Kabul - Free Range International

March 21, 2009August 29, 2010

Combat Operator Podcast and the Civilian Surge for Afghanistan

I had a great interview with Jake Allen from the Combat Operator Ezine. He is just as talented on the radio as he is with the pen and it turns out we had met each other several years ago when his former rifle company commander Dave Furness and I dropped by his home in Salt Lake City. In the small world department I should be seeing the good Colonel tomorrow night when he swings through Kabul. Colonel Furness is irritating over two decades of infantry service, multiple combat tours, and he remains in perfect shape and looks like he’s about 37 years old. Smart as a whip, writes way better than I do, no bad back or trick knee or even good scars but a great friend and I could not be prouder seeing him doing so well. There was that kidney stone incident which (unfortunately for Dave) was witnessed by then Captain now Colonel Eric Mellinger acknowledged as one of the best comedic talent amongst our generation of infantry officers. That is a great story involving surprise, suspense, danger (Dave was driving when the stone hit) lots of bad language and a surprise ending. But you won’t get it from me if there is a Marine lurking out there looking for Mess Night material the FRI blog respects the USMC bashido code so you’ll have to look elsewhere. But it is a damn funny story and one which the good Colonel is most reluctant to tell.

Jake and I had wide ranging interview which touched on contractors and reconstruction a topic which is leading current news cycles. You can listen to the interview here. For those who are interested in the private security market you should bookmark Jake’s ezine he is an excellent writer and has a very astute read on the industry. Private security contracting is a growth industry and Jake covers the industry better than any other writer I know.

Afghanistan could use some civilian fire/rescue mentors with modern trucks and equipment. Especially if they could call in medevac birds and use the excellent military trauma centers for serious auto accident victims. That is the kind of operation which would generate nothing but goodwill from your average Afghan

The “civilian surge” has been a topic getting much press as of late. There is little question that Afghanistan could benefit from a surge of civilian reconstruction types with the money and the ability to fund and supervise redevelopment projects. The question is will this “civilian surge” contain people who can do that. Judging from the feeding frenzy I am seeing in the private security market my guess is the answer is no. There are several large US AID prime contractors operating here and they all share similar traits. They have large corporate headquarters in Washington DC. They protect their field teams with expatriate security operatives and live in heavily fortified compounds which is consistent with the contracts they have been awarded. They have lots of corporate overhead to pay for. When they deploy teams into the Provinces it takes a ton of money. Because these are large corporations who are performing a very large contracts the management of money is very strict which I appreciate as a taxpayer but it slows everything down, especially on large complex projects.

I want to be clear about the fact that these companies are running good programs and are executing their assigned projects professionally. There is no question the people on the ground working for these companies are doing great work no question. The point is a ton of money for these projects goes into the front end and most of it is siphoned off before any comes out the receiving end. That fact which is a common complaint aired by Afghan politicians in the local press and thus a point not lost on the Afghan population is compounded with the lack of urgency and commitment with which aid is being delivered.

Work for cash programs can briefly employ massive amounts of manpower. But it takes internationals in the districts to allow these programs to make a significant impact

As I have said many times before you can still travel throughout the majority of Afghanistan without elaborate security measures. Internationals can set up very secure living compounds using the United Nations Minimum Operational Security Standards (UN MOSS) for about half the cost of building a compound to meet the standards on US AID contracts. We need a surge of civilians but it should be a surge of armed contractors who are able to live in the communities with local security. I blogged about exactly that kind of program here and it is this type of cost effective reconstruction that will be effective because it allows capacity building in Afghan firms while keeping the majority of the reconstruction dollars in the Afghan economy.

I would take that concept one step further by saying we should also consider attaching teams of armed contractors directly to maneuver military units. They could represent one of several current US AID programs which are designed to fund and mentor small to medium Afghan businesses. That would instantly magnify the already considerable positive economic impact of the current Commanders Emergency Funds Program (CERP) by allowing a commander to turn to his civvie contractor team and say “I want to get the machinery in here to open this green marble quarry find a program that can fund it.” That would take one phone call right to the ops guy in Kabul for ASMED or one of the many other US AID programs set up to create Afghan enterprises and you’re funded. Working with US AID money is a pain due to the required accounting and reporting procedures but with a small staff embedded into the military you can manage the paperwork delivering aid and starting capitol with precision. And it is dirt cheap compared to how we are doing it now and better yet it would directly support the efforts of maneuver commanders who are on the ground and know much more about what is needed than their US AID or State counterparts in Kabul.

The French are getting better at moving through the constricted Mahipar Pass. They are much more relaxed too as they have gotten very used to running this road which leads to Surobi

Also mentioned in the podcast was a current shortage of weapons in the Kabul area. I was trying to find a good pistol for a friend and discovered that all the old sources are not selling any weapons at the moment. There are a hundred theories floating about concerning why this is the case I have my suspicions but don’t really know. What I can say with authority that it is not a positive sign. And then this pops up today in the media. Ten policemen and a district chief ambushed way up north in Jawzjan Province. There were some dusts ups in that province last summer between the police and armed fighters representing who knows but they didn’t amount to much with the ANP easily driving off their antagonists. The provincial chief of police says the Taliban were responsible and that he has also arrested four of the attackers. That is hard to believe so I put a call into the Bot but he’s in Mazar-e-Sharif which is completely locked down due to today’s New Years visit by the foreign ministers from Iran and Tajikistan. He’s not too sure Taliban would be poking around up there but is alarmed with the proficiency of the bad guys who did this one. Ten killed, four more wounded – that was an ambush conducted with a good degree of skillful planning and execution. We would hate to see that kind of stuff happening with any degree of regularity.

As I said the Bot is on lockdown but I’m not sure what that means. Here is more or less the end of our conversation.

Bot “On lock down mate going to go on the piss with the boys”

Me “how are you going to go on the piss if you’re locked down?”

Bot “I’m not that locked down mate for God sakes man”

Me “Oh then what does lockdown mean?”

Bot “It means I’m going on the piss mate what’s the problem”

Me “You know what I mean where is my Blog post?”

Bot “Now you done it mate XXXXXX and further more mate here is another fact XXXXXXXXXX etc”

I can’t print the rest because then this post won’t get through my Dad’s net nanny which would precipitate a harsh email from him with foul language which somehow escapes his net nanny via the outlook program. Who knows how that works? For the hundreds who have asked the Shem Bot is fine and will post again once he has recovered from being “locked down.”

January 22, 2009May 6, 2025

Approaching the Tipping Point

The Fab Folk continue to work like demons to maximize their time on the ground. Yesterday they had successful test shots with their fabricated internet antennas to a local NGO and the Nangarhar Public Hospital. They work every evening setting up the XO laptops they have sent in, and early each morning, they meet for a couple of hours to learn Pashto. Their teacher comes from the local school and is a lifelong resident of the local village. He tells me that poverty is driving people to desperate measures despite the very mild winter we have had to date. Frequently, voices call out to him from the shadows at night, “We are Taliban, give us your wallet, watch, and cell phone.” They are not Taliban but men he has known for years. I asked why this was happening because our understanding of Pashtun culture would prohibit such gross criminality inside one’s community. “Yes, this is true, but we are now so poor that the elders do not ask young men where they got this or where they got that; they praise them instead for bringing anything of value, which will ease their poverty.” This is just a hint at the tension under the surface of a population in one of the more affluent portions of Afghanistan.

We have been running the road to Kabul a lot lately, taking people to and from the Airport in Kabul. A couple of days ago, we took Dr. Dave and Dr. Art Mendoza back to Kabul for their flight home and saw the aftermath of a big fight the night before. We were warned before leaving by another security firm (we share all intel at all times in the field) that there had been much fighting outside Gamberi and sure enough when we got to the point in the road where the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) had set up on the shoulders we saw this:

A group of Armed Opposition Group (AOG) fighters sneaked up the draw between the ANA and ANP positions and shot up the truck above with small arms and RPGs. They then fired at the ANP positions to their west and the ANA positions to their east before withdrawing across the Kabul River. The ANA and ANP spent the next hour or so firing at each other. By the time we rolled past the ANA had taken their casualties and withdrawn leaving the poor police to sit in their shallow little holes to suck up all the rain we have been getting of late.

We are convinced that somebody in Laghaman Province is running an RPG gunners school because we see reports of RPG-only attacks on police posts along this portion of the road every 4 to 5 weeks. Normally, they volley 10 rounds rapidly and withdraw, causing little to no damage. But we know at least one RPG mechanic (most likely in Laghman) who can put some English on his rockets and consistently make challenging shots. I bet he has a group of students he is working with, and what better way to train them than to take on the softest of soft targets, like the silly deployment of ANA and ANP forces five feet off the main road? You could tell just by looking at them that they had no fire plans, fire control measures, and probably no plan. They need no more PowerPoint lectures from DynCorp contractors; they need mentors in the field, and there are not enough here.

Yesterday I was returning from dropping off James the Marine, and because I had no choice, I had to make the return drive alone. As I rounded the Mahipar Pass, I saw a wall of trucks pulled off to the side, indicating some tunnel blockage. I moved far enough to get a look before turning around and saw a U.S. Army convoy stopped right in the middle of the pass. Once the traffic stops flowing in Afghanistan, it is very difficult to start again because all the east-bound traffic will move into every nook and cranny available to their front and block the road. Getting them out of your way takes an hour before the convoy can move again. But I was ready checking my wallet to find 100 Euros there I turned around and headed back to the German PX at the ISAF camp outside Kabul to score some premium German beer (at only 12 euro a case) figuring if I had to drive back in the dark I might as well do so with a truck load of beer.

The American convoy is stopped, and the vehicles are stacking up behind it. The same is true to their fron, so when they start moving, they will have to thread their way through the local traffic, which sort of defeats the whole purpose of keeping the traffic away from them at all times. It also makes it easier for the bad guys to target them.

Sure enough, when I returned to the Mahipar Pass, it was clear, and I was driving smoothly for the next 45 minutes until I got outside Surobi. Rounding a corner, I saw all the trucks parked in the right lane, and taking the left lane, I moved far enough down to see the same convoy parked in the middle of the road. They sat there for 30 minutes and then took another 30 minutes to get moving before stopping again, maybe five miles down the road. I had worked my way up to the front of the line by then, and 45 minutes into this stop I approached the convoy tail gunner to ask if they would let me through. He got on the radio and in a few minutes said, “No, because the road to the front is blocked (by the west-bound traffic) and I couldn’t make it through anyway.” I asked him what the problem was and he replied “don’t know” which is precisely the correct answer because he has no business telling me a damn thing.

But the longer we sat, the more upset the locals behind me became. Soon, the sound of a thousand car horns filled the air. Over a hundred men stood around my vehicle, trying to get the ANA troops to let them pass. As is usually the case, several fluent English speakers amongst them came over to chat me up about what was happening. I was as pissed as they were and being a poltroon by nature freely admitted this. Then out of the crowd came a man with a very sick-looking child, and I was pressed into service to intervene on his behalf. I walked over to the tail gunner and asked if a vehicle with a medical emergency could get through. He asked how many more vehicles contain people with medical emergencies, and I glanced back, saw about a thousand cars stacked up behind me, and said “probably about a thousand,” which made the kid laugh. Again, a correct response from the tail gunner, who seems like a great trooper, because if you let one vehicle through, the rest will follow. TIA, this is Afghanistan. To make a long story short, it took me five hours to return to the Taj. Several more times, the American convoy stopped, and each time, the fluent English speaker from Leeds, England, came up to stand near my car. That is a very Pashtun thing to do. He was watching out for me to ensure none of the drivers behind took out their frustrations on the lone American in their midst. Not that I thought this would occur, but it was a nice gesture.

The struggle of the average Afghan to find enough to eat, the continued lack of performance by the Afghan security forces, and the inability of the ISAF military to operate amongst the Afghans without treating every civilian they come in contact with as a crazed jihadist killer are linked. The United States and its allies have spent billions in Afghanistan and have very little to show for it. Afghanistan is currently in a death spiral, not because of a lack of aid funds, but rather how those funds have been spent and allocated. Every indication we see on the ground is that more money will be thrown into the same failed programs currently being implemented; another demonstration that we have not learned any meaningful lessons.

These programs won’t work because they are off-the-shelf solutions designed to make the lives of bureaucrats and contracting officers easy, rather than bringing assistance to the Afghans. The Department of State has spent 2.5 BILLION bringing in police trainers, jail guard trainers, and lawyers to train the judges. Now, what the hell does anyone at DynCorp or PAE know about Afghan police or Afghan jurisprudence? Nothing, of course, but that is not why they win these large, lucrative contracts; it is because they already have large, lucrative contracts and therefore know how to work with DS contracting officers to make their lives easier. What is the return on our investment? After the large-scale jail break in Kandahar last summer, investigators discovered over 100 illegal cell phones in the hands of inmates. When we capture important Taliban leaders and send them to the central Afghan jail at Pul-i-Charki, they are often back home before the soldiers who delivered them. The Afghan police are unreliable and prone to preying on the population. The current Afghan government is more of a problem than a solution. It is being out-governed by the Taliban in the many districts under Taliban control. Who “built capacity” with these Taliban? How many billions of dollars were spent teaching the Taliban to administer justice and civil control so effectively?

The State Department used off-the-shelf solutions, which had nothing to do with the situation in Afghanistan and everything to do with what was easy for the Department of State. After all, when you spend all your time in Afghanistan locked inside a gigantic posh embassy compound, how in the world would you know what the Afghans need? You are forced to work through the Afghan government. Have you ever read a news story about the Afghan government that was not about the appalling corruption found at every level in every ministry? I would say you have not, but as an insider, I will tell you there is one ministry, the aviation ministry, that is as honest and effective as its international counterparts.

The State Department is and has been the lead agency in Afghanistan, and its performance here is a fiasco, as it is in Iraq. Remember that Paul Brenner was President Bush’s compromise between Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon. He gave the boys at State a year to get Iraq back on its feet, but Brenner used his 12 months to destroy the country and hamstring our military. He unilaterally made decisions for which we paid in American blood. The price tag for his incompetence paid by the Iraqis is probably beyond measure. Colin Powell, who foisted Brenner upon Iraq, had more to do with the fiasco portion of that war than Rumsfeld. Still, you’d have to do some serious archival research to know it because the nitwits in the MSM would not in a million years burden the people of America with good, honest reporting that strayed from their preferred narrative.

That is not to say that the US Military has demonstrated the capacity, tactical flexibility, or ability to assess the situation on the ground, learn from past mistakes, and formulate a strategic framework under which all operations in Afghanistan can be conducted. They have not, and we are risking another Vietnam, and I am not talking about getting beaten by the ragtag assortment of Taliban and neo Taliban on the field of battle. I am talking about having the American peoples will to fight crippled by a media who can reveal that the Generals are spinning tales that are as stupid and uninformed as the old “five O’ Clock follies” in Saigon were back in Vietnam. Let me clarify: I am not critical of the American (or any other ISAF) soldier here doing his duty. All of them volunteered to join the military during wartime, and their grit, determination to do what is right, and courage are commendable.

I am critical of the generals who seem unable to implement the very doctrine they tout as the answer to the counterinsurgency battle. I am not the only one who sees things this way. Please take the time to read this excellent piece by a retired Army Colonel who is a much better writer than I am. He calls for a massive forced retirement amongst American General Officers, which would be a smart move given their lackluster performance and one with serious historical precedent.

The only reason we are not at the point where the American people start to treat their military in the manner it was treated in the early seventies is that our media is even more incompetent than the Department of State or the Pentagon. If we had the same type of reporters as the ones who worked in Vietnam year in and year out, they would be able to throw the BS flag at every single briefing they are given, because the things I hear the big Army saying about the situation here are flat-out nonsense. This situation will not last much longer. As I saw when talking with Martha Raddatz, the Senior Foreign Affairs Correspondent from ABC News, the drive-by media is starting to get a clue. The only thing stopping her from getting a comprehensive first-hand view of how silly the DS and military approach is to this conflict is her own silly corporate “force protection” rules. But she got an earful from me and spent a few hours roaming the countryside like the thousands of other internationals living and working here. Not that you can do that in every district or province in Afghanistan, there are many where it would now be suicidal for a westerner to walk around, knowing where you are safe and where you are not is the most basic function of military intelligence. Why we cannot figure that out and act accordingly is beyond me.

Here is the connection to my rambling observations. If our billions of dollars went to implement the infrastructure improvements that the Afghans at the district level have been pleading for during the last six to seven years, you could instantly start employing massive amounts of idle, unemployed men. But you cannot do this with the Department of State contracting vehicles or through large, bloated, international companies like Louis Berger, DynCorp, PAE, KBR, or any other current “implementers” receiving most of the reconstruction monies. You need a company like Louis Berger to build big things like hydroelectric dams, posh embassy compounds, or international airports. You do not need Louis Berger to build roads and schools. The Afghans can do that themselves. You also don’t need the nitwits of Foggy Bottom deciding how to implement a reconstruction plan because what you get is what the average Afghan sees now. Lots of police posts, government office buildings, and training bases are being built for the very people and organizations who abuse them, steal from them, and fail to protect them from other (nonuniformed) criminals or the Taliban. The only way forward is for civil-military teams to stay in the community and green-light and supervise Afghan-designed and built irrigation, road, and micro-hydro projects. An excellent prototype of this kind of team worked in Afghanistan in the early days before the Big Army came and put all the SF teams back inside the large FOBs. It will be the topic of my next post.

January 14, 2009May 17, 2024

Fab Lab Surge and ABC News

The Fab Lab team has arrived and is now hard at work. They are blogging daily and you can monitor their progress here. They’re doing cool stuff like fabricating antenna’s to share our fatpipe internet with the local schools and NGO’s. They’re raising money to buy XO Laptops for every 6th grader in the local (Bagrami) school. They’re setting the local kids up with a tee shirt business to fund the Jalalabad FabLab operations and the local kids are beside themselves with opportunity that just landed on their doorstep.

Amy and her roommate Kieth from MIT – the Fab Lab advance party

We have had to run up to Kabul and back several times to get all the Fab Folk to Jalalabad. The Jalalabad to Kabul road is a vitally important supply route to both the military and the government of Afghanistan. There were several attacks on the road this past summer and there continues to be problems on it now despite the winter weather. We saw several interesting things along the route and the first was the number of French Army troops transiting from Kabul to Surobi.

French troops on the road outside of Kabul

Surobi is a large hamlet half way between Kabul and Jalalabad, last August the French suffered a humiliating defeat in the Uzbin valley which is just to the north of Surobi. The town has long been considered to be sympathetic if not supportive of Gulbiddin Hekmatyar and his party Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG.) We see sunburned adult males with high-water trousers, tennis shoes, and black turbans every time we pass through Surobi. They could be Sheppard’s or gold miners but it’s a safe bet their Taliban fighters hitting Surobi in for in-country R&R (rest and recreation).

The French have been serious about establishing a presence in Surobi since their first unfortunate encounter with the Taliban. They are keeping units in the field 24/7; have launched several operations which have netted some prominent local commanders (according to UN incident reporting). It’s good to see our ISAF allies taking the initiative, going on the offensive and clearing out such an important area.

But after you clear an area you have to hold it and it will be interesting to see how (or if) they do that. The operations in Surobi are not impacting the repeated attacks on the Kabul/Jalalabad road – with one exception. We’ve heard from reliable sources they tracked down and killed The Mechanic. It appears to be true too because it’s been months since we’ve seen his signature long range pin point RPG shots nailing tankers. The tankers are still getting nailed but only other portions of the road that allow ambush from rifle and machinegun range.

As noted in previous posts these occur in the Tangi valley area east of Surobi and in portions of Laghman Province below the Tangi. Both the ANP and ANA have posted small units along the road to augment the numerous permanent police posts. As you can see from the pictures below the positions they have set up are weak at best and their patrol routine, which appears to be sitting by the side of the road, is not proving very effective.

Typical ANP deployment on the Jbad – Kabul road

ANP machinegun crew – they are not dug in and they don’t move so they are not accomplishing much

Here is an intel report from one of the PSC’s (the private security companies in Afghanistan do a lot of intel sharing with each other.)

Laghman Province, Qarghayi District, Route 1-area of Tangy

AOG Vehicle Checkpoint 05 January 2009, between 1630-1700 hrs

A doctor who works for a NGO was returning to Jalalabad from Kabul alone in his private car, when his vehicle was forced to stop by a group of armed men. The doctor was then questioned about his work and personal behaviour. He was finally allowed to proceed unharmed when, on seeing the cassette player in the vehicle, the armed men instructed the doctor to play a cassette found in the vehicle. The cassette played was a religious tape and satisfied the requirements of those who had stopped the car. Despite reported increased security force deployments, this is the third reported instance of AOG activity on Route 1 in the Tangy area since 31 Dec 08. All three incidents have occurred in daylight hours and two have been attacks on military vehicles. These incidents should demonstrate to all the risk of travel along Route 1 between Kabul-Jalalabad at any time of day. Any international staff using Route 1 should expect further instances such as that outlined in this report and seek alternative means of travel between Jalalabad-Kabul.

Along with the above report, we have made several trips the past few days along the route. A few ANA vehicles have been pulled off the side of the road about half way back to Kabul, and the soldiers were in a defensive posture behind their vehicles, weapons pointed at the high ground. Most likely some pot shots taken at the ANA as they passed thru.

The Kabul to Jalalabad route is one of the most important in Afghanistan. The effort being expended to secure this route is currently being wasted because the troops are being deployed in poorly sited positions and being tasked to do nothing other than sit there. There is an easy fix and that would be to embed and infantry squad into the Qarghayi District ANP headquarters with a mission style order. It should sound something like this; “Sergeant you’ve got six months to work with these guys and stop any and all attempts to attack this vital route, go down there scout it out, come up with a plan and I’ll see you in five days so you can brief me on your plan. ”

Winning the IED battle requires that you kill the IED makers and you can only do that if they are unmasked by the people. To reach the people with the consistency required to gain that level of cooperation requires that you leave the big armored vehicles and spend time (lots of it) among the people. I am pretty sure that if you consult the Pentagon’s counterinsurgency manual you’ll find that it says more less exactly the same thing.

It is always a good sign to see American soldiers getting a handle on the recent attacks

There is hope for those of us who use the Kabul Jbad road frequently and that is the appearance of a small American patrol right in the heart of the Tangy valley visiting the local ANA checkpoint. Inshallah they will be spending some time and effort trying to help the various small unit commanders develop a more aggressive plan to secure the route. We did not encounter any problems on our numerous trips to Kabul and back. What follows is some photo blogging about the Fab Folk we are hosting and some of the things they are up to.

Kieth, Steve and Carl from the Fab Folk team. Carl is from South Africa, Kieth and Steve are Americans. The Taj manager Mehrab is pulling interpreter duty – he is between Steve and Carl

Smari and Andres – Fab Folk from Iceland

Miss Lucy, a former US Navy officer, getting ready to cross the Kabul river from Little Barabad

Steve and Keith getting ready to cross the river to Little Barabad

The Fab Folk took a box of stuffed animals with them to Little Barabad. Here is a great shot of the girls watching them cross the river

We hosted ABC News reporter Martha Raddatz at the Taj yesterday.

Here’s a link to Martha’s first news story from her visit to Jalalabad.

December 30, 2008May 6, 2025

Dubious News Reports from Afghanistan

An interesting article in the news about Afghanistan today illustrated (to me) the dire straits we now face. A senior USAID officer gave a mildly negative critique of the USAID reconstruction efforts. The story represents a total lack of situational awareness as 2008 draws close.

When you have lived in a poorly understood, distant country like Afghanistan, as long as I have lived here, it is easy to find mistakes in the international press. I am not nitpicking mainstream news reports because they report as fact things I know to be completely untrue. You get that a lot from the media these days.

The article was written by Mark Ward, a senior Foreign Service Officer with US AID, who had just completed an impressively long tour in Afghanistan. Here is the opening paragraph:

“Nearly every observer of Afghanistan, from the most senior U.S. military officers to Washington think tank analysts and everyone in between, agrees that stability in that country demands a multipronged approach involving the military, diplomatic efforts and economic assistance. Having spent nearly the past five years as the senior career officer responsible for U.S. economic assistance to Afghanistan, I agree with those in the military who have said that 80 percent of the struggle for Afghanistan is about reconstruction and sustainable economic development and only 20 percent about military operations. In the face of a heightened Taliban insurgency, the U.S. military has changed its tactics. But if civilian U.S. agencies do not change the ways they deliver economic assistance, they jeopardize their chances for success and risk alienating the Afghan people.”

He is spot on with this assessment. I would judge that he is around six years late, but better late than never. He then goes on to discuss the ramifications to the morale of the American people if, given relaxed security standards, Foreign Service Officers get killed in the line of duty. What??? The American public doesn’t even know what a Foreign Service Officer is, and they couldn’t give a hoot if a few buy the farm in Afghanistan. You have already lost men in Iraq, and that caused no detectable disturbance in the body politic. My friend, FSO Steve Sullivan, was killed by a VBIED in Mosul along with three Blackwater contractors. State Department and contractor casualties are not the same as military casualties because the mainstream media doesn’t treat them the same. You won’t see our names in memorials on Sunday talk shows or PBS, or our numbers included in the national dialogue.

A new administration is also taking office, which will change the tone and tenor of media coverage 180 degrees for reasons that are too obvious to mention. I do not believe for a second that the concern about FSO casualties will in any way affect (or even register with) the will of the American people to continue our efforts in Afghanistan.

This is an excellent picture from an old NYT article by Moises Saman

Mr. Ward concludes his article with this paragraph:

“The new team at the State Department and USAID should engage a team of outside experts to conduct an objective assessment of the security rules and their impact on our economic assistance program in Afghanistan. The review should give due weight to the importance of interacting with the Afghan people to hear their ideas, get to know them and gain their trust. It should rigorously test the theories about what would happen if an increasing number of Foreign Service officers were killed and injured as a result. And it should look at other donor countries’ approach to security in Afghanistan. Some have the balance between security and access about right, particularly in parts of the country where security is more permissive.”

We do not need expensive DC-based contractors to conduct a review of security procedures or conduct an assessment of the consequences of increased Foreign Service officer casualties. There is a seven-year track record in Afghanistan from governmental and nongovernmental organizations operating precisely as Mr. Ward advocates. The government of Japan has over 100 “Foreign Service officers” (the Japanese do not use that term) spread out from Mazar-e-Sharif to Jalalabad, working every day in Afghan ministries and offices, mentoring their Afghan colleagues. They do this on a security budget that is less than the cost of providing bottled water to the US Embassy compound in Kabul. The Japan International Cooperation Agency uses the same security guidelines as every other international organization in Afghanistan (except for the US AID contractors who use DS guidelines), and that is the UN minimum occupational safety standards (UN MOSS.)

The UN MOSS standards are not applicable in contested provinces (Helmand, Zabul, Kandahar, etc). In those provinces, the best solution would be to turn over all reconstruction monies to our military, which has repeatedly demonstrated that they are better at delivering reconstruction aid anyway. For the rest of the country, the US could start sending its FSOs out into the provinces immediately and be reasonably sure that any casualties they take would come from motor vehicle accidents, one of the bigger threats faced by internationals living outside the wire. There have been IGO and NGO casualties in Afghanistan, but they are rare and disproportionately suffered by those who choose not to use armed security. By that I mean those organizations that place stickers on their vehicles of an AK 47 with a red circle and a line drawn through it. Nothing says “I am important and unarmed” like a new SUV with “no weapons on board” stickers. This is not a country where it is wise to advertise that you are both essential and unarmed. It is a dangerous place, but the risks are manageable and reasonable, which has been proven by JICA and the hundreds of other organizations currently operating outside the wire in Afghanistan.

The last time I was at the Kabul International Airport I saw a group of embassy workers being escorted from the VIP parking lot adjacent to the terminal to the front door by four Blackwater contractors with weapons and complete kit. I would submit that having armed men escort your diplomats the entire 100 yards from the parking lots to the front door is not only unnecessary but insulting to the host nation. The men Blackwater places on the embassy contract are highly trained operatives who must maintain rigorous weapons proficiency standards and top-secret security clearances. They would be of much greater use out in the provinces and undoubtedly be much happier roaming around the countryside where their skill set is used. Parading around the Kabul airport with rifles at the ready is silly.

I applaud Mr. Ward for highlighting this issue in Washington, D.C.. Still, I must stress that we must adopt a sense of urgency regarding the rapidly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. We do not have the time or money to study what to do; it is time to do. The way forward had been marked by the thousands of internationals operating inside Afghanistan daily, using the UN MOSS security guidelines. The American Embassy and US AID already have dozens of highly trained security contractors in Kabul. It is time to put them to better use.

December 10, 2008May 12, 2024

Irregular Warfare

The Pentagon recently released a directive on Irregular Warfare that has generated speculation among the various players in Afghanistan. When you see documents that say “The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff shall” it is a powerful piece of paper from on high. There are a finite number of people in the world who can task four star generals or deputy secretaries of defense and professionals in the business study these directives as if they were the Dead Sea Scrolls. This comment came from a discussion thread in a group I belong to.

“I find it particularly interesting that DoD would come up with a “Directive of the obvious”… For all of its claims the Army as an organization doesn’t learn so quickly. I suppose that it took years of doing the same things expecting different results for the light to shine on reality. Not to be condescending in any way; I am glad to see the directive has been introduced. I hope that it grows roots quickly and flourishes… There is a full-spectrum under which many current peripheral entities can be brought to bear in order to surpass the expectations that DoD may currently have.”

I could not have said it better myself; it will be interesting to see how this directive impacts the template used by the U.S. military as it introduces more maneuver units into the country. Reports in the press indicate that the Army is planning on sending combat units in to Loghar and Wardak Provinces which are just outside of Kabul. The Marine Corps appears to be preparing to deploy in expeditionary force strength into the south. That could mean up to three infantry regiments of Marines with all their supporting arms, aircraft and logistics. That is a lot of gunfighters. The Question is – does it matter?

The Taliban control large swaths of Afghanistan not because they are better fighters but because they are beating the Karzai regime with better governance in the areas they control. The people know that a Taliban tribunal will not award land and water rights based on the largest bribe. They also know that once a case is settled the dispute is over. Fire fights between families involved in land and water disputes are frequent and bloody affairs in areas under government control. In areas under Taliban control the losing party accepts the Taliban ruling or takes 15 rounds in the chest. People tend to cooperate in systems like that.

But they don’t like it too much and would rather see a platoon of Marines or Army soldiers hanging around than a crew of religious zealots. It would be a pleasant surprise to see the Army and Marine units who flow into the country next year deployed down to the district level. I suspect that there will be tentative steps to branch out like that and these steps will involve what the new directive terms “civilian-military teams.”

That will be interesting to see play out and I believe small teams at the district level can, if properly funded and deployed, make a difference in the battle to control the only thing that matters in Afghanistan. The people.

Getting ready for a road mission. The guy on the right is our buddy Brandon who just graduated college and is in Nangarhar teaching orphans English (a story line he is planning to use to pick up women when he returns home; we’re coaching him on the art of seduction but he’s a big Liberal and isn’t catching on too well). The pixalated guys are American SF – Shem and I are in the middle.

We were able to conduct a “civilian-military team” field trial a few days ago during a road mission to Kabul (to re-stock the bar). This was a demonstration to our SF buddies of why we prefer unarmored local vehicles and they caught on fast. One of the Captains remarked that he never really got to see too much of the country because his visibility in an armored hummer was so restricted. They also marveled at how we attracted no attention (except in the busy main street of Surobi; a HIG R&R village). We also rolled up on a French convoy which gave the boys an excellent opportunity to experience the joy of low visibility ops when the Frenchman manning the trail .50 cal swung the barrel towards us.

Ah yes using local transport - always a good deal — Using local transport is not always a good deal

The military travels in convoys that do not allow the local vehicles to get near them. They do this to avoid being hit by “suicide vehicle borne improvised explosive devices” (VBIED’s). In the south Canadian and British forces force all traffic off the roads they are driving down to prevent VBIED’s. In the east sometimes all the traffic will pull off the road when they see an American convoy approaching and sometimes it won’t.

One of the Army officers had "good glass" on his camera and took this photo which I think looks pretty damn cool - if I say so myself — One of the Army officers had “good glass” on his camera and took this photo which I think looks pretty damn cool – if I say so myself

Using unarmored local vehicles with light body armor and fighting kit is another option. This appears to be taking unwarranted risks but I’ll let the quote below from Vietnam legend Col David Hackworth address the issue.
“In Vietnam, today’s most successful infantry tactics and techniques were yesterday’s heresy and madness. When these ‘overly reckless’ ideas were first introduced by farseeing innovators in 1965 and 1966, few commanders took them seriously. Most, because of parochial conventional orientation, looked upon these new concepts with contempt not unlike many reactionary English lords’ attitude toward the longbow before Crecy. But today in Vietnam, these once ‘wild schemes’ have become standard drill. These bold techniques have changed the thrust of the war from uneconomical multi brigade operations to fights that are fought almost exclusively by the squad and platoon.”

That was true in Vietnam and it’s true today; we need to win the people and that means being in the with them 24/7. We can do it and do it for pennies on the dollar we currently spend. But only if we reach back to our past and remember how to conduct independent small unit operations on a very large scale. Let them live and move around like we do and you’re talking change you can really believe in.

Another cool photo shot with the good glass - this is the Mahipar Pass outside Kabul — Another cool photo shot with the good glass – this is the Mahipar Pass outside Kabul

It is time for some “outside the box” thinking and last week’s demonstration may lead to more discussions between the big base behind the wire military and all the other internationals in Afghanistan who feel safer at night on the streets of Kabul or Jalalabad than we do in Washington DC or Chicago.

November 26, 2008April 29, 2025

Change you can believe in

Today started great, I am back in Jalalabad after completing a short job which I cannot freely blog about, and the weather is perfect. I fired up the computer and checked in with Power Line to find this excellent story about a Marine rifle platoon that 250 Taliban ambushed. They routed the Taliban and sent them fleeing from the battlefield in panic, with the designated marksmen putting down dozens of the enemy fighters using their excellent M-14 DMR. The M-14 DMR fires a 175-grain 7.62x51mm match round through a 22-inch stainless steel match grade barrel at 2,837 fps out of the muzzle. Marine marksmen can routinely hit individuals at 850 meters with this rifle, and because of the round, it has real stopping power. You won’t see a Taliban fighter take six hits with this beast and keep running (which happens frequently with the M4). You won’t see a Taliban or any other kind of human take two rounds and keep moving.

The Marine story made my day and validated something I have said repeatedly on Covert Radio which is you can move anywhere in this country with a platoon of infantry. The Taliban, rent-a-Taliban, criminals, and warlord-affiliated fighters cannot stand up to the punishment a well-trained platoon can inflict. NATO needs to learn this lesson quickly. The French lost almost a dozen men in an ambush up in the Uzbin valley in August. In that very same valley last month a force of 300 French troopers conducted a “tactical retrograde” leaving behind sophisticated anti tank missiles in the process when they were confronted by a small force of Taliban. When a much larger enemy force hit the Marines, the entire unit immediately got onto the flanks of the ambushers and rolled them up to free the men trapped in the kill zone. Once they accomplished this, they maintained contact until the Taliban broke and ran.

Conversely, the French expended all their resources and energy trying to break contact and recover casualties, a tactic not unheard of among other NATO military units. The point to all this isn’t that the Marines are great and the French army is not, but rather it’s difficult to build and sustain good infantry. NATO countries did not have to worry about producing quality infantry over the past 50 years; instead, they allowed America to shoulder that burden while they developed their economies with the money they would have otherwise needed for national defense. Producing good infantry requires a confident attitude and mindset not typically found in polite society, but when Europeans are faced with adversity, they will develop effective infantry units. You’ll know when they do because you’ll start seeing 30-man platoons from NATO countries running all over the country, hoping against hope that 200 to 300 Taliban are stupid enough to try and take them on.

Fighting in the town of Garmsir last summer - the 24th MEU drove the Taliban out of that district in a 72 hour blitz while taking just one casualty — Fighting in the town of Garmsir last summer – the 24th MEU drove the Taliban out of that district in a 72 hour blitz while taking just one casualty..

I enjoy it when events validate some of the things I say in this blog or on Covert Radio. Still, this excellent story of combat dominance will have absolutely no impact on the situation in Afghanistan at all. You cannot win here by just killing people, nor can you deal the Taliban and their affiliates a decisive blow, because they are not a unified movement, and their leaders are all in Pakistan, outside our reach. The people of Afghanistan are the prize of this contest, and a few of them are down in the Helmand or Farah Provinces. While the Marines dominate their area of operations, the rest of the country is falling outside of central government control. Every district, town, and village in Afghanistan has some ongoing land or water dispute, and land disputes here are often deadly affairs. We routinely see clashes between clans over land disputes in UN security reports, and some of these conflicts result in over a dozen casualties. When the Taliban move into an area they decide these disputes using Sharia law instead of who can pay the biggest bribe. They are considered fair in most of these rulings and will tolerate no armed fighting over disputes once a case has been decided upon. A country doesn’t lose a war against insurgents by being out-fought; they lose by being out-governed, which is exactly what is happening all over this country.

Last night, I was chatting down at the new and improved Tiki Bar with some old friends who have considerable experience in Afghanistan. One of them first came here with an NGO in 1996, and the other in 2002. Our conversation was all about change. When I first arrived in Afghanistan, it took about six hours to drive between Jalalabad, which is now a 90-minute drive. In Kabul, it was rare to see a woman who was not wearing a burka, and today the opposite is the case. In Jalalabad, which is one of the largest cities in the Pashtun belt, not all women here wear the hated burka.

Duranta area of Jalalabad this local woman and her daughter walked in and joined us for lunch without ever saying a word.

However, there is a fundamental change that will never be reversed. The change you can believe in is computers and the Internet.

Middle School girls in Jalalabad summer 2008 — Middle School girls in Jalalabad, summer 2008

Computers provide access to knowledge for children who are impoverished and eager to learn about the world around them. That genie is now long out of the bottle, and my friends and I believe that the sudden surge towards modernity is spooking many of the elders who play such an important role in tribal life. We noted the backlash in Peshawar where the Pakistani Taliban is trying to reverse the headlong rush towards modernity by forcing the woman back into the burka (and with some short term success at the moment.) Peshawar used to be a very modern place that welcomed internationals and where very few women could be seen in the burka just two years ago. Not true today, and you can’t buy CDs or pirated movies either. There are many forces at play in Central Asia, and the most significant one has its momentum and will continue to generate a range of unintended consequences as it unfolds. Knowledge is power extreme poverty is motivation and the people of Afghanistan, Pakistan and all the other Stans are very motivated to acquire the power of knowledge.

We cannot control the effects of the explosive power of the internet and computers on the local people. What we can do is to continue developing the infrastructure while providing a secure environment in which the Afghans can build their economy. Security in the Afghan context requires boots on the ground doing what the Marines did in Shewan. Small units who are constantly outside the wire with the Afghan people and who crush anyone silly enough to fight them, even if they are outnumbered 20 to 1. Combat is a dangerous business, requiring men who can endure incredible hardships and discomfort while maintaining their motivation and, most importantly, a sense of humor.

Good infantry doesn’t need ice cream every day or the cushy barracks found at the Khandahar airfield; they need water, chow, lots of ammunition, and leaders who trust them. The Marine Commander down south is Colonel Duffy White, a close friend, an extraordinarily competent and experienced warrior, and a man who combines pragmatism with a great sense of humor. America has a few more like him, as do our allies. I hope to see them in-country soon, utilizing the decentralized tactics necessary to provide security to people living outside main cities and military bases.

Poor Bloody Infantry - they wouldn't have it any other way — Poor Bloody Infantry – they wouldn’t have it any other way

This morning’s email contained two different security alerts about impending attacks on the vital Jalalabad-Kabul road. We have been here for almost eight years and still have not oriented our forces to provide security for the vast majority of the Afghan population. We are running out of time but it is not too late to get more of our forces oriented on the population and operating like the lone rifle platoon from the 2nd Battalion 7th Marines did in Shewan a few days ago. That requires courage from commanders on high, there are troops on the ground who already have that courage and are ready to fight like lions to give people they do not know a chance to enter the modern world. That is a worthy fight by any standard of measurement.

November 19, 2008April 29, 2025

Shakedown

We had to make a run to Kabul last Friday to take some clients to the airport and to pick up new ones. The Jalalabad to Kabul road is considered very dangerous by the military and US State Department, of medium risk by the UN, and minimal risk by me and the hundreds of internationals who travel the route daily. The Taliban or other Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) have never ambushed internationals on this route with the sole exception of taking some pot shots at a UN convoy last week. The reason this route remains open is that it is too important to all the players in Afghanistan to risk its closure; almost 80% of the Afghan GDP flows along it, so the Taliban would have a real PR problem if they cut it, causing a large-scale humanitarian crisis. The criminal gangs and drug lords who cooperate with the Taliban would also become very agitated if the road were closed and probably turn on any real Taliban groups foolish enough to be within their reach if that happened.

We don’t take this run lightly, but we often choose to make it without body armor or long guns because we fear being ambushed by other villainous members of the Afghan security forces. On Friday, our long string of luck ran out, and we became the latest victim of the Afghan security company game. It cost us two sets of body armor, which we cannot replace because you cannot import body armor into Afghanistan, and we were lucky to get away with the weapons. Although we cannot replace the body armor, we were fortunate to get off lightly; it would be difficult for a small company like ours to raise the funds needed to secure the release of an international prisoner from Pul-e-Charkhi prison.

Many think of private security companies as analogous to mercenary bands with all the associated negative connotations. A few of them are shady companies and deserve all the contempt and bad karma in the world to befall their greedy principals. However, most of the companies operating here are well-run and highly professional. To facilitate the implementation of the rule of law in Afghanistan, they formed an association three years ago to support the effort to regulate the industry. That effort has been stymied at every turn by Afghan government officials who seem less interested in regulation or the rule of law than in establishing rules that benefit them.

Just one of many examples; when the Afghan government wrote the first set of regulations, it stipulated that the payment of all fees and penalties would be made to the Ministry of the Interior (MoI). The Private Security Company Association of Afghanistan (PSCAA) has politely pointed out that the new Afghan constitution explicitly states that all fees and taxes must be paid to the Ministry of Finance. There are sufficient international mentors at the Ministry of Finance (MoF) to ensure that fees paid into the ministry are directed directly to the Government treasury.

It was immediately clear that our assistance in Afghan constitutional law interpretation was not well received and the process has gone downhill ever since. There are still no valid laws regarding PSCs in Afghanistan; however, a series of “temporary” licenses have been issued, which every legitimate company in Afghanistan has acquired. These “temporary” licenses are often overlooked by Afghan security services not under the control of the Ministry of Interior (MoI). Afghan security forces have arrested international workers for licensed PSCs who had individual weapons permits from the MoI and thrown them in jail. Although we cannot replace the body armor stolen from us, we were fortunate to get off lightly; it would be difficult for a small company like ours to raise the funds needed to secure the release of an international prisoner from Pul-e-Charkhi prison.

Here is how it went down. We were through the Mahipar pass and almost to Kabul. We approached the last “S” shaped curve before the Puli Charki checkpoint, and an NDS (National Directorate of Security) checkpoint was set up with belt-fed machine guns off to the side, with a good quarter mile separating the east and west checkpoints.

Unfortunately I did not have the Shem Bot with me so I had Haji jann, my good friend and official driver in the contested areas, come down from Kabul to drive us up. This turned out to be a critical mistake because the NDS will not toy with two armed expats when one is driving. If they see an armed Expat with a local driver, it is an indicator for an ” illegally” armed international, which means big cash if they play their cards right. I flashed my weapons permit and license but the boys noted my two clients, PhD candidates from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) – had body armor. In Afghanistan, body armor (used to protect clients), armored vehicles (also used to protect clients), and two-way radios are considered the tools of war, and those of us working here must obtain licenses for them. However, clients change frequently, so we cannot get individual permits for them. We have also never had a problem with this catch-22 because our language skills and charming personalities normally forestall any potential disagreements.

The reason I take Haji jann on all missions into contested areas is because he is a former Taliban commander of some repute (emphasis on former.) He has also been with me through thick and thin, and I truly appreciate him. We talk for hours, although I understand very little of what he says, but we love to chin wag with each other. I heard him say right after we were stopped something like “the armed white guy is a little crazy and I would not arrest him if I were you.” I gave him the ‘what the fuck’ look, and he didn’t smile, indicating that things were serious.

The National Directorate of Security (NDS) wanted the body armor from my MIT clients because they had no license. They also started searching our baggage, which was problematic. I had another gig starting up in Kabul and had extra rounds, magazines, and a first aid kit, all of which are considered illegal (for internationals) in Afghanistan. The “commander,” who is the pot-bellied, slack-jawed fellow in the black fleece, started pulling all my stuff out for confiscation.

I looked at Haji jann who shook his head slightly giving me the go sign and went off like a firecracker at the “commander” who also instantly lost his cool and started to yell back at me. That is a great sign because it indicates fear on his part, and I knew I was not going to lose my spare ammo (which is expensive) and first aid kit. However, they removed the body armor from my MIT charges, and I could do nothing about it. The “commander” gave me a FU smile when his boys stole the body armor because he knew there was no cell signal in the canyon, so what was I going to do? You can only push so far in a situation like this.

This kind of harassment has been routine for the past 18 months in Kabul. We have been spared because we have the proper licenses and travel in pairs, as a rule. Yesterday, I was copied on an email from the security director of the largest US AID contractor in the country regarding one of their projects in the north. It is slightly redacted:

“This afternoon Gen Khalil, commander of the police in Sherbegan, visited one of our well sites demanding to see the PSC license of (deleted) Security. He informed (deleted) that the license expired and that they have until 16:00 to produce a new one or face arrest. Rather than facing arrest all LN guards were stood down and the Expats and TCNs went to Mazar to stay over for the night. This leaves one of our sites uncovered and can have a serious impact on our operations. Can MOI please as a matter of urgency issue new licenses? Maybe someone in MOI can talk some sense into (deleted) head. His no is xxxxxxx”

LN = local national, TCN = third-country national, Expats = armed Westerners

Which brings us to the US Embassy and how they react to news like this, which is (to my mind) deplorable. The embassy response was:

“We do not encourage US citizens to come to Afghanistan for any reason and will not help you in your dealings with the Afghan government. If you are arrested, we will endeavor to ensure you have adequate food and a blanket.”

Since working as a contractor for the Department of State, I have grown to hate it. I was the project manager for the American Embassy guard force and knew precisely what was going on inside our embassy. I’ll write a book about it one day; the tentative title is ‘Diplomacy is Hard When You’re Fat, Stupid, and Arrogant. ‘

A significant problem with the stability operations part of our campaign in Afghanistan is that the local people do not perceive us as serious. The people are our mission; everything we do should be focused on bringing security and infrastructure to the district level to benefit them. After seven years on the ground, we have yet to accomplish basic infrastructure programs. The most efficient way to do this is with a small number of armed contractors who can work at the district level for extended periods. A few people are doing that right now; they are armed because they have to be, and they are doing the daily quality control of Afghan contractors.

We need more support in this area regarding mentoring and quality control of projects awarded to Afghan small businesses. That level of oversight and reporting brings in donor dollars because the money can be accounted for. Donor dollars and expat project management would significantly help break the funding logjam, which currently hampers the district-level reconstruction of roads, irrigation systems, and micro-hydro power generation.

At some point, one hopes the powers will realize this and aggressively support the Americans and other internationals operating far outside the comfortable confines of Kabul. For now, we are essentially on our own, which will ultimately lead to tragedy. Nothing good will come from continued confrontations between dodgy police running “surprise” checkpoints and armed Westerners.

October 11, 2008February 4, 2017

Heros: Medical Professionals Working Miracles On Their Own Dime

International hospitals in Kabul do not allow cameras on their facilities because of cultural sensitivities. The treatment of female patients by male doctors is not universally accepted in this corner of the world. Educated families in Kabul have no problem with male doctors treating their woman; in the south men will fight to the death to avenge the slight to their family honor if a male doctor so much as looks at their woman. I have been to both the CURE hospital and the French Medical Institute for Children (FMIC) on the job and have a good idea about their missions and operations. I have a good friend who volunteers his time and skill at CURE which is how I was able to obtain these photos. There is also a German hospital in Kabul, but I have never visited it. There are no similar efforts by closer rich influential nations like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or China. I often wonder why?

cleft-baby — Young child in pre-op – his life is about to be changed forever by Americans who are in Kabul at their own expense

Birth defects in Afghanistan are common. The culturally accepted practice of marrying within the family is generally believed to be the cause of this alarming problem. Last winter Phil Woolas, of the British Environmental Ministry ignited a fire storm by calling attention to the alarming rates of birth defects in the Pakistani community due to cousin marriages. Just raising issues like that in England is now grounds for dismissal. That to me is very strange.

In Afghanistan it is common to see children with club feet awkwardly moving down the street. I was born with a club foot. I read somewhere that former Dallas Cowboy quarterback Troy Aiken was too. Correcting that type of birth defect has been a routine procedure in the west for over a hundred years. Correcting those defects is not common here and when you see children with cleft palates or club foots on public they are not laughing and playing. They are out too stigmatized by their appearance in this culture. CURE hospital fixes cleft palates and club feet at no cost to the Afghan families daily. The demand far outstrips their capacity. Like their French counterpart, they also train Afghan doctors to do these procedures and over the years have developed some real talent in the Afghan medical community.

mom-and-child-pre-op — A young mother comforts her child as she waits her turn in the OR

The heroes of this story are the doctors and nurses who volunteer their time and spend their own money to come here and do these procedures. They do not seek attention, they are not self promoters, they live outside the wire without any of the elaborate security procedures found in official US government programs. They come here to help and help they do. My Dad, who is a retired general officer (Marine of course), forwarded me an email he received from a friend about a highly qualified doctor sent to Kabul on a six month deployment. He related a story about going out to the main Kabul hospital to consult on an orthopedic case but getting there (about a mile away from his base) took days as the security escort package was arranged. When he arrived the head of the hospital served up tea and a good hour of chit chat, when the Americans asked to see the patient they came to examine they were told the child was sent to Pakistan for treatment days ago.

This is stupidity beyond measurement. I used to walk to work daily down the same streets he had to travel for his appointment because driving is such a nightmare in downtown Kabul. We are losing the war in Afghanistan and losing it fast and one reason for that is our military acts like force protection is mission number one. Guess what? If force protection is the mission it is easier to do that back in the United States. The US military sent a highly skilled orthopedic surgeon here for a six month tour and all he will do is go to Bagram (his first trip to Bagram took three days as he had to stage a day early at the Kabul military airfield which is half a mile away from his base and wait for a flight. We drive from Kabul to Bagram in 45 minutes) once a month to sit in conferences and suffer death by PowerPoint. His civilian counterparts who are here at their own expense and do not have armored trucks or armed escorts would operate on hundreds of patients and train scores of doctors if they could afford to stay six months. As a retired military officer it pains me to write this but it is true.

bribe-sign — Most Afghans have no idea how they receive treatment without paying bribes but they are thankful. This is how you fight a counterinsurgency, fixing one child at a time with honesty, integrity and compassion.

The doctors who volunteer at CURE also work on adults. Team Texas had a great plastic surgeon who replaced the ear of a truck driver who had lost his to a Taliban checkpoint in the south when he was stopped while hauling fuel for ISAF.

fixed-ear1 — The Taliban may be able to take ears but could never put one back. This lesson will not be lost on the family and friends of this man

The men and women from France, Germany and America who come to this war torn land to help people who are so poor and need so much represent the best of what our countries stand for. To give so much and ask for nothing in return…that means something to me and should to you too. They do not get medals, or bands, or parades, or any formal recognition. They are heroes and do the right thing because it is the right thing to do. They make all of us a little prouder and little better. May God watch over and bless them.

September 13, 2008April 25, 2025

Kabul Re-up Run

Today, the Bot and I had to run to Kabul for a re-up. We started our journey by striking a pose for our sponsor. Well, not a real sponsor, but they sent us some hats, bumper stickers, steak rub, and a generous assortment of candy, so we feel sponsored. Here is Shem (a.k.a. Shem Bot a.k.a. Bot) and I at the start of the day with our signature La Rue Tactical hats. We’ll have to do this again, as the resident expert has told me that this picture lacks technical merit due to failure to use proper lens filters.

The drive was smooth and fast. We rent SUVs and frequently switch them up to avoid standing out on the road. We stop at all checkpoints and chat up the ANP (Afghan National Police), who appreciate that we speak some Pashto and are polite. In this country, a little Pashto or Dari and a big smile will win you a ton of goodwill from the local officials and people.

The problem with traveling in low-profile mode is that running into an ISAF or American military convoy can cause drama. I was shot at by the American Army in downtown Kabul back in ’07 while driving a brand new Armored Land Cruiser with diplomatic plates identifying it as belonging to the Government of Japan. A rear gunner in a five-truck convoy thought I got a little too close to them as they were exiting a traffic circle. I may well have strayed too close, but it never occurred to me that the young trooper would not recognize a large brand-new armored SUV as being on his side. The startled gunner unleashed a good 6-round burst into the hills above my truck (where about 3000 people live packed into squalid mud huts). I was out of the driver’s door and running down the road yelling at this idiot before I realized what I was doing. That startled the five hundred or so Afghan pedestrians who stopped and watched this unfold in utter amazement.

That was an embarrassing incident. Getting too close to the convoy was sloppy on my part; getting shot at was bad, bolting out of the driver’s door without even letting the vehicle stop was awful, but it elicited one of the more memorable quotes from my favorite Japanese client. He was a senior diplomat whom I consider a great man and with whom I was very fond and proud to work. When I came back to the truck, he looked at me, shaking his head and muttering Tim san, I do not understand how you people beat us.

We were jamming up the Mahipar Pass, passing a slow-moving truck, when up pops the American Army in MRAPs, and the Bot swears the turret gunner has his pistol pointed at him. The kid did have his pistol out, but as the more experienced professional, I opined that the chances of him even hitting the car from up on top of that giant armored vehicle were remote. Plus, the soldier was switched on and lowered his pistol once he saw we were expats. The Bot took no comfort from that and unleashed a torrent of invective (as we high-speed writers say) which seemed to calm him down.

Here are the guilty bastards (I say that in good humor) as they moved further down the pass, note the futility of attempting to keep all civilian traffic away from you, which the military tries to do with their convoys. Only once have I seen a convoy of obviously very experienced French soldiers, who moved with the traffic and allowed local vehicles to mix in with their convoy. Solid thinking on their part.

As you can probably tell, the pass is a long series of hairpin switchbacks, and one can always count on an old truck to be broken down and blocking one lane of the road. The fuel truck in this photo is broken down which is why the buses are stacked up behind it. I have spent hours sitting on the road here because a car broke down and blocked one of the four tunnels. Here is another good shot of the Mahpair pass.

After that brief excitement, we headed to Kabul to stock up on essentials, including pasta, seafood, beer, wine, and spirits. We visited our favorite Italian place for a proper sit-down lunch and spent the next few hours exploring Kabul without body armor or long guns. The Kabul PD gets crappy with civilian expats wearing body armor and carrying long guns.

Here is what the ole Haji ride looked like after our last stop in the greater Kabul area:

It was smooth sailing back to the Taj. We made it from Camp Warehouse to here in 85 minutes. There was little traffic on the road, no ISAF convoys, thank god (they can double or triple your trip time and often jam up traffic for 5 to 10 miles behind them because they move so slow), and the weather was perfect. The Taj is now stocked and ready for the arrival of Baba Ken, the leader of the Jbad geek squad. One of the wonders of the third world is the number of young men in these places who are scary proficient with computers.