babatim - Free Range International

October 10, 2008May 11, 2025

Travelling South: Wardak, Ghazni, Zabul, Khandahar

The southern region of Afghanistan is unstable, dangerous, and a hazardous place to travel by road these days. This is a new development that started about one year ago. Before that, we would routinely make trips down to Kandahar, tracing the same route made famous in James Michener’s excellent book Caravans. Back in 2005 and 2006, it was still a risky trip, but the risks were manageable. We always travel in armored trucks in these contested areas, but unlike 98% of the other security companies in Afghanistan, we opted for the low-profile trucks with firing ports. These rides are not comfortable and noisy, but they perform as advertised.

I hate being stuck in large armored SUVs because you are locked in and cannot use your weapons unless the Taliban opens the vehicle for you. Usually, that is done with an RPG, which disables the vehicle and any survivors inside. People working outside the wire in Afghanistan are like people anywhere; they don’t think that they will be targeted or attacked, and therefore, they value the comfort and false sense of security that large, brand-new, armored American SUVs provide.

Hope is not a security plan, but it is the most common plan people use. Every second of every day, somewhere in the world, someone is being victimized. The chances that you are the one being victimized are minimal. But that is irrelevant when you find yourself the target of criminals or terrorists. When that happens, the statistical chances for you are now 100%, and at precisely the time you realize they are 100%, you also discover you are dealing with a pack of wolves (terrorists) or a rabid dog (criminals), and they do not respond to reason.

The route to Kandahar runs southwest through the provinces of Wardak, Ghazni, Zabul, and Kandahar. Up until last year, Wardak and Ghazni provinces were pretty safe. Our Panjshir fighters used to pick up their weapons from the police in Ghazni when operating in Kabul city became too difficult due to police harassment. They are a registered company with weapon permits, but that has nothing to do with getting arrested by the Kabul police. The corruption in Kabul is genuinely stunning, and the local cops have gotten bolder in the last few years. They have even locked up internationals from large security companies who had weapons permits, licenses, and letters from one of the generals running the Ministry of the Interior. Our embassy and those of our allies couldn’t care less; security contractors are as popular with them as an ACORN-trained community activist would be with me. Local Afghan security companies have it much worse, depending on who owns them and who is watching over them. I would go on about this rather sore topic, but prudence dictates I leave this sleeping bear alone.

Our team of Tajik fighters from the Panjshir Valley is getting their weapons and body armor from the ANP in Ghazni. The chief of police there is an uncle of the team leader.

Wardak province is now statistically the most dangerous portion of the trip south. Earlier this month, AOG fighters ambushed a convoy guarded by Afghan security contractors in the middle of the day. They killed three guards in the firefight and captured four whom they beheaded, again in broad daylight, on the main ring road. These AOG fighters call themselves Taliban, but they are not the Taliban we read about training and infiltrating out of Pakistan. The “Taliban” elements who routinely attack military units and oil tankers along the route south are local people who may or may not be sympathetic to the Taliban cause.

Many are local criminals whom the Taliban pay to do their bidding, which is most ironic. The Taliban got their start back in the 90’s in Kandahar by hanging an Afghan soldier (and his commander) who had raped a local school girl the day prior. Mullah Omar was the leader of this group of religious students, which entered the Army camp reportedly armed with only the Koran and self-righteous indignation. I guess that makes Omar sort of an Afghan version of Gandhi because showing up unarmed to lynch a few miscreants is as close to nonviolent protest as Afghans are ever going to get. Instead of protecting the faithful from criminals, they are using criminals to prey on the faithful.

The road out of Wardak descends to the plains of Afghanistan and the ancient city of Ghazni. Ghazni was once considered the most incredible military fort of its day, but that fame was short-lived after the British Army arrived in 1839 and stormed it rather quickly with little effort. Here is how it looked when the British first arrived:

And here is a picture of the city today

Source: http://avalon.unomaha.edu/afghan/afghanistan/ghazni/bz01pic.htm

The Ghazni PRT, run by the American military, sits outside the town astride the main road. Not all the PRTs are manned by Americans; our NATO allies are responsible for over half of them. Here is a map of the PRTs that I pulled from Wikipedia. Like many things on Wikipedia, it is wrong. The Germans man the PRT in Mazar, not the Swedes. The PRT in Lashkar Gah is British, not Canadian ..

us_provincial_reconstruction_teams_in_afghanistan

Knowing which country in which PRT is critical for internationals working in Afghanistan is vital because each nation in ISAF has caveats covering which missions their respective governments authorize them to do. This is a fancy way of saying that many of our allies are not allowed to leave their compounds and come to the rescue of internationals in distress. The American PRTs will always respond to calls for help at any time and in any condition. I understand the Brits, Canadians, and Aussies have identical rules and attitudes. As for the others, you are on your own. Needless to say, these caveats have contributed to the glacier-like pace of international reconstruction.

Like many bases situated in unstable areas, the Ghazni PRT has an aerostatic balloon for surveillance and fire control.

These aerostatic systems are impressive. Some friends and I got to see how they work at FOB Lonestar, right down the road from the Taj in the Khogyani district. The technology is impressive, the capabilities unbelievable, and the details best kept on the low, but trust me, this is one piece of technology worth every penny spent developing it.

Ghazni was the last safe place to stop for needed vehicle maintenance, which we did on one of our trips in the summer of 2006. One of our vehicles had a tire problem, and we wanted to fix it before heading into Indian country. There are no tire stores here, just a stand on the side of the road with a compressor. The stand we pulled into was run by a young boy and his younger brother. Here they are diagnosing the problem.

After diagnosing the problem, the younger of the two must remove the tire using a pry bar and tackle rig.

It was well over 100 degrees that day. If we returned during winter, these two boys would wear the same clothes. The people here are that poor, my friends, and if you think this looks sad, you should see the beggars and trash dump kids. Having patched the tire, the younger child filled it while his brother prepared to mount it on the car. This pit stop was over in 5 minutes. The boys worked with the intensity and speed of a NASCAR pit crew.

Kids with kites usually indicate limited Taliban in the area.

Heading south out of Ghazni towards Qalat, you run through a series of unsafe villages for foreigners, even back in 2006. One of the most notorious was Shah Joy, and it is the scene of the only attack against us, if you could call it that. I was in the trail vehicle when, out of the corner of my eye, I saw a frag grenade sailing towards the truck. We were doing about 70 kph, so hitting us with the thing would not happen, and the bazaar was packed with people. I watched in utter amazement as it went off, clearly injuring some of the bystanders who did not even react when the grenade landed in the middle of the road. How weird is that?

However, the Taliban is not the only threat to the Kabul-Kandahar road. The terrain and weather conspire to sometimes turn this route into a real pain. The only way to build roads in this part of the country is to make them withstand floods. The easiest way to do that is to allow the water to spill over the road in traditional flooding areas. We discovered during a November trip that there are 23 such spots on the road, and here is the first one you run into when heading from Kandahar towards Kabul.

Decision time – cross or wait? I hate being out in the open like this.

We were already late and not too happy about this. The locals were in good cheer and offered all sorts of advice. Understanding when you are in danger and when you are not is a key skill, and these people were not a threat and seemed to enjoy having us stuck there, too.

If you can’t move, the next best thing is to chat up the locals to make sure everything is on the up and up.

One way to tell if they are a threat is to look for high-water pants and tennis shoes. Afghans wear open-toed sandals; tennis shoes are typically seen only on male children and fighters transiting the area. The high-water trousers seem to be a style statement, but I do not know why. In this situation, if you saw a group of men in tennis shoes, the best thing to do is to walk up and offer a formal greeting. If the men do not immediately break into broad smiles and offer a return greeting, they may be Taliban or associates. When that happens, guys like us get in our trucks and turn around because unless they produce a gun, we can do nothing. We operate with the same rules of engagement as our military, but unlike our military, we are also subject to the laws of Afghanistan. Do not be fooled by the mainstream media writing stories about armed contractors being able to do anything they like in Afghanistan. There are expatriates sitting behind bars in the big house at Pul-e-Charkhi to prove that the media reports are fake news.

This logjam was broken when a large bus plowed through the deep, fast-moving water

The truck was followed by a small passenger car, which triggered a mad rush from our side of the river.

If this little car could make it, we were going too

Qalat is the provincial capital of Zabul Province and the home of another impressive old fortress. It has an American PRT co-located inside an ANA base, and they were always very hospitable when we dropped by. Here is what the town looks like as you drive in from the south. Every hilltop in this country seems to have a fort or outpost built on its crest. The one in Qalat is really cool when you see it pop up on the horizon.

Heading south from Qalat, there are just a few isolated compounds and no major bazaars or towns. In sparsely populated areas like that, attacks by AOG fighters are rare. Taliban do not like humping around in the boonies much and confine most of their activity to populated areas. That makes sense because the bad guys cover and conceal the civilian population. Moving out into the desert away from the protection that innocent civilians provide is risky for insurgents.

Our trips south always terminated in Kandahar city, home of the Continental Inn. We could find a bunk out at the Kandahar Airfield, but we would have to leave our escort to fend for themselves, which is uncool. Here is a shot of the Continental, which has slow internet but a super cook who excels at making curry.

Before hitting the Continental, we would usually pull into the Kandahar Air Field (KAF), home to about 15,000 international troops and a rear-echelon establishment extraordinaire. Gyms, restaurants, fast food stands, a boardwalk, stores, a hockey rink, and field music on Sundays.

Most of the troops on this base will never set one foot outside the wire during their tour. Many from allied nations are obese and have problems, so fat that they have issues with the heat, even though they do not wear body armor or carry weapons on base. KAF means getting a double-double at Timmy Horton’s and Burger King for my Afghan crew. Afghans love Burger King, and we like Tim Horton’s.

We do not run down south without at least one, if not two, escort vehicles filled with Tajik fighters from the Panjshir valley. We use Sediqi Security Services (SSS) exclusively for work in the south and west. They are great fighters who battled the Taliban back in the day, and the bad guys hate them more than they do us. This is an age-old technique for outsiders operating in Central Asia. If the North were as dangerous as the South, we’d travel the North with Pashtun escorts for the same reason.

We have used the same guys on all the high-risk trips we have done over the years, and needless to say, we are a tight crew. The owners of SSS are young mid-thirties who, as children, would sneak into Taliban lines to disarm and steal anti-personnel mines. They would then sell them to the Northern Alliance. Below is a picture of them leading the way back to Kabul.

SSS crew in vehicle headed back from Kandahar

That is a PKM machine gun sticking out of the back window, a good piece of kit to bring along on trips south. The new laws being written for private security companies in Afghanistan will prohibit us from owning or using machine guns. That is taking stupidity to new and higher levels, but the laws here are designed for one thing only: to make the people writing them rich. In that respect, the Afghan lawmakers are just like their democratic counterparts in Washington, only a little more upfront about it.

In 2006, Kandahar had many expatriates who lived and worked inside the city. There was even a Starbucks-influenced coffee shop run by an Afghan American that was very popular with the locals. The internationals are almost all gone now; those who remain live in heavily guarded compounds and rarely travel. On our last trip down, we were leaving the Continental to head back to Kabul, and I took this snapshot of the street.

Suddenly, the next block was empty, the shops shuttered, and the hair on my neck was on end. I took another picture before picking up my weapon. Here it is:

When you roll down a street that looks like this, you are heading for big-time trouble. There was only one way out of the city, so we had no choice but to keep moving north, but Jesus, it was a scary 10 minutes. Nothing happened that day, and I don’t know why the street cleared out like it did, but I’ll tell you what. I don’t think we’ll be heading back to Kandahar anytime soon.

October 6, 2008May 11, 2025

Kala Jangi Fighter Fortress

Mazar-i-Shariff is home to the Kala Jangi Fighter Fortress, the scene of a famous battle in November 2001. Unfortunately, I only have one picture of the fort’s exterior, which does not do it justice. My good friend CC (code-name Cautious Citizen) and I were in the area on a site visit. He is one of the few guys I know who served in the very top tier of our Special Operations establishment, which is why I don’t use his real name. He probably couldn’t care less, but you never know about those tier one guys, and I’d hate to have one mad at me. He and I got a tour of the portion inside Kala Jangi where the fighting occurred. The remainder of the base was off limits when we were there in June 2007.

Just last week, the Shem Bot and Michael Yon tried twice to get inside but were denied entry. The Bot speaks good Dari, which the Afghans appreciate; unusually, he could not BS his way in. The Eid holidays were last week, and the commander was home with his family, which may be why Shem couldn’t get past the gate. It would be a shame if American or British visitors were no longer allowed to see where their special operators fought with such courage and ability. Fortunately, I have spent a few afternoons wandering inside and have plenty of interesting photos to share.

On November 25^th, 2001, two CIA agents went to the Kala Jangi fortress to interview the Taliban who had surrendered to Gen Dostum’s Northern Alliance fighters the day before. While interviewing a group of prisoners, the Taliban suddenly attacked the agents and their Northern Alliance escort. One of the agents and all the Northern Alliance fighters were killed. The 300 prisoners revolted and armed themselves with weapons and munitions that the Taliban had stored in this portion of the fortress years before. What followed was a three-day battle reported to the world in near real time.

The American military, with a few CIA officers, had arrived in Central Asia mere weeks after the attacks on our homeland. Donald Rumsfeld had pushed the Pentagon and Langley to go quickly. No military professional likes to execute ad-hoc seat-of-the-pants combat operations half a world away. Still, the Pentagon let loose the dogs of war, allowing our SF teams, aided by CIA paramilitary contractors, and advance elements of the US Army 10th Mountain Division to operate independently with mission-type orders and without micro-management. The result of this initial phase of our campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda was a brilliant success.

This appears to be what the Marines would term a “Tactical Air Control Party” in action on the north wall of the fortress. They are probably from the 10th Mountain Division. It is interesting to see the old war belt load-bearing rigs, which were being phased out back then in favor of the load-bearing vests in use today.

It is hard to conduct such a fluid, wide-ranging battle where all the targeting and ordinance delivery is based on inputs from ground controllers in contact. The fog of war is a potent performance inhibitor that affects all men on the field of battle, and the fog of war inserted itself into the struggle of Kala Jangi when a 2,000-pound JDAM hit adjacent to the team who had called it in. It was a miracle that this blue-on-blue SNAFU killed none of our troops. Dozens of American, British, and Afghan soldiers were injured, five Americans required medical evacuation, and British casualties are unknown because the UK never releases information about SAS operations. The Northern Alliance reported over 30 KIA from this JDAM strike.

Point of impact of the arrant JDAM crater as it appeared in 2007

This is the SF team’s view when calling in the JDAMs. The Taliban occupied the line of buildings to the front, which is 300 meters away. It takes real balls to call in air-delivered ordinance this close to you, and I mean real balls.

I remember watching this unfold through the video of a German TV crew who had the good luck to be on hand when the fighting started. I was amazed that we were conducting such a ballsy mobile warfare style campaign and had gotten there so quickly. Checking out this old battlefield was an opportunity I could not pass up.

The portion of the fort where all the fighting occurred is the southeastern quarter, right behind the gate, next to the sign pictured above. The battlefield is essentially untouched since the battle. EOD teams did remove or destroy most of the UXO (unexploded ordinance), but our Afghan Army guide was adamant that we stay on the many paths through the brush, lest we step on some live ordinance or a cobra. We were there in July, and apparently, snakes are a problem in that area during the summer months.

Gen Dostum’s men had not searched the Taliban nor the portion of the fort where they put the Taliban (who had owned the fort until just days before they surrenderd) when American CIA agents arrived to interrogate the captured Taliban fighters they had no idea they were being held in a portion of the fort that the Taliban had used for weapons and ammunition storage. I am certain that they had detected in previous encounters with the Taliban a certain battlefield rhythm, and part of that rhythm was the acceptance of surrendered Taliban of their POW status. For whatever reason, the Taliban in Kala Jangi were in no mood to accept their fate, and they revolted, killing a CIA agent (and former Marine Corps officer), Mike Spann, and a dozen Northern Alliance guards. They then opened the weapons storage containers they had put there previously, and the fight was on.

A CIA agent identified in the media as “Dave” used the sat phone from a German TV crew to call the K2 base in Uzbekistan for reinforcements.

In response to the call made from a CIA agent identified as “Dave,” a mixed group of 9 American special operators, 6 British Special Boat Service operators, and a nine-man advance party from the 10th Mountain Division arrived on the scene.

The Taliban weapons stores remain there to this day, although the Afghan Army has rendered the weapons unusable. The second picture below is of one of the shipping containers that received much attention from an AC-130 gunship during the night of 26 November.

The weapons in this conex were here in 2001 and functional

Inside a weapons conex that got some AC130 love – it looked like Swiss cheese it was so shot up

Although the battle lasted for three days, it was essentially over after the AC-130s pounded the Taliban on the night of the 26th. On the morning of the 27th, the surviving Taliban retreated into the basements under the mud huts that line the southern wall.

This is a shot from the Taliban perspective, looking north towards the allied positions.

You can still find medicine bottles, primitive field dressings, torn and bloody clothing, and a ton of rusty un-serviceable small arms ammo down in these basements.

\What is left of the stairs leading down to the basement rooms.

Dostum’s men flooded the basement to drive the surviving band of die-hard fighters out. And when they did, out popped Johnny Walker Lindh and another 80 or so surviving fighters. There are few absolutes in life, but the death penalty for traitors to our great land is one of them. Lindh should have been hanged a long time ago in public. Nothing personal, but the same principle applies here as it did to the murdering horse thieves in Lonesome Dove. Gus and Captain Call had to string up the group they caught, which included their lifelong friend Jake Spoon. They didn’t want to do it, but they had to because it was their duty under their code. There are some things a man cannot tolerate if he calls himself a free man. Horse thieves and traitors are two of those things. Again, this is not personal – I can understand the ennui which drove young Walker to Islam. I can admire his courage and fortitude in leaving home at such a young age to venture into the northwest frontier of Pakistan alone. But he turned traitor, and at that point, all the understanding and empathy in the world are irrelevant. The issue becomes black and white, just like a Panda.

Johnny Walker Lindh moments after being recaptured

I lifted a picture taken after the battle from the net. Nobody knew the Taliban had an arms cache inside that portion of the fort because Gen Dostum used it to stable his horses.

I arrived in Afghanistan four years after this battle and can only imagine what it was like for the American and British operators who drove into the breach back in 2001. They were free to operate as they saw fit based on what they developed on the ground. The Afghan people were 100% behind our efforts to rid them of the Taliban scourge. They must have been greeted like liberators everywhere they went, and when the Taliban tried to stand and fight, they were able to defeat them in detail with precision, direct, and indirect fire. What could be better than that?

October 4, 2008May 11, 2025

Travelling North: Salang Pass to Mazar-i-Sharif

The northern regions of Afghanistan are the safest areas in the country. A majority of the population in these provinces is Tajik or Hazara and was not known for supporting the Taliban. We routinely travel in the north without body armor or rifles and occasionally leave the side arms at home out of respect for the local leaders and populace. All my trips into the north have terminated in the fabled city of Mazar-i-Shariff, where our main client, JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), has an office and several programs.

The trip north starts by crossing the Shamali Plain (Shamali means “windy” in Dari), which saw much fighting during the Soviet invasion in the 80s. As a point of interest, the main road from Kabul to Bagram airbase used by our armed forces today was built by the Soviets so they could stay out of the Shamali plain as much as possible. The Soviets fought hard and often all along the main road to the north. After the Northern Alliance and our SF teams drove out the Taliban in 2001, there has been no fighting or attacks on the international or Afghan military on the plain or anywhere else along the route to Mazar-i-Shariff.

In 2006, an American army convoy caused a fatal traffic accident where the roads above terminate inside Kabul. They opened fire on the crowd that gathered at the accident site, sparking an entire day of rioting in Kabul. Unruly and agitated crowds are a staple at Afghan traffic accidents, which occur frequently and tend to be gruesome given the speeds at which Afghans drive and their propensity for stuffing extra women and children in car trunks or on roof racks. Firing into the crowd that day (I saw it live on Tolo TV) is a symptom of the big base, big army mentality that infected our efforts here as soon as the regular army took over the fight. The soldier I saw unleash his 50 cal into the Afghan crowd at point-blank range was scared. He was scared because he did not understand Afghanistan or its people, and he thought the crowd was after him and his fellow soldiers. This was four years after we first set foot in the country. Today, some seven years into the fight, a majority of the soldiers are just as clueless about the Afghan people and their customs as the knucklehead on the machine gun that day. But I digress.

Halfway across the plain is the town of Istalif, famous for its pottery. With a bit of haggling and good humor, you can buy any of these pieces for just one dollar, although after haggling and completing the sale, I always give a tip. Haggling is fun, but a couple of extra dollars thrown in at the end of the deal is fun too. Afghans seem to enjoy foreigners who are funny and fair.

After getting through the Shamali, you have to climb up the Salang Pass, which is 12,723 feet up into the Hindu Kush Mountains, making it one of the highest roads in the world. Here is a view going up the pass and looking back towards Kabul.

The Soviet Union built a tunnel through the pass back in the 60’s, which is 2.6 kilometers long and scary. The roadbed is pitted and often filled with slush, the evacuation fan system stopped working decades ago, it is dark, and the Afghans cannot deal with vehicle accidents or any serious injuries. In 1982, an explosion in the tunnel caused the Soviets to block both ends as they thought there was an attack in progress. Those trapped inside kept their vehicles running to avoid freezing, the resulting buildup of carbon monoxide and smoke killed as many as 700 Soviet troops and over 2,000 Afghans.

Once you’re through the Salang tunnel, it is a steep drop down into the valley floor where one can find the best fresh fish in Afghanistan. Here is my favorite seasonal fish stand seen from the road above:

Approaching the valley floor on the northern side of the Salang Pass

Like I said, it is a step grade down the north side of the Salang

The guys sitting behind me in the picture above are truck drivers who wandered over just in case I ate like an Afghan, which is to share food and drink automatically. I have been here long enough to understand that, so the three of us tucked into the excellent fish and engaged in conversations using a mix of basic Dari, American slang, and sign language.

The drive from the Salang Pass to Mazar is pleasant and fast over good roads. The largest city along the route is Puli Khumri, which has little international presence but few AOG (armed opposition group) incidents. One of the more interesting aspects of driving around the country is discovering how the industrious Afghans can be with found objects. The picture below demonstrates that point well and is the best use of old Soviet BTRs I’ve yet to see.

A fuel station a few miles south of Puli Khumri is built on top of old Soviet BTR 72s that were stacked into the river, covered with dirt and rock, compacted, and leveled. One way to get a land title in Afghanistan is to create your own land.

From Puli Khumri, it is about three hours of driving through one small hamlet after another. Moving off the main road in areas with no villages or towns is not a good idea. Every natural choke-point has an old Soviet command post, and the terrain around them could still be seeded with anti-personnel mines. Most of these areas have been cleared, but the sign below provides a warning that remains applicable today to the savvy traveler.

This is a warning from HALO Trust (a de-mining NGO) in Dari and English, explaining that the land off of the main highway in this pass contains an active minefield.

The Afghanistan state-controlled media back in the Soviet days called Soviet soldiers Quay Dhost, which means “friendly forces”. When we rolled up to Afghan police checkpoints, we’d smile and introduce ourselves as Quay Dhost, which generated a look of surprise followed by a big belly laugh. Afghans love jokes and funny foreigners who make an effort to speak Dari.

Mazar-i-Sharif is a small city famous for the Blue Mosque, which is supposed to contain the remains of Hazrat Ali, a son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad. Islamic scholars believe Ali’s grave is in the Imam Mosque in Najaf, Iraq.

I have read and heard from the locals that the Mosque was buried to prevent its sacking by Genghis Khan in 1220 and not uncovered until the 1480s. I have no idea how the locals could have done that back then, but I also don’t know how the Egyptian Pyramids were built, so maybe it’s a true story. For us foreigners, this is as close as we can get to the Mosque, which is fine because the real treat when visiting the North is checking out the Kala Jangi fortress, which was the scene of a big fight on 25 November 2001.

There is also work in Mazar, which means looking after Ms Tani san of JICA, who runs the women’s empowerment program. The picture below shows Tani-san criticizing one of her women’s groups for slacking on keeping the cows and barn that the people of Japan provided clean and functional.

JICA’s Women’s Empowerment Program in action. The woman huddled in a school circle is catching hell for being behind in maintaining their new cattle barn.

While she is in the villages, the police guard and I hang out with the village’s males, often sitting in the closest field for some nan and yogurt. If we check up on five villages, that’s five lunches of nan and yogurt and sometimes kabob that you can’t not eat because it’s impolite for guests to refuse hospitality. The life of an independent international security operative often looks like this:

I’m going to get fat if I keep doing this. The cold mint yogurt tea is damn good though and I’ve never tasted anything like it.

The eggplant we eat with the nan (bread) is called Borani Banjan and is delicious. It is greasy, as the day is long, but tasty. Our next stop will be the Fortress, but it deserves a post.

October 3, 2008May 11, 2025

The Afghanistan Travel Series

One of the advantages of working outside the wire is the ability to travel. Internationals can move freely through most of Afghanistan without taking elaborate or expensive security measures. Due to the extent of armed criminality, being armed is always a good idea. One reason criminals rarely target internationals is the universal belief among Afghans that we are all armed and capable with those arms. That is not always true, but it is conventional wisdom.

My oldest daughter Megan came over last summer and worked for us when we had a few bomb and drug dog contracts. Like her father, she is an excellent dog handler/trainer and thrives on travel and adventure. Here she is with her friend Sarah, formerly of the Australian Army and at the time the Kabul coordinator for ANSO (Afghan NGO Safety Office.)

Megan and Sarah exploring the Panjshir Valley.

The picture above was taken in the Panjshir Valley, where the girls had visited with Sarah’s driver’s and interpreter’s families. Neither I nor my colleagues considered this to be unusually risky. My daughter is competent with a sidearm after taking multiple four-day handgun courses at Front Sight in Las Vegas when I was on the staff there. Sarah has a few years of experience and is very capable, too, but they were perfectly safe on this trip because of the Afghan people.

One of the facts of life on the ground here, which has not translated well in the media coverage, is the acceptance of internationals by the vast majority of the Afghan people. Without their active support, the various international organizations involved in the reconstruction fight could not stay here or operate. Afghanistan is a poor country with little infrastructure, a spotty track record of central government control, and no ability to extract the valuable natural resources (which are considerable) that have been identified to date. The people have little and expect little, so they respond so positively to internationals who have come to help them. This includes the international military. There are few places in this country happier than an isolated village that just had a platoon of Americans roll in with plans to stay for a while.

I took this picture of a kid who was working a one-person vehicle maintenance stall on the Shamoli Plain just north of Kabul in the summer of 2006

The more the average Afghan interacts with internationals, specifically the international military, the more they like us. We have tens of thousands of troops deployed here but a vast majority spend their entire tour behind the wire on gigantic military bases. These bases are called FOBs (forward operating base). Still, when there are restaurants, American and Canadian fast food stands, coffee shops, gigantic bazaars, and massage parlors, it is hard to think of a base as being forward or operating. The words rear and supporting are better descriptors.

We cannot continue to rely on technology to solve tactical problems. When you do that, you end up with the MRAP, a vehicle so tall it will rip out the electrical wires from every street it drives down if it moves off a main road into a village or town. It is also so heavy it cannot maneuver well on the local dirt roads, cross local bridges, or climb the many mountain passes in Afghanistan.

MRAP’s – not as helpful as one would think. Not good on narrow canal roads or inside villages due to their width and height

Yes, it will protect the troops inside from most of the mines and IEDs used by the AOG, but as a student of history, I know it is easier and cheaper to defeat new technology than to develop it. The AOG will develop IEDs big enough to beat this improved armor. All the players in the game know that.

There will be additional posts covering the north, south, east, and west of Afghanistan. They include lots of pictures, which I hope everyone will enjoy. Many of the places pictured are no longer safe for internationals. It will be decades before another Westerner can photograph them again. We are losing terrain to the bad guys, and with the terrain goes the people. In a counterinsurgency fight, the people are the center of gravity; we cannot allow this current trend of ceding terrain to the Taliban to continue, or we will lose. It is that simple.

September 26, 2008May 10, 2024

Talking with the AOG

There are many names used in Afghanistan to describe the groups hostile to the central government. Taliban, insurgents, Anti Government Elements (AGE) and Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) are the most common descriptors. AOG can be Taliban, criminal gangs who cooperate with the Taliban, rent-a-Taliban (mostly teenage boys who need money and want adventure) or militias controlled by warlords. Every armed group has its own agenda and few cooperate with each other. This is their principal weakness -the inability to operate with unity of command or purpose. Our big weakness is that we cannot take advantage of their weakness because most (not all) of our military is confined to large bases and most (not all) have a limited understanding of tribal dynamics in their areas of operation.

We were asked by a journalist if we could set up an interview for a story he’s working on. Here he is talking with the village Malik from Spur Kunday and an AOG fighter up in the hills above Surobi.

It is not comfortable for us being out in the open like this. We are at the mouth of the Uzbin valley up in the foothills just off the dirt track which is the only road in the area. The valley has seen much fighting since the French ambush last month. The chances of a predator or some other American surveillance platform zooming in on us to determine friend or foe status is high. We are certain that the American ROE would prohibit attacking us as long as they do not see weapons. But who wants to chance that? Not us which is why we tried to hurry the interview along as best we could.

Shem and I left the weapons and body armor in our vehicle and pulled security for the hour or so it took to conduct the interview. It is a strange situation to be in – we could not put a US flag or an air panel on our roof because we know there are bad guys in the hills above us. We also could not walk around with our rifles which would offer protection from local AOG but open the door for a visit from Mr. Predator.

Friday morning we got organized and set off for our interview – here is a shot of us getting jocked up in the local garb. Shawal Kameez, pakol hat, scarf and vest over the body armor. On the road we take off the sunglasses because Afghans don’t wear them. We do not fool any locals who get a good look at us as we scream by in our vehicle but that is not the point. The point is to be inside the OODA loop of anyone looking to cause mischief. If a bad guy wants to ambush internationals on the Jalalabad – Kabul road he has to Observe the target, Orient his weapon systems on the target, Decided to attack and then Attack the target. Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA.) That loop takes much longer then most people realize because most people received their tactical combat training via Hollywood movies. In the real world understanding the OODA loop theory and how to apply it is the fundamental building block upon which an accurate threat assessment is made. Unless AOG spotters have identified us and radioed ahead to an ambush team (something we have never seen on the Jbad road to date) it would require superhuman decision making ability to ID us and decide to attack us as we scream by in a vehicle that looks just like every other local SUV on the road.

Tim Lynch and Shem-bot in local attire — The meeting took a long time but that is a story for our journalist friend to tell.

Free Range International low profile vehicle near Surobi, Afghanistan — This is what I mean about being exposed, sitting on the topographical crest like this is no good but what are you going to do? The trip back was uneventful and smooth.

September 20, 2008April 25, 2025

The Caves of Little Barabad

We recently took a trip across the river into Beshud District to the village of Little Barabad to photograph the old caves that line the northern shore of the Kabul River.

When we show up at this village, we often pick up and escort local kids – they tend to segregate by gender, and here are some of the girls from Little Barabad.

The people of Little Barabad are Kuchi tribesmen who are dirt poor and from a different tribe than the Shinwari’s who live up the river in the village of Big Barabad. Because the elders from these two villages cannot agree on anything, Little Barabad suffers and cannot spend its NSP (National Solidarity Program) funds on building a well or making other infrastructure improvements. The NSP money comes from the World Bank, and each household receives $2,000. However, this money can only be spent on projects that collectively benefit the village. The only recognized village in this area is Big Barabad.

The San Diego sister cities project is scheduled to build a foot bridge over the Kabul River, which would allow the kids from Little Barabad to attend school. There is a large school located just 300 meters away on the Jalalabad side of the river, but it is a one-hour drive by road. The people of Little Barabad do not have a vehicle or much of a road, for that matter, so their children are unable to attend school.

San Diego and the La Jolla Rotary Club have been very active in Jalalabad, which is a sister city to San Diego. How that happened remains a mystery, but they have invested a substantial amount of money in Nangarhar University and Jalalabad. Here is the current method of crossing the Kabul River, and the reason why a footbridge will be such a good deal. When you look at this float, keep in mind the river is swift, and these folks aren’t swimmers.

One goal of today’s trip was to get a proper picture of my new SOMA FM t-shirt to send to their website. Inshallah, they will post it, so getting the pistol in frame was important. From looking at my fellow donors at the Soma FM site I’m sure to be the only one who even owns a gun. Soma is based out of San Francisco, so I’m sure they’ll find the pic of an armed American to be innately disturbing. Guns = authority = bad to them. To me, guns represent keeping authority in check, and are good. Plus, there is a war going on here, and even though it is easy to avoid drama, one must be prepared. Be friendly to everyone you meet, but always have a plan to kill them. That’s a Marine motto that is worth remembering in this line of work.

soma-kids2 — Some of the boys who escort us around the area

The village kids love to have their pictures taken and always enjoy it when we come by to hike up to the caves. We hook them up with a bottled water and a dollar each for being our guides. See how blond the kid in the middle of the photograph above is? You see that a lot of that is in Nangarhar Province. The Soviets kept their presence relatively quiet while they were here and even had an R&R camp in Jalalabad. They also allowed their troops to leave the base and enter the bazaar, where they could support the local economy. I go to the bazaar all the time myself, and the local merchants seem to enjoy it when an international visitor stops in to chat with them and buy their goods.

Many of the locals think our troops are cowards because they only see them in armored trucks racing through the town and pointing weapons at anyone who they think is too close to them. The Soviets flooded the bazaar when they were off duty, and I believe our troops and the Afghan people would both benefit if our military adopted the same liberty policy as the Soviets. Getting close to the locals is a good thing, and it is a basic tenet of our counterinsurgency doctrine. Judging from all the blond and red-headed kids we see in Jalalabad, some of the Russians got a little too close to the locals, which is a dangerous game to play in Pashtun lands.

Little Barabad is a collection of compounds belonging to one extended family. They have goats and sheep, three cows, plus a little corn and wheat but that is about it.

The bats were “nishta” or all gone this time because they seem to occupy the caves during the heat of summer. We will have to wait until next year to get a good picture of the bats. I

September 13, 2008April 25, 2025

Kabul Re-up Run

Today, the Bot and I had to run to Kabul for a re-up. We started our journey by striking a pose for our sponsor. Well, not a real sponsor, but they sent us some hats, bumper stickers, steak rub, and a generous assortment of candy, so we feel sponsored. Here is Shem (a.k.a. Shem Bot a.k.a. Bot) and I at the start of the day with our signature La Rue Tactical hats. We’ll have to do this again, as the resident expert has told me that this picture lacks technical merit due to failure to use proper lens filters.

The drive was smooth and fast. We rent SUVs and frequently switch them up to avoid standing out on the road. We stop at all checkpoints and chat up the ANP (Afghan National Police), who appreciate that we speak some Pashto and are polite. In this country, a little Pashto or Dari and a big smile will win you a ton of goodwill from the local officials and people.

The problem with traveling in low-profile mode is that running into an ISAF or American military convoy can cause drama. I was shot at by the American Army in downtown Kabul back in ’07 while driving a brand new Armored Land Cruiser with diplomatic plates identifying it as belonging to the Government of Japan. A rear gunner in a five-truck convoy thought I got a little too close to them as they were exiting a traffic circle. I may well have strayed too close, but it never occurred to me that the young trooper would not recognize a large brand-new armored SUV as being on his side. The startled gunner unleashed a good 6-round burst into the hills above my truck (where about 3000 people live packed into squalid mud huts). I was out of the driver’s door and running down the road yelling at this idiot before I realized what I was doing. That startled the five hundred or so Afghan pedestrians who stopped and watched this unfold in utter amazement.

That was an embarrassing incident. Getting too close to the convoy was sloppy on my part; getting shot at was bad, bolting out of the driver’s door without even letting the vehicle stop was awful, but it elicited one of the more memorable quotes from my favorite Japanese client. He was a senior diplomat whom I consider a great man and with whom I was very fond and proud to work. When I came back to the truck, he looked at me, shaking his head and muttering Tim san, I do not understand how you people beat us.

We were jamming up the Mahipar Pass, passing a slow-moving truck, when up pops the American Army in MRAPs, and the Bot swears the turret gunner has his pistol pointed at him. The kid did have his pistol out, but as the more experienced professional, I opined that the chances of him even hitting the car from up on top of that giant armored vehicle were remote. Plus, the soldier was switched on and lowered his pistol once he saw we were expats. The Bot took no comfort from that and unleashed a torrent of invective (as we high-speed writers say) which seemed to calm him down.

Here are the guilty bastards (I say that in good humor) as they moved further down the pass, note the futility of attempting to keep all civilian traffic away from you, which the military tries to do with their convoys. Only once have I seen a convoy of obviously very experienced French soldiers, who moved with the traffic and allowed local vehicles to mix in with their convoy. Solid thinking on their part.

As you can probably tell, the pass is a long series of hairpin switchbacks, and one can always count on an old truck to be broken down and blocking one lane of the road. The fuel truck in this photo is broken down which is why the buses are stacked up behind it. I have spent hours sitting on the road here because a car broke down and blocked one of the four tunnels. Here is another good shot of the Mahpair pass.

After that brief excitement, we headed to Kabul to stock up on essentials, including pasta, seafood, beer, wine, and spirits. We visited our favorite Italian place for a proper sit-down lunch and spent the next few hours exploring Kabul without body armor or long guns. The Kabul PD gets crappy with civilian expats wearing body armor and carrying long guns.

Here is what the ole Haji ride looked like after our last stop in the greater Kabul area:

It was smooth sailing back to the Taj. We made it from Camp Warehouse to here in 85 minutes. There was little traffic on the road, no ISAF convoys, thank god (they can double or triple your trip time and often jam up traffic for 5 to 10 miles behind them because they move so slow), and the weather was perfect. The Taj is now stocked and ready for the arrival of Baba Ken, the leader of the Jbad geek squad. One of the wonders of the third world is the number of young men in these places who are scary proficient with computers.

September 12, 2008April 25, 2025

The Taliban take Dih Bala

Fridays are always laid-back, as it’s the one day off we get each week. We had our usual complement of French and German aid workers visit for drinks and a dip in the pool.

If you can’t tell, my French friend Pierre is in flagrant violation of the’no Speedo’ rule at the Taj. Every time we try to explain the rule to him, he pretends not to understand English. However, he and his crew are great folks who pay in Euros, which makes them especially popular with me, so we let him slide on the speedo issue.

The interesting tidbit of the day comes from the lady on the right. She is German and works for the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). She requested our assessment of the attack last night on the Dih Bala district center, which is 300 meters away from one of her offices. Like many international NGO workers, she has a high tolerance for risk. She has been here a long time, knows Dih Bala and the surrounding area well, and is completely freaked out because there have been no problems with the Taliban before.

Dih Bala is about 10 miles to the east of us and the home of many large clans of Brigands. They never molest the NGO’s or IGOs as reconstruction makes it easier for them to smuggle stuff across the frontier, which is how they have earned their living for the past 2 to 3 thousand years. The Governor of Nangarhar Province has successfully eliminated the cultivation of opium poppy in the area. However, there are still tons of the stuff here because of the smuggling expertise of people like those in the Dih Bala district. So the fact that the Taliban is attacking the district center means something.

It could be the elders posing with weapons to get the governor’s attention. The Governor, Gul Agha Sherzai, is from Khandahar Province, and the local tribal chiefs have a tenuous working relationship with him. One way to get the attention and a little love from the big man is to have your district center attacked and then say you drove the bad guys out when the Afghan Army arrives to investigate. Or it could be the Taliban has moved into the district, and that is always bad news for the elders. The Taliban typically dismantle the local power structure to establish dominance in an area. The elders can pledge allegiance to the Taliban or be targeted for assassination. If the Taliban are not strong enough or if they miscalculate when dealing with certain elders, the villagers will grab their rifles and fight. Intimidation of an armed population is a dangerous game – the Taliban screw it up sometimes.

Our assessment of Dih Bala district is that the Taliban are back and strong enough to challenge the central government for the district center. Our German friend agreed, which is a bitter thing for her to do, because with the Taliban back, her work here is at an end.

As the security situation continues to deteriorate, we have been making a point to look at every tanker and police check post attacked by the Taliban.

This truck was attacked by the Taliban note the local kid who has walked about 3 miles from Surobi to drain some of the remaining diesel.

The tanker pictured above was attacked from across the river and took a good 60 to 70 rounds into the cab and front proper aspect. It also took an RPG round into the cab. The RPG shot was either beginner’s luck or we have one hell of a pro RPG gunner working the area. The closest probable ambush site is 400 meters away and 200 meters above the truck.

This truck was not attacked by the Taliban; it was torched to cover up fuel theft. I’m with my buddy Special K, who visits from time to time, and I wanted to take a picture for the blog.

The tanker pictured above had 10 bullets and one RPG hit; all the rounds came in from the left rear or the roadside of the river. There are ANP checkposts 500 meters behind us and 500 meters ahead – an ambushing party can’t cross the river or set up on the side of the road without being detected. All the Taliban attacks come from across the river and include enough firepower to fix the checkposts while they go after fuel tankers. That didn’t happen this time, and there is also little fuel left in the tanker. We guess that it was emptied in Laghman Province and then shot up in the same spot as the previous two Taliban attacks. The criminals were probably mounted in local vehicles, and they and the driver escaped after paying off the cops. It’s just a guess, but it’s the simplest explanation.

September 11, 2008April 25, 2025

Seven Years Since 9/11, the View from Afghanistan

It has been seven years since the events of 9/11. The war on terror, or the Long War, which is a better term, is the reason I am here. I’m in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, where I’ve been living for the past year. I spent a few years living in Kabul and free-ranging the country, having found a reason to visit every province in Afghanistan. I’m a security contractor; outside the wire type and the crew I run with use low-profile, local vehicles and are very good at talking their way past checkpoints.

The security contracting business in Afghanistan is a challenging endeavor. The American firms Blackwater and DynCorp have secured the majority of the lucrative DoD and DoS contracts, and the rest of the market consists of British PSCs and a growing number of Afghan companies that employ Expatriates. Tight competition for lucrative reconstruction work drove the compensation rates into the basement.

Our State Department and USAID have established burdensome security standards that far exceed the UN MOSS (minimum operational security standard.) These stringent standards slow projects and drain millions from building infrastructure to paying for fleets of armored vehicles and large secure compounds. Other donor countries abide by the UN standards, and their operating costs are a fraction of what the US spends on security and life support for their Aid implementers.

Our cook Khan has been pissing and moaning about cooking during Ramadan and came up with a dozen very crappy meat pies and then took off for his home village to prepare for Eid. We were getting ready to buy some chickens to cook, but instead, we tried dusting the meat pies with Old Bay spice we found. It’s Thursday night, which is the night the Tiki Bar hosts all the NGO folks, and who wants to fuss with dressing out a skinny chicken during happy hour?

It’s Poppy Eradication Bob’s birthday is tonight. He’s former Army SF and loves to sing all the old crappy high rotation FM hair band songs from his misspent youth. His singing is horrible, but he’s a “good bloke” in contractor speak, so we tolerate the noise with grace and humor.

The price we are paying for not having enough troops outside the wire is increased instability and more and more Taliban attacks. It is not yet a problem in Jalalabad city, but the Jalalabad to Kabul road, which is essential to ISAF and US supply efforts, as well as for our weekly booze runs, has been hit with many ambushes this summer. We go out to examine most of them to get a handle on just how severe the attacks are becoming and the tactics they are using.

Below is a photo of the whole team from this summer, when we were fortunate enough to have Amy Sun, a PhD graduate student from MIT, who is a bona fide rocket scientist. She was quite astute in determining what had happened from the forensics and the amount of fuel remaining in the tankers. She wasn’t bad at reading bullet and RPG strikes, too; in fact, she was smarter about all this than we are, which was annoying but handy.

It’s been 7 years since 9/11, and I’ve been out here for four of them. We work with the Japan International Cooperation Agency. Unlike USAID, JICA personnel work in the countryside or Kabul alongside their Afghan counterparts. Every yen the Japanese people send here to help the Afghans gets spent exactly as it is supposed to because the Japanese JICA staff is in the offices with the Afghans, ensuring they know where every yen goes. We’d be in much better shape if USAID did the same.

This will be a long war that my children will fight, if they choose to serve, and their children will too. There is no way to understand this place or fight effectively here unless you are familiar with the people and their culture. Eventually, we must figure out how to keep more people like me in the country for a long duration so that they, too, learn how to operate in the tribal districts. I have lots of ideas on how to do that, which I will share in future posts.