Shem Bot and I rolled out to recon another tanker attack last Thursday. Atmospheric collection is continuous; to get a sense of the 5 W’s (who, what, when, where and why) we often do our own BDA (battle damage assessment.) I am most pleased to report that we do not believe the RPG mechanic had anything to do with this latest attack. Looks to be yet another fuel theft which is a booming business these days in Afghan.
I’m going to give you a story board on the fuel tankers while highlighting something that may be a nasty problem for the U.S. Army concerning battle of Wanat which occurred over a year ago in Nuristan Province.
Tomorrow’s Washington Post will contain an article titled “Army Brass Conduct Before Afghan Attack Is Questioned” by Greg Jaffe. Here is an extract from the article:
A member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and an Army historian are raising serious questions about the performance of Army commanders prior to an assault that killed nine U.S. soldiers at a remote outpost in eastern Afghanistan last July.
Sen. James Webb (D-Va.) said he has asked the Pentagon’s inspector general to conduct a formal examination of the Taliban assault and suggested that the Army may have mishandled an investigation of the incident. He also cited the flawed investigation into the death of Army Cpl. Pat Tillman, a well-known football player who was killed by friendly fire in Afghanistan in April 2004.
“The manner in which the Army mishandled the aftermath of Pat Tillman’s tragic death raised serious questions about the integrity of some who held high positions in its leadership structure,” Webb, who saw intense combat as a Marine platoon leader in Vietnam, said in an e-mailed statement. “This incident raises similar questions. Its importance is not merely to provide lessons learned for future operations. It speaks directly about the Army’s ability to speak honestly to itself and to the American public.”
I have met Jim Webb and once saw him give a speech at the Naval Academy which antagonized a Clinton Defense Department official so badly I thought they were going to get into a fist fight right there on stage. He he is no shrinking violet and his interest in this matter is not a good sign for the Army.
Wanat was a minor disaster – the Army lost 9 killed and over 20 wounded out of a force of 42 soldiers and 3 Marines. The only thing which saved the day for these warriors was their own tenacious resistance. Tom Ricks has written extensively on the battle and even has a book out on it. I went back and looked at the intel reports we were receiving back then – primarily from the UN. Wanat is in Bargi Matal District which just fell to the gem smuggling branch of the Taliban last week. Here is a report on that district from the day before the battle for Wanat:
On 12 July, Nuristan Province, Bargi Matal District, unknown time, a group of AGE (approx 600 members) including foreigners has infiltrated into the area. The group is planning to take over the DAC and is currently engaged in an armed clash with the security forces in the area. The district authorities have requested the provincial government to send more reinforcement to help defend the DAC from the insurgents.
DAC stands for District Administrative Center which is the only area under government control in Bargi Matal.
One of the aspects in dispute from this battle is that the senior commanders were not paying attention to the situation in this remote province and sent too small a force on a mission which made little sense. These things happen in war – but it is always the cover up which causes problems and that is clearly what Senator Webb is focused on. One of the reasons the people in Bargi Matal were in no mood to host soldiers had to do with us killing all their doctors and nurses in one very stupid attack. Again I go back to UN reporting from a year ago:
The most notable incident during this reporting period was the killing of three INGO local staff members (along with approximately 13-18 other locals) and the wounding of a fourth by IMF on 4 July. The victims had been warned to evacuate the area by IMF ahead of an imminent operation and were in the process of departing the area when the incident occurred. The NGO staff was travelling in local transport when it was attacked by a helicopter. IMF claimed the victims were AOG, a claim that was subsequently proven incorrect. The security situation in Nuristan has deteriorated rapidly since Governor Nuristani’s removal from office due to his perceived ineffectiveness with dealing with AOG.
AOG = armed opposition groups and IMF = international military forces in UN reporting. This incident was a bad deal, no other way to describe it and the locals were in a state of high agitation about it too. Did you note the name of the Governor who had just been sacked by the Karzai government? Governor Nuristani who was obviously from Nuristan and, given the surname, a man of prominence. Want to bet the locals were steamed about that too? One has to wonder what the plan for Wanat was and why we would send troops there given the amount of bad juju happening in such a remote place. There are no American forces anywhere near this district today – it is now (and should always have been) a problem the Afghans have to deal with.
The Army apparently conducted a very weak investigation into this battle and then tried to put it sown the institutional rabbit hole by removing after action interviews from its Operational Leadership Interview series and issuing well deserved medals for bravery to surviving participants. It is not just ignoring the lessons from this unfortunate incident in question but how the Army fights the counterinsurgency battle. The senior Generals are defending their plan by claiming they were executing current COIN (counterinsurgency) doctrine. Yet it appears they were doing the exact opposite. The troops manning these small combat outposts have limited to no meaningful contact with the local people. They’re too busy defending themselves.
Inspirational senior battle leaders are hard to come by. Qualities which the services value in peace time commanders do not always translate well to combat command especially in counterinsurgency warfare. I do not believe Senator Webb is after the brigade commander directly responsible for the deployment of a under equipped platoon to Wanat last July. I think he has much bigger fish to fry. Maybe some good will come of all this, but that is not normally how these things turn out.
Tim,
Another accurate observation regarding any real appreciation of COIN history. I am still wondering what is the U.S. military “COIN” strategy in Afghanistan? Get through next month’s presidential elections, train-up some ANA/ANP to set-up checkpoints and conduct patrols, and then call it a day? I am weary that the people of Afghanistan will gain anything longterm from the presence of U.S. forces. Like any good guerilla fighter the Taliban and their Arab muj friends disperse to Pakistan whenever things heat-up too much (see the 2nd MEB and their short-term successes in Helmand). They have dispersed the Taliban leadership in the south but my sources tell me longterm ‘nation building’ assistance is slow and not on the scale needed to stem the Taliban’s ideological influences in the Madrassa’s and Mosque’s… American politics and senior military leaders lack endurance to stay the course, hold the ground, and make those in the State Dept accountable for getting those nation building projects running…
As for Senator Webb’s demand for an investigation this will drag on for years I imagine. The Pat Tillman case ran for years and in the end a few slaps on the wrist were handed out, but much like Abu Ghraib the military’s most senior leaders take care to watch for themselves first and should an enlisted service member take the fall or you throw a Reserve GO to the wolves it’s a small price to pay for keeping the machine going…
15-6 investigation report
The Road to Want (Wanat) Part 2
Bloggers Roundtable with COL John Agoglia. You can hear what the COIN Strategy is here:http://www.blogtalkradio.com/bloggersroundtable/2009/07/22/DoDLive-Bloggers-Roundtable-with-Col-John-Agoglia
Col. Agoglia, Director Counterinsurgency Training Center will provide an update on the current curriculum and methodologies used in counterinsurgency training in theater. This was recorded two days ago.
I’ll leave the debate regarding Wanat to those more knowledgeable than I. Certainly they are plenty…. But good read as always….. From the pic of the cab “buckled from the heat” to the “I’m no expert” pic (where you can see both vehicle and payload demise)…. I must agree, this is BS fuel theft. 20,000 to 30,000 litres (typical capacity) of “missing” fuel is not explained unless this cat was hauling an empty tanker (right??). Where does the “off-load” occur, (obviously not where the tanker is “dumped”), and who benefits most? Who’s fuel is this, before the theft and after?? Does anyone really GAS?… Rhetorically speaking of course.
The COIN plan for Afghanistan is much more complex than just getting through the elections and calling it a day. You will never change what is said in the madrassas, but you can change whether or not anyone listens. There are some potentially good signs right now in terms of capabilities and willingness to learn. It’s still going to take time.
As far as Wanat, there were some really basic COIN errors made there, no doubt. The objective now should be to learn, not to roast a battalion commander a year later. I think the problem with the first report is the officer who wrote it didn’t really know COIN, either. There are plenty of good lessons to be learned here.
Agree with you call on the truck, Tim. Theft, covered up by fire.
Hey Tim,
Great post. Just for clarity’s sake: “Wanat” (more properly, “Want”) is actually the District Center for Waigal District of Nuristan, which is in the south-central part of the province near Kunar. During the initial days of the attack, it was mis-reported as being in Dara-i Pech District of Kunar.
Otherwise, keep on keeping on — your blog’s one of the best!
Cheers,
Josh
I just got this a few minutes ago and thought I should pass it along. Tim- I am sure you were well aware of this even before it hit the press.
By RICHARD LARDNER, Associated Press Writer Richard Lardner, Associated Press Writer 1 hr 38 mins ago
WASHINGTON U.S. military authorities in Afghanistan may hire a private contractor to provide around-the-clock security at dozens of bases and protect vehicle convoys moving throughout the country.
The possibility of awarding a security contract comes as the Obama administration is sending thousands of more troops into Afghanistan to quell rising violence fueled by a resurgent Taliban. As the number of American forces grow over the next several months, so too does the demand to guard their outposts.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said he wants to cut back on the use of contractors that now provide a wide range services to American troops in war zones, including transportation, communications, food service, construction, and maintenance. As recently as February, however, Gates called the use of private security contractors in certain parts of Afghanistan “vital” to supporting U.S. bases. A contract for the work also creates job opportunities for Afghans, he said.
But the use of private contractors in Iraq has been highly contentious. Since a September 2007 shooting of Iraqi civilians in Baghdad by guards employed by Blackwater (now Xe Services), critics have urged U.S. officials to maintain much tighter controls over hired guards.
The Washington Post reported Saturday that the Army published a notice July 10 informing interested contractors it was contemplating a contract for “theater-wide” armed security.
“The contract would provide for a variety of security services, to include the static security of compounds on which U.S. and coalition forces reside, and for the protection of mission essential convoys in and around forward operating bases located throughout Afghanistan,” the notice states.
No formal request for proposals has been issued. If the military decides to move ahead, a contract could be awarded by Dec. 1.
Agree with the truck BDA. If it had been an attack, the tank would have burned up.
As far as the cover up goes, I didn’t go to Vietnam and God knows Jim Webb has seen more combat than I have. However, he has a tendency to play both ends against the middle and it will certainly be unfortunate if the Army is shown to need someone like him to keep it honest.
The Thunder Run has linked to this post in the blog post From the Front: 07/27/2009 News and Personal dispatches from the front and the home front.
Hey Tim, no worries. When I was stuck at BAF, I couldn’t access my own blog either. We’ve had scattered reports, too, of Uzbek ISPs blocking us because we’ve been critical of the Karimov regime. Go figure—censorship on both ends of the stick.
The bullet holes in the back of the tanker run vertically up the back of the truck. It seems odd to me that you would shoot up instead of sideways. Possibly the truck was already on it’s side when it was shot? No idea, just an observation from a civilian that watches too much CSI. lol.
Inspirational senior battle leaders are hard to come by. Qualities which the services value in peace time commanders do not always fit the bill, especially in counterinsurgency warfare. Sad, but true. Have you written about the qualities that are needed for effective leadership in this long and drawn out endless engagement?
I’ll post a link to your post over on Facebook.