked his undercarriage. Typical keystone cop execution by the forces of evil. These bombs are made with 2 to 3 lbs of PE 3 explosive and are pretty powerful.
This was placed under the front passenger seat of a Toyota Corolla belonging to a Colonel in the National Directorate of Security. It’s about the size of a cigar box but thicker and protruded from under the vehicle.  The Colonel saw the shiny light colored tape the next morning so he checked his undercarriage. Typical keystone cop execution by the forces of evil. These bombs are made with 2 to 3 lbs of PE 3 explosive and are pretty powerful.

Right now things are not looking too cool in Jbad for us internationals but there could be change afoot. Lost in all the news surrounding the appointment of Gen Petraeus is the amazing (one-sided) fights that have been happening in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces. Last week the troops stationed at the Nuristan PRT in Kala Gush spent several hours watching video feed of some 200 fighters climbing the mountain to the west of them in order to stage a massive attack. By the time the villians had humped all the heavy guns, mortars, rockets, ammo, etc… up the mountain there were B1’s stacked above them with 2000 lbs JDAMS.  Talk about an ass whooping – these kind of debacles piss off the local tribes because their young men join the fighters and promptly get atomized by JDAMs for nothing and losing men for no reason is not covered in the Pashtunwali code.

Kala Gush Nuristan - the Taliban attempted to attack by fire from the mountain to the left and sucked up a couple of 2000 lb JDAM's for their troubles.
Kala Gush Nuristan – the Taliban attempted to attack by fire from the mountain to the left and sucked up a couple of 2000 lb JDAM’s for their troubles.

Around the same time the Kala Gush Taliban were sucking up massive tac air attacks a group of local Taliban launched an effective IED attack which killed 5 Americans in the Marawara valley which is just across the river from Assadabad. I am guessing that the commander of the 101st had enough and went after them with his entire battalion. The villains, who have been openly hanging around Marawara for weeks, rushed in to reinforce the Taliban groups caught in the paratroppers dragnet and the Army has by now killed well over 150 of them.

There is much more American military activity around Jalalabad including flying columns of the varsity Afghan SF with their American advisers who use Toyota trucks just like their Afghan colleges.  These small, fast, powerful formations are by far the most effective joint US/Afghan effort of the war and the only example of real embedded (as opposed to co-located) training currently being done with the Afghans .

Afghan Commandos with embedded American SF pause for a radio check outside their base in Jalalabad. They are heading towards the Southern Triangle which contains Taliban units who operate day and night and have driven the Afghan Security Forces out of many districts.
Afghan Commandos with embedded American SF pause for a radio check outside their base in Jalalabad. They are heading towards the Southern Triangle which contains Taliban units who operate day and night and have driven the Afghan Security Forces out for the time being.  Local traffic always stops well short of the Afghan Commandos who enjoy an excellent reputation among the Afghan population but have pretty strict force protection standards.

The shop keepers, ANP, Provincial Counsel members and various other men of importance can run the Taliban right out of Jalalabad if they want to. But they haven’t which is why this string of bombings is concerning and why the aggressive operations by the U.S. Army in RC East is welcomed news. Focusing on the population doesn’t mean giving the bad guys a free pass which I have written about many times in the past. Herschel Smith over at The Captain’s Journal has consistently covered this aspect of the COIN debate with the most coherent, in depth pieces on the topic.  His latest can be found here and I am, as usual, in complete agreement.

The only way this current, and admittedly troubling, activity inside Jalalabad City is going to stop is if the Taliban out in the districts start getting their asses kicked on a routine basis. That is exactly what is happened in Kunar and Nuristan Province this week and may be happening south of me as I write this post. What I hope to see is a lot more of this aggressive posture because it is the only way those of us in the reconstruction fight will be able to maintain freedom of movement.

Look at the body language here - the guy getting searched has the classic Taliban look; long hair, untrimmed beard, Pakol and high water pants.
Look at the body language here – the guy getting searched has the classic Taliban look; long hair, untrimmed beard, Pakol and high water pants.  The ANP officer recognizes him for what he is and is giving him a pat down but do you note this officers posture? He’s giving this guy a pass

General Petreaus has a window of opportunity to turn this thing around.  He arrived in country today and he may well turn out to be the right man arriving at exactly the right time.  Inshallah.

Petraeus Comes East

The coverage of the impending arrival of General Petraeus to take charge of the Afghan Campaign has been intense.  Pundits both big and small have been offering anaysis almost non-stop – I’m getting Petraeus fatigue reading all this junk.  But for those of you who haven’t reached that point yet here is my contribution on The Aloyna Show:

Apparently this move was greeted by the White House press corps as pure genius on the part of the President and on that I am not too sure.  Granted this is an inspired choice and a much better one than I feared would be made.  I still think General Mattis was the best choice for the job because there needs to be serious reform to how the ground troops are deployed, missioned, and supported with both air and surface delivered fires.  It will be difficult for Gen Petraeus to introduce changes in the ROE because McChrystal worked for him and the current operational constraints iritating the troops had to have been approved by Central Command.

We should start seeing more of this.  In most of the country it is possible, and culturally advisable to move outside the FOB's without the body armor or helmets like this soldier was dpoing last week in Bamiyan. Our Friegn Service Officers could and shold be doing the same in places like Mazar and Herat but instead surround themselves with hire gun guys who have no experience with the local culture and are thus of little use
We should start seeing more of this. In most of the country it is possible, and culturally advisable to move outside the FOB's without the body armor or helmets like this soldier was doing last week in Bamiyan. Our Foreign Service Officers could and should be doing the same in places like Mazar and Herat but instead surround themselves with hired gun guys who have no experience with the local culture and are thus of little use

Changing up the ground game is an urgent requirement but it won’t fix the inherent problem with our efforts in Afghanistan nor has President Obama created conditions he needs to get anything resembling an adequate outcome.  The Rolling Stone article showcased a  dysfunctional senior team which is not exactly news to anyone paying attention for the last 18 months.  The President had the opportunity to  clean house by bringing in a new ambassador, relieving Holbrooke of his Czar duties, because the position is confusing and Holbrooke annoying, and then focus the new team on defining an acceptable end-state and  getting the hell out of here.

The President made a choice which probably seemed to be wise under Chicago rules but was not too damn bright when viewed through the lens of Grand Strategy.  Petraeus made President Obama, his V.P. Joe Bidden and his Secretary of State Hillary Clinton look bad.  Really bad.  When he appeared before the Senate before the Iraq surge those three senators made asses of themselves.   Now they give Petraeus a slight demotion (I guess because he still reports to CENTCOM) and an impossible task as a little payback for past slights and whatever hand Petraeus had in engineering the relief of McChrystal’s predecessor Gen McKiernan.  They sent Petraeus here to fail because even our President and the group of home town dim wits he surrounds himself with know that the military cannot win this thing alone.

Time for a little H.L. Menken; to wit:

“The older I grow the less I esteem mere ideas. In politics, particularly, they are transient and unimportant. …. There are only men who have character and men who lack it.”

Character – that is all that really matters now…does Gen Petraeus have character?  Pulling this goat rope together requires a dynamic leader who motivates the troops, both Afghan and ISAF, for the trials ahead.   I know Gen Mattis could do that because he’s done it, but Gen Petraeus?  We shall soon see.  I am not encouraged by this exchange in the oval office (hat tip to Herschel Smith at The Captains Journal:)

Inside the Oval Office, Obama asked Petraeus, David, tell me now. I want you to be honest with me. You can do this in 18 months?

Sir, I’m confident we can train and hand over to the ANA [Afghan National Army] in that time frame, Petraeus replied.

Good. No problem, the president said. If you can’t do the things you say you can in 18 months, then no one is going to suggest we stay, right?

Yes, sir, in agreement, Petraeus said.

Yes, sir, Mullen said.

The president was crisp but informal. Bob, you have any problems? he asked Gates, who said he was fine with it.

The president then encapsulated the new policy: in quickly, out quickly, focus on Al Qaeda, and build the Afghan Army. I’m not asking you to change what you believe, but if you don’t agree with me that we can execute this, say so now, he said. No one said anything.

Tell me now, Obama repeated.

Fully support, sir, Mullen said.

Ditto, Petraeus said.

The Afghan Security Forces will not be ready in 18 months and everybody knows that.  But that was then and this is now.  Gen Petraeus brings with him great stature.  If he asks for more troops it is hard to see how he could be turned down?  If he reports that he will need more time what can Obama do but give him more time?  One of the most salient facts concerning the Iraq surge which has disappeared down the memory hole is that President Bush pushed that plan on the Pentagon – President Obama doesn’t have a plan to push which means the Pentagon will be dictating to him and not the other way around

In the vast majority of Afghanistan both the military and the Foriegn Service Officers could move like this, unarmored without the Ivanhow suit, and in vehicles which can handle to rural roads without breaking down.  But it takes local knowlege, self confidence, and a laser like focus on the mission to develop the situational awarness required to work like your average NGO guy or gal.  This is a Kiwi patrol in Bamiyan Province near the Bandamer Lakes
In the vast majority of Afghanistan both the military and the Foreign Service Officers (FSO's) could move like this, unarmored without the Ivanhoe suit, and in vehicles which can handle to rural roads without breaking down. But it takes local knowledge, self confidence, and a laser like focus on the mission to develop the situational awareness required to work like your average NGO guy or gal. This is a Kiwi patrol in Bamiyan Province near the Bandeamir Lakes

The military focus remains on Kandahar which has been a disaster to date.  We said we were coming and have been shaping the battle field with SF hits designed to take out Taliban leaders.  They have had some success but it is not working out like we hoped.  The purpose of removing battle leaders in violent night raids is to sow discontent between the troops in the field and their pay masters back in Quetta.  That did not seem to work out in Marjah and in Kandahar it is the bad guys who are running up the numbers from their own JPEL list.  This from Thomas Ruttig in Foreign Policy:

“Kandahar’s deputy mayor Azizullah Yarmal, Abdul Majid Babai the head of the province’s culture and information department, Abdul Jabbar the district governor of Arghandab and Haji Abdul Hai an Abdul Rahman Tokhi the tribal elders — all killed in the past few months. Not to talk about Matiullah Qate the provincial police chief killed by the thugs of a guy who calls himself the Nancy Pelosi of Kandahar’ and the uncounted other Afghans.”

Attempting to Decapitate the southern Taliban just is not working.  If somebody removed all the CEO’s from fortune 500 companies would that automatically mean the companies would fail?  If we lost all 100 of our current senators would our political system be worse or better off?  The enemy always has a vote in war and their vote regarding Kandahar was for us to bring it on.  Our response?  Wait a minute ….we need a do over.

Kandahar is a must win situation of our own making and moving Walid Wali Karzai out of the way so that the new Governor, Tooryali Wesa (a Canadian citizen)  can function with the required authority is a critical task which has fallen on Petraeus.  Marja, although called a “bleeding ulcer” in the Rolling Stone piece is not over and could end up an overall success.  C.J. Chivers from the New York Times has been filing a steady stream of excellent reports and assessments from his embed with the Marines.  His latest on Marja is a fair description of what is going right for the Marines as well as the cost.  The current rules of engagement are restricting the Marines use of fire and thus their ability to maneuver in contact.  The price for that is lost momentum which translate into slower operations.  Which means Marja is costing more time than we anticipated which happens in War and is not necessarily an indicator of failure.

Both Marja and Kandahar are shooting wars.  Groups of fighters who attack our forces in those areas need to be crushed decisively each and every-time they encounter us which we can do now and have done before.  I have been very critical of  the military over the needless deaths caused by dysfunctional procedures to “protect” convoys which have killed over 600 Afghans while not stopping one VBIED attack.  I have heaped scorn upon the military and intelligence systems which allow the senseless bombing of wedding parties and I  think the current application of Special Forces attempting to kill or capture high value targets is stupid.  But when our troops are in contact their priority is to maintain contact until their tormentors are destroyed.  If the bad guys go to ground in a local compound too bad so sad for the people caught in the middle which is exactly our response to non combatants who happen to be danger close during a Drone strike.    There is a word for situations like that “war.”  If local Afghans don’t like it when the effects of war are visited upon them they should make a greater effort to keep the villains away.  That may not be fair but there isn’t a damn thing fair happening in the life cycle of your average tenet farmer in Afghanistan.  And look at what popped up on the wire just now?  Petraeus to modify rules of engagement – well there you go.

outer works from the
The outer works from the Shahr-e Zohak (Red City) fortress in the mountains of Bamiyan Province at the convergence of the Bamiyan and the Kalu rivers. Unfortunately the defenders of this fortress killed the favorite grandson of Genghis Khan in the early 6th century which resulted in annihilation of everyone in the Bamiyan valley when the great Khan visited the area to avenge the death of one of his own. This fort was used during the fighting between the Taliban and local Hazara resistance fighters in the 1990's.

The Taliban ROE is unchanged despite proclamations to the contrary.  Yesterday ISAF found 10 beheaded bodies of local men in the south.  They don’t seem too concerned about generating scores of anti Taliban fighters as they knock off more and more of the tribal leadership.  A famous military quote, attributed to both Andrew and General Stonewall Jackson is to “never take counsel in your fears” which is a bit of wisdom the Taliban have taken to heart in their combat operations and one which we ignore at our own peril.

So now Petraeus comes east to take over the war while fine tuning the “Clear Hold, Build” tactical approach.  Let us hope he has some success but the fact is unless he changes his entire ground scheme his efforts will produce marginal results.  It is time to let the Big Dog have his say and so I leave you with a down and dirty assessment from my father MajGen J.D. Lynch USMC (Ret.)

The clear phase is a military responsibility. There is an impressive number of military personnel in Afghanistan today. I have not seen a breakdown of the ratio of infantry to support troops but suspect that the infantry number is, on a relative scale, low. There are two basic ways for the infantry units to operate in Afghanistan. One is to live and work with and among the people. The other is to live on and operate from, Forward Operating Bases (FOB’s). The former is the course of action more likely to bring positive results. The latter, appears designed with force protection as the dominant factor. I have often wondered if, somewhere, there is an analysis of the infantry strength living among the people and the infantry strength operating from FOB’s.

Despite probable inefficiencies in the use of available infantry units to clear areas as they operate from FOBs , the fact remains that the clear portion of the strategy could be executed with some degree of success.

The hold phase is where the strategy’s serious problems start. There are not enough infantry to clear an area, then hold it for reconstruction projects. Resultantly, the Afghan National Police (ANP) are the logical force to hold a cleared area. Despite the millions of dollars expended to train ANP, there appears to be a shortage. Exacerbating the problem is the fact that the bulk of the population, with ample reason, considers the ANP to be a corrupt, untrustworthy, and illegitimate organization. This problem is compounded by the fact that the bulk of the population also holds the same view of the Karzai government. They consider the central government to be a corrupt, irrelevant entity. The result is that large segments of the population want nothing to do with the ANP or other representatives of the Karzai government intruding on their lives.

The build phase is now largely a figment of the imagination. Neither the major companies operating from FOB’s nor the more agile, smaller companies who live and operate with the Afghan population can operate in the absence of a hold force.

In the final analysis, the three prong national strategy has two broken or missing prongs. It is a charade summing to the point that the problem and its cures are essentially in the political, vice military, realm. It becomes an even greater charade when the world, including our enemies, knows that the U.S. will start withdrawing forces from Afghanistan in July of 2011. The most disgusting reality of all is that the charade and its continuance mean that the lives of American military patriots are being squandered, ruined and/or wasted for no valid reason.

A Trillion Dollars

Yesterday the New York Times reported a stunner which was that the United States has discovered 1 Trillion dollars in untapped mineral wealth in Afghanistan. That news would seem to be a potential game changer and I went out this afternoon to downtown Jalalabad to conduct a couple man on the street interviews with local Afghans. What a shocker – not one guy I asked had any idea about the story which took up some much of the press cycle yesterday.  Not one guy I asked had any idea what the number “trillion” represents.  Yet all understood that there is mineral wealth in the country.  What they don’t understand is how so much wealth could directly benefit them and their fellow citizens.  The concept that a Saudi style money spigot could be turned on and spent on a nation wide program of modernization which would benefit them without their having to pay a penny is impossible for your average Afghan to contemplate.

As expected the Danger Room blog brought some perspective to the story.  Katie Drummond added this post to the debate which jived with what Afghans told me today and that is the potential for mineral development is well known. What is not well known is what it takes to convert mineral potential into wealth.  Educating the Afghan  public about the requirement for all fighting to stop so that the infrastructure can be developed to not only mine but refine these minerals could be a game changer if done correctly. Imagine if every shura in every part of the country with ISAF stressed a sense of urgency about stopping all armed opposition so that the country can get the international investors in so they can start developing the resources which should make every man, woman and child in Afghanistan richer than a Saudi national.  I wonder how much pressure from below that would generate?

This is the land title storage room of the Nangarhar Provincial Agriculture Department. Some of these papers date back a hundred years and fall apart if you touch them. They are not cateloged or organized
This is the land title storage room of the Nangarhar Provincial Agriculture Department. Some of these papers date back a hundred years and fall apart if you touch them. They are not cataloged or organized

Generating popular opinion from below to pressure the various factions from on high who could pocket vast fortunes from Afghanistan’s mineral wealth may be one of the most important things we could do for the people of Afghanistan. It seems that we are getting  asses kicked by the Taliban (actually we are kicking our own asses) despite winning every firefight and there is little doubt that our feckless President will start pulling out next summer.  How fast the military can do that and what will we consider an acceptable end-state remain the Trillion Dollar Question.  The only man who can answer it is our Commander in Chief but he seems has absolutely no clue about anything is general and the art of leadership specifically.   The military/State Department will have to muddle through for lord knows how long and it will not be long before a majority of our fellow Americans ask just what the hell is the point of being there for so long while accomplishing so little at such great cost.

Back to the Trillion dollars – how do you think this mineral wealth is going to play out for the average Afghan citizen?  That may well depend on us and the rest of the international community who remain engaged with Afghanistan.  The worst case example is happening right now with the recent announcement that Afghanistan would “delay” the award of iron ore and natural gas contracts in an effort to stamp out corruption.  This “delay” sounds suspiciously like the last major award to two Chinese firms for the largest known copper deposits in the world.  Firms from American, Canada and Europe were all finalists in that bid until there was a “delay” and the Chinese came out of nowhere to win the bid.  Here is the money quote from the WSJ article liked above:

“Mining could be a major economic contributor. But the Mines Ministry has long been considered among Afghanistan’s most corrupt government departments, and Western officials have repeatedly expressed reservations about the Afghan government awarding concessions for the country’s major mineral deposits, fearful that corrupt officials would hand contracts to bidders who pay the biggest bribes — not who are best suited to actually do the work.”

The Afghans working in this office have to reputation for scrupulos honesty which is no doubt required if they want to avoid being collateral damage in a land dispute - but you see what they are working with - digitizing these form into a searchable data base should be a priority nation wide
The Afghans working in this office have to reputation for scrupulous honesty which is no doubt required if they want to avoid being collateral damage in a land dispute – but you see what they are working with – digitizing these form into a search-able data base should be a priority nation wide

Land disputes generate more killings around Nangarhar Province than Taliban attacks do.  That’s because families who are fighting over land go at it toe to toe where you can’t miss with an AK rifle.  Ten, twelve, fifteen people killed in one of these fights is rather routine.  What if these people thought the land they owned had the potential to earn them riches beyond their wildest dreams?  What if every-time any international talked to any group of Afghans The Message came out over and over and over – that message being “you have to stop the fighting and support development or your leaders will sell the future of your country away to the Chinese for pocket change and you’ll leave nothing for your children but death, disease, and a denuded country where no sane person would want to live.

These titles have the potential to verify land claims which would make families rich beyond their wildest dreams. How important do you think it is that we rapidly preserve these important documents in a tamper proof format to prevent the disinfranchisment of ordinary Afghans?
These titles have the potential to verify land claims which would make families rich beyond their wildest dreams. How important do you think it is that we rapidly preserve these important documents in a tamper proof format to prevent the disenfranchisement of ordinary Afghans?

Land disputes are a problem because  the central government is not perceived as being honest in its dealings with ownership claims.  There are many places in the country where people are squatting on land which is not theirs.  The default position of the government seems to be that if  you cannot prove ownership the land belongs to the Government.  When the government moves to exert eminent domain over land it claims the results are always bloody.

The township of Amanullah Khan in Rodat district where the squatters are being burned out. The ANP has moved down in there in reposnse to sniping from the hills to the right
The township of Amanullah Khan in Rodat district where the squatters are being burned out in an effort to clear the land so it can be sold by the Provincial government. The ANP has moved down in there in response to sniping from the hills to the left.
A member of the Provincial Counsil and ANP escort work the crowd to try and prevent rioting. As this picture was taken heavy firing broke out in the valley below
A member of the Provincial Counsil and ANP escort work the crowd to try and prevent rioting. As this picture was taken heavy firing broke out in the valley below
The crowd turned hostile as the shooting started and the local pol and his escort beat a hasty retreat
The crowd turned hostile as the shooting started and the local pol and his escort beat a hasty retreat so the crowd started firing on us
The ANP established a road block on the main Jalalabad - Torkham border road about 100 meters west of the rioting
The ANP established a road block on the main Jalalabad – Torkham border road about 100 meters west of the rioting
Rioting here can get out of hand quickly
Rioting here can get out of hand quickly – there is now a lot of gunfire coming from the crowd and a fair bit of it had been directed our way until we quit the hillside and got in our car to head home.
Locals massing behind the police lines tell us their take on what is going on.
Locals massing behind the police lines tell us their take on what is going on.  They are furious at what they perceive as the powerful taking advantage of their positions to rob them of their lands and livelihoods.  

When I talked with average Afghans about this supposed 1 Trillion dollars of mineral wealth I rapidly discovered that not one them could imagine how all that money could possibly benefit them. The thought that they had rights to minerals in land they owned or that the government would negotiate for tons of cash which would be dispersed  to Afghans just like Saudis do with their oil wealth is beyond their comprehension.

This is an opportunity for us to attack a problem asymmetrically.  Our problem is that we do not have a viable partner in Afghanistan, we do not have a competent Commander in Chief, we do not have  military leadership which has the temperament or confidence required to unleash the superior problem solving and fighting skills of the junior leaders on the ground and we do not have anything remotely resembling professional or competent diplomats. What we do have is a compelling story line which would resonate with the Afghan people if it were messaged correctly. That story line is simple – if you do not force an end to the fighting, if you do not force accountability in your leaders, if you do not stand up for your rights and human dignity then a Trillion Dollars, which should belong to you  is going to flow directly into the banks of Dubai and the coffers of the Peoples Republic of China.

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