Traveling in the East of Afghanistan; Jalalabad, The Khyber Pass, Peshawar, with a Small Rant on Reconstruction

There are two main routes heading through the mountains to the east out of Kabul. The Latabad Pass, which is a poorly maintained dirt track road, and the Mahipar Pass which is a newly paved road and in excellent condition. Both passes funnel traffic into the village of Surobi and from there all traffic heading east must take the main Jalalabad to Kabul road, which is also called Route One. The trip between Jalalabad and Kabul takes about two hours on the paved road and four on the Latabad Pass route. Traveling in the east was very safe until this past summer when fuel tankers started getting ambushed in the Tangi valley, which is just to the east of Surobi. Some of these attacks were made by criminal gangs to cover up fuel theft and some looked to be the work of Taliban affiliated fighters. The first post on this blog covered our efforts to determine what was happening on this vital route.

Security on the route has improved in the past week as the Afghan National Army patrols it much more aggressively. They have to because almost all the supplies needed by ISAF enter the country at the Torkham border and move over the Jalalabad Kabul road.

The main road out of Kabul goes through the Puli Charki pass. This is a good picture of that pass looking back towards the direction of Kabul.

The road then heads down the Mahipar Pass which is really spectacular;

The guys at Bill and Bob’s Excellent Adventure have video of them driving the switchbacks of Mahipar Pass in their Hummers which you can find here. They say it takes them three hours to do this drive the Bot and I average 90 minutes. Being unarmored and low profile allows us to move smoothly through the countryside and smooth is fast.

As the road heads towards Surobi a few abandoned villages can be seen across the river. These villages were destroyed by the Soviet Army who would not tolerate attacks on their military convoys. If they felt a village had provided Mujaheddin fighters with sanctuary there was only one response complete destruction. When you see a village like this today which has not been reclaimed by people it is a good indicator that there are lots of mines and/or unexploded ordinance seeded into the soil. Only the very foolish would approach structures like this. When the de-mining teams work these areas they leave behind white rocks where they have cleared, and with the white rocks will come people to reclaim what little productive land remains around these unfortunate settlements.

One of the frequent and more interesting sights along this road are the nomadic Kuchi people, who head up into the northern mountains for the summer and back into the lower plains around Jalalabad during the winter months. These are a hardy people who follow their own ancient traditions even the Taliban were deferential to them and did not attempt to force their women into the Burka. They are mostly illiterate and they have not had a good run since the Soviets invaded Afghanistan almost 30 years ago. Drought, land mines, UXO’s, and constant conflict with Afghans villagers over open range grazing areas have decimated the Kuchi. These are people who really bitterly cling to their guns and religion – and with good reason.

Typical Kuchi camp with low tents, camels and dogs but no water or vegitation nearby
Kuchi’s using the foundation of an old destroyed fort to anchor their tents. The woman do not wear the burka and are often responsible for moving the family while the men scout ahead for their next camp site

The Kuchi nomads are not the only people you see on this road Afghan families being repatriated by the UN are a common site too. This used to be a money maker for more affluent Afghans. Every spring they would fly into Peshawar and rent a truck, fill it with empty boxes and some cheap livestock, rent a family or two worth of woman and children to throw on top, and then proceed to the UN repatriation station for their cash payment to go home. Much to my surprise I have learned there are parts of the UN which function with admirable efficiency. This was the case with UNDP Peshawar who obtained biometric data measurements on all returning displaced persons thus instantly eliminating the massive fraud which had plagued the program. The UN also runs absolutely first rate mine dog training and certification programs, thus ensuring mine dogs are in fact performing to standard. There are no similar standards for bomb dogs in Afghanistan outside of the military working dogs and almost every bomb dog team in this country should be considered suspect. The good canine operations will follow the US Army training manual on canine team employment to the letter; the marginal operations have little in the way of training program documentation at all. It is too bad the UN does not have a mandate to certify all detection dog teams working in Afghanistan.

Afghan men heading towards Kabul in high spirits
I’m not too sure I’d be so happy to be riding down Rte 1 like this but it is a common site.

Here is a picture of the Latabad Pass dusty, miserable, dangerous and long. We had to use this route for about three months earlier in the year when the main route was closed for repairs. I get a headache just thinking about it.

Latabad Pass – May a pox fall upon anyone who makes me drive that route again

All passes lead into Surobi a large town with good water and 24/7 electricity thanks to the hydroelectric dam which is named after the town. This is the territory of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) which was founded by the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The boys from HIG are not our friends. Their leader is not too friendly with the Taliban either, but does cooperate with them when it is in his interests. He also has a long association with Al Qaeda and we believe that the foreign fighters who moved into the Surobi area and tangled with the French back in August were funded and protected by HIG. Although there is a strong Afghan police presence in Surobi and many internationals travel through the town daily on Rte 1 it is not a good idea to stop here.

The Surobi Dam – Rte 1 is on the other side of this reservoir as is the town of Surobi. This picture was taken from the head of the Uzbin valley which is now Indian Country

Once you exit Surobi (if you’re smart) you’ll drive like hell through the Tangi valley and on into Jalalabad. The Tangi saw a half dozen or so attacks on fuel tankers this summer. Since the end of Eid there have been several reports of Taliban affiliated vehicle check points (VCP’s) appearing on this part of the road. These VCP’s could well be manned by criminals who are shaking down motorists for money, but UNDSS reports say they are looking for Afghans who work for the government or international organizations. It is hard to say without interviewing the Afghans who were stopped at these VCP’s, but I can tell you this much it is impossible for these VCP’s to operate without some sort of tacit support from the ANP who man checkpoints on the road every 2 to 3 kilometers. I drove to Kabul yesterday to resupply the Taj bar and saw that the Afghan National Army (ANA) had units on the road and in the high ground throughout the Tangi Valley area. They really have to drive any criminal or enemy activity off the road because all of the ISAF supplies and most of the Afghan legitimate commerce travel this route to and from Pakistan. If the route were cut the impact on both the international military and normal Afghans would be disastrous.

FRI incident investigation team augmented by Dr. Sun from MIT. This tanker was destroyed by Taliban fighters. Most of the others attacked and burned last summer we attribute to fuel theft.

When heading into the east of Afghanistan the international visitor has to stay on the main paved roads and really has one of two destinations. They can visit Jalalabad or they can head to the Torkham border and cross into Pakistan via the Khyber Pass. The other Provinces in the east Nuristan, Kunar and most of Laghman are considered extremely high risk. The US Army averages several firefights per day in Kunar Province (although they rarely take any casualties). Nuristan is very isolated and violent and would generate more incident reporting were it not for the fact that no international organizations (except the military) operate there. Jalalabad City is in Nangarhar Province which is generally considered to be stable. However the districts of Nangarhar bordering the Spin Ghar (White Mountains which contain Tora Bora) are rapidly falling out of the government’s control. Taliban flags now fly openly in the bazaars of Khogiani district which is very close to Jalalabad moving off Rte 1 into the surrounding countryside is not a good idea unless you really know what you are doing.

Jalalabad is a city of some 200,000 people and sits at the junction of the Kabul and Kunar rivers. It remains the business center for the region and is considered a “green” or open city by the UN. There are lots of schools in Jalalabad and lots of kids. The international community has been here over seven years yet there is still very little electricity or infrastructure improvements. There is a hydro electric dam in the Duranta area just outside the city which is supposed to be refurbished as part of the US AID AIRP program. The Louis Berger Group was awarded this multi-Billion dollar program in 2006 but they have not gotten around to the Duranta Dam which is (to be fair) a very small component of that massive effort.

The Duranta power plant was put back on line with donations from local businessmen in 2003.

The Duranta Dam was built in the 1950’s by the Soviet Union and is producing 25% of its rated capacity due to equipment shortages. The plant managers told me that it was bombed by US planes back in 2001 but I don’t believe that. When American Tactical Aircraft go after a target like a hydroelectric dam there is normally not much left of it when they finish. I saw no evidence that it had been attacked back in 2006 when we conducted a security assessment for the refurbishing project we thought was to start back then. There are probably good reasons why, two years later, nothing has been done. No doubt one could sit in the US Embassy and get a great PowerPoint from US AID explaining what to me is unexplainable.

So the people of Jalalabad go without electricity and seven years into our rebuilding effort you see this; schools without lights, or heat, or much of anything. Allow me a slight rant here please. Every year I hear the ISAF commander stressing the fact that the reconstruction effort is the most important mission in Afghanistan. There is no question that this is true. Yet the reconstruction effort has yet to gain momentum while the central government continues to lose control over larger sections of the countryside. This will slow the reconstruction effort to a snail’s pace. Well, that is not true – it is at snails pace now and always has been so I guess I’ll have to think of a metaphor for slower than a snails pace.

It was freezing cold when I took this picture last winter. Note the chairs and desks piled up on the roof of the school building. You see that at every school in the area because they take up too much room in the classrooms given all the children who attend.

We are cursed by the “man on the moon” phenomenon. The Afghans believe that if we could put a man on the moon than we are more than capable of fixing their infrastructure if we really wanted to. I understand that this is a common problem in third world redevelopment work. Another common problem is the conviction amongst the educated locals that the CIA has a master plan and everything that happens is a planned milestone from the master plan. Trying to explain the historically dismal record of our Central Intelligence Agency is pointless no one believes you. And so the frustration mounts and the population which is the center of gravity slips further away from us. These are the seeds of disaster which if allowed to grow will cause our defeat.

The Afghans believe in education but do not have the capacity to provide enough of it to their children

The second best reason to drive east from Kabul is to pay a visit to the Khyber Pass. You need to obtain special permission to transit the tribal areas of Pakistan. If you enter from the Afghanistan side and exit the tribal lands in Peshawar you have to again get permission to transit them back to Afghanistan. I learned this the hard way which was a most unpleasant experience and cost me a ton of cash. The pass is just plain cool 53 kilometers long and 3 meters wide at its most narrow point. On one of my trips I was escorting a diplomat from one of our strongest allies. We had a large armed escort which you can see in the picture below. Note the old belt fed machinegun bungee corded to the top of the pickup bed cover. This is a stupid way to rig a machinegun and is more for show than utility. It also tells the military experts out there a lot about the kind of weapons and support the Khyber Rifles enjoy today. These old weapons may help explain why the Frontier Corps gets beaten like a drum every time they try to take on the Pakistani Taliban.

Ceremonial escort – although Rambo could make it through a 2 hour movie with just 10 rounds of linked ball hanging out of his machinegun feed tray in real life it doesn’t work that way. These troops are carrying enough ammo to last them about 45 seconds in a real firefight.

The Michni Post is the ceremonial HQ of the Khyber Rifles and it overlooks the Torkham crossing into Afghanistan. The Khyber Rifles do an excellent dog and pony show for visiting VIP’s. I’ll let the pictures tell that story.

VIP briefing room. The Khyber Rifles have a first rate presentation on their role and mission
VIP briefing room. The Khyber Rifles have a first rate presentation on their role and mission
More ceremonial guards. Having sentries pull stag out in the open like this may make sense to a Hollywood producer but not to someone who knows what they are doing (like the Pakistani Taliban.)
The Sov’s apparently shot rockets into the Khyber Agency on a regular basis back in the day.

If you are on the VIP tour you will also stop into the Khyber Rifles officer club. Back in the 1920’s when the British were still garrisoning the Khyber a group of junior officer’s stumbled out of this club in the early morning hours and thought they saw the large oak tree in front attempting to desert the post without proper orders. They had the sergeant of the guard place the tree in chains and those chains remain there to this day.

This tree was placed under arrest in 1922 for attempting to go AWOL.

Like any proper O club there are lots of plaques including this one from the mighty 22 MEU. I know Col McKenzie (now a two star if memory serves) and I’m pretty sure he didn’t clear the spelling on this plaque. I would be interested in learning how it got there. Col McKenzie commanded the 22nd MEU in 2001 2002 when they were down south policing up the Taliban and I can’t imagine that he found time for a courtesy call on the Khyber Rifles. By 2004 the good Colonel would have been on another assignment – you only get one shot at commanding a MEU. Check out the old uniforms on the side boys which reflect the incredible history of the Khyber Pass. As an old military man there are few things more interesting to me than this kind of nonsense.

The plaque reads “Presented by Col Mekenzei on 20 Jul 2004”
Traditional uniform of Khyber warriors dating back to the time of the Golden Horde

My first trip to the Khyber was self funded. I had a month to kill before going home at the end of a contract. Going home earlier would have cost me around 25k in income taxes as I had been outside the country for just 10 months. Yahya and I headed to Peshawar to kill a couple of weeks and Yahya’s childhood friends welcomed us like we were part of their extended family. This trip was on the cheap so I wore my Shalwar Kameez and we stayed in a dive guesthouse. They had 24/7 Fox News in the City View Inn which made my stay most enjoyable. We applied for permits and traveled the Khyber with Afridi tribal fighters who knew Yahya since he was boy. Yahya’s family had moved to Peshawar to escape the Soviets, but returned just before the Taliban took over. That proved to be a big mistake. The Afridi’s were an interesting crew who all wanted to immigrate to the US. I told them to cough up Bin Laden and I’d get the whole tribe green cards which they thought was really funny. Because I was their guest of honor I was duty bound to eat lunch in the most disgusting room I have set foot in. Being an American guest of honor I got to pay for the feast too which wasn’t exactly cheap. The Afridi tribe is a collection of land pirates who don’t really follow the tenants of Pashtunwali. The meal was actually very tasty and I didn’t get sick which was nothing short of amazing. We also traveled around Peshawar which has interesting museums and is home to the famous Qissa Khawani Bazaar.

Once again I’ll let the pictures flesh out the story.

The Afridi's claim this is the best kabob stand in Landi Kotal. I was dubious about this claim to put it mildly
The Afridi’s claim this is the best kabob stand in Landi Kotal
You can't just not eat in this kind of situation but the only thing gripping my bowls was apprehension
You can’t refuse to eat in this type situation without losing face. The only thing that ended up gripping my bowls was apprehension. The food was really good. Honest.
Outside Michni Fort on the non VIP tour with the Afridi's
Outside Michni Fort on the non VIP tour with the Afridi
Yahya and some friends waiting to linkup with the rest of our land pirate guides
Yahya and some friends waiting to linkup with the rest of our land pirate guides
You see these unit plaques throughout the Khyber Pass
You see these unit plaques throughout the Khyber Pass

The bazar

Qissa Khawani Bazaar.

 

Driving through the Khyber these days has gotten much more risky. There was serious fighting between the semi secular Afridi. like Yahya’s friends, and their more fundamentalist Taliban influenced neighbors. Scenes like the picture below are common now and unless things change dramatically I would not recommend driving through the Khyber Pass.

Tribal fighter at his post two feet off the main road. The compound he is guarding was attacked two days prior to our last trip to the Khyber

Travelling West: Ghazni, Herat, Ghor, Chaghcharan, Jam Minaret, Badghis, Qala-i-Naw

The security situation in the western provinces of Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly over the last year. The first five years after the Allied invasion were a time of peace and hope for the people in the West. The Western city of Herat has 24/7 electricity from nearby Iran, functioning modern infrastructure, and has shown much promise early on. But bad news started filtering out in late 2006. Stories about businessmen unable to operate or turn a profit due to the graft, corruption, and incompetence of the Afghan government appeared in the press. Now, Taliban fighters are active in Herat, Ghor, and Badghis provinces, and the brief flame of hope that Herat once represented is dying slowly but surely.

We had a mission out west back in December of 2006 to conduct a food assessment survey. It was rumored that famine was afoot in the remote mountain villages out there so someone needed to assess how much food was available and at what price. Readers familiar with the military effort here probably think, “Wait, that is what the PRTs are supposed to be doing”, which is true. But that would require extended missions outside the wire, which is something PRT’s do not seem to do, so we were contracted to do it for them. Long-haul remote trips like that are our specialty, so the Afghan American specialist assigned to this task contracted us to take him. I was gone two weeks, yet at times felt I had traveled back 200 years. Along the way, we came across one of the most unbelievable sites in Afghanistan: the minaret of Jam.

The Minaret of Jam — I thought I was the first Westerner, since the 1970s, to see this unbelievable sight!

We had serious time and budget constraints, which forced us to drive around the ring road to Herat, where the assessment was to begin. That could not be safely done today, and it was dangerous two years ago, too, but not so much during the winter months. The picture below illustrates one of the reasons why being molested by the Taliban while traveling in the winter is rare.

Snow covered Ring Road – we are in the hills just north of Ghazni.

There are no snow plows in Afghanistan (except a few the Soviets left behind in the Salang Pass), so a traffic jam like this can last several days. Working with my usual team of Tajiks we weaved through this mess in about 90 minutes by cajoling people to move a little here and a little there, and sometimes driving through the snow on the shoulder. Afghans will always cooperate and help an international who smiles at them, is polite, and knows a few words of Dari or Pashto. Being a good Marine, I first learned the swear words. Swearing about the weather, the road, and the lack of snow plows allowed me to fit right in.

More waiting in traffic on the way to Ghazni

We arrived in Herat the next day and hit one of the better restaurants in town for an early afternoon meal. The weather was cold that day so of course we ate outside because my team knew I would be cold and wanted to see if I bitched or moaned about it. I know how to play this game, and acted like eating out in windy, 40-degree cold was precisely what I wanted to do. This made Little Daud (pronounced Dow good, Dari for David and a familiar name) glum. He had bet Big Daud and Medium Daud (there are three in my crew) that I would make them move inside, and now owed a little coin to his cousins.

Cold eating outdoors at a restaurant in Herat
The city of Herat – beautiful, modern, and currently failing

The Marco Polo Inn in Herat has a wing for foreigners with heaters in the halls and rooms, sit-down toilets, and TVs playing live CNN and the BBC news casts. I would have to wait for a trip to Peshawar of all places to watch Fox News, but man, did I like the sit-down toilet and heat. Afghan buildings are not heated and this was the last I was to see of a warm room and biased crappy western news for the next 10 days.

Downtown Herat

We headed into Ghor Province the next day, planning to take two days to reach Chaghcharan, the provincial capital. Like most countries, the roads into Ghor are unpaved and often rugged to follow. Sometimes, they peter into dry stream beds or divide into three directions. A map and compass are critical if you stay on track. In the countryside, you have two choices for overnight accommodation: camp out in the mud or remain on the floor of a local tea house. We chose the tea house route

The main road through Ghor Province
Afghan Tea House in Ghor Province
Dining in Afghan style – after folding up the sleeping mats it is time for chow. This tea house is 10 miles south of the Jam Minaret.

Life in the villages of this rural area has remained unchanged for many years. There are a few modern conveniences; the people have access to motor transport, some have generators, and most have radios. The irrigation systems are primitive but work, plus this is one area where the US AID contractors have had great success with their field veterinary units. These outposts, run by Afghans, provide vaccinations and medicine for local livestock, the primary source of food and income. But for all intents and purposes, life in these villages has not changed for generations.

Wooden Irrigation Controls
Remote mountain village

On our second day of travel, my crew and Karim awoke with great excitement and anticipation. They would not tell me why, saying I would not believe what we would see in a few hours. They were right. As we moved down a valley towards the Hari Rud River up popped the minaret of Jam. The tallest complete and authentic ancient minaret in the world, it was built by the once great Ghorid Empire, which in the late 12th century ruled over what are now Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.

Rumors about this magnificent tower did not reach the West until 1944. They were not confirmed until a French archaeologist located it in 1957. For 700 years, since Genghis Khan had rampaged through the valley destroying the Ghorids, it had been forgotten by history.

The Jamm Minaret suddenly appears as you drive down towards the river – the sight is stunning and this picture does not do it justice.
Detailed work from over 700 years ago
Remnants of the Turquoise Mountain Complex behind the Jam

None of my Afghan colleagues had ever seen the Jam, and a few had doubted its existence. There was one ANP policeman guarding the site, and he told us no westerner had ever been here before as far as he knew. I was excited, soon convincing myself I was the first westerner to see the Jam in 40 years. After this trip, I flew home for Christmas and picked up a book by a Brit named Rory Stewart in the Dubai airport. He had walked the exact route I was driving with just a dog, a backpack, and a walking stick. His book had an entire chapter on the Jam Minaret and the surrounding Turquoise Mountain complex. Rory lives in Kabul and is restoring an old bazaar with his Turquoise Mountain foundation, and I hope to meet him someday. Walking from Herat to Kabul with only a dog and a big stick in winter is madness. But the kind of madness I can respect.

Group photo: The boys seemed excited to be here, but their enthusiasm was tempered by the raging river behind us that we had to cross.

Crossing the Hari Rud River in the middle of the day was drama – the river was swollen and the ford point so deep that when we came back, we hit this spot at 0200, knowing the water level would be much lower. In Chaghcharan, we stayed at the house of a local judge related to Karim. We reported to the PRT, which was manned by Lithuanian troops so that Karim could chat with the USAID representative. I don’t know how much the Lithuanians get out and about, but man, they had a gigantic, very cool-looking sauna in their camp. After conducting our census and talking with the Provincial Governor, we headed back out the next night to cross to Hari Rud before dawn.

I was so happy to see a sit-down toilet in Herat. At least these did not smell, given the sub-zero temperatures.
Downtown Chaghcharan

On the way out of Ghor, one of our vehicles had a front strut weld break. Big Daud spotted a hand-cranked welding machine on the side of the road in one of the villages, so we stopped and asked the owner to help us fix the truck. That took about 10 minutes and cost all of two dollars. The weld has worked to this day. Afghans may not have been educated well, but they are smart people.

On the road fix
Big Daud and the broken vehicle

The trip’s next leg was into Badghis Province, requiring us to go way above the snow line. As you transit the lowlands, you’ll see that most houses are made of thick mud walls with domed roofs. Domed roofs are standard in the lower elevations of the west and north because there is not enough timber to build flat roofs. The domes are also efficient in areas with a significant variation in daytime and nighttime temperatures. They vent the warm air at night and allow cool air in, making it comfortable for the families below.

Domed style housing is found in the west and north of Afghanistan

As we moved up into the Badghis Pass, we hit a fair-sized snowstorm, which required us to get the tire chains fitted.

Putting on the chains at Badghis Pass

Once in the pass, we encountered a typical scene: traffic jammed up due to heavy snow, trucks with bald tires, and no chains. Once again, the crew got out and started moving traffic out of our way.

Main road into Badghis

The capital of Badghis Province is Qala-i-Naw, and Spain has the PRT there. We stayed at the local RRD (rural rehabilitation department) office. Karim and I could get onto the PRTs overnight, but our escorts could not, so leaving them to fend for themselves is uncool. Tajiks from the Panjshir valley are not always welcomed in these parts, although most of the population is Tajik, so we stick together at all times and in all places.

Downtown Qala-i-Naw

Qala-i-Naw reminded me of an old Western town like Deadwood—mud, mud, and more mud. We took a census of the wheat lot and moved out because heavy weather was coming in, and we didn’t want to be stuck there.

Typical wheat lot; we found that supplies were plentiful and the prices not inflated.

The drive out was easy, as we beat the storm. Here is an excellent shot of medium Daud up on the pass.

Medium Daud in the mountains

We could not make a trip like that today, even in the snows of winter. I saw a news article about a BBC film crew that went to the Jam Minaret last year to film a special. They took 60 ANP policemen with them. That is unquestionably overkill. In the remote west, the chances of running into AOG bands numbering more than a dozen are around zero. It cost the BBC a fortune, too, but who cares?

Karim is getting a photo for the folks back home.

There is little doubt that the region is much more dangerous than it was just two years ago, ten times more dangerous than four years ago, and twenty times more dangerous than six years ago. See the trend line?

Heros: Medical Professionals Working Miracles On Their Own Dime

International hospitals in Kabul do not allow cameras because of cultural sensitivities. The treatment of female patients by male doctors is not universally accepted in this corner of the world. Educated families in Kabul have no problem with male doctors treating their women; in the south, men will fight to the death to avenge the slight to their family honor if a male doctor so much as looks at their woman. I have been to the CURE hospital and the French Medical Institute for Children (FMIC) and have gotten a good idea of their missions and operations. I have a good friend who volunteers his time and skills at CURE, which is how I obtained these photos. There is also a German hospital in Kabul, but I have never visited it. There are no similar efforts by closer, richer, or more influential nations like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, or China. I often wonder why.

Young child in pre-op – his life is about to be changed forever by Americans who are in Kabul at their own expense

Birth defects in Afghanistan are common. The culturally accepted practice of marrying within the family is believed to cause this alarming problem. Last winter, Phil Woolas, of the British Environmental Ministry, ignited a firestorm by calling attention to the alarming rates of birth defects in the Pakistani community due to cousin marriages. Just raising issues like that in England is now grounds for dismissal. That to me is very strange.

It is common to see children with club feet awkwardly moving down the street. I was born with a club foot. I read somewhere that former Dallas Cowboys quarterback Troy Aikman was, too. Correcting that type of birth defect has been a routine procedure in the West for over a hundred years. Correcting those defects is not common here, and when you see children with cleft palates or club feet in public, they are not laughing and playing.

A young mother comforts her child as she waits her turn in the OR

The heroes of this story are the doctors and nurses who volunteer their time and spend their own money to come here and do these procedures. They do not seek attention, they are not self-promoters, they live outside the wire without any of the elaborate security procedures found in official US government programs. They come here to help, and help they do. My Dad, a retired general officer (Marine, of course), forwarded me an email he received from a friend about a highly qualified doctor sent to Kabul on a six-month deployment. He related a story about going out to the main Kabul hospital to consult on an orthopedic case, but getting there (about a mile away from his base) took days as the security escort package was arranged. When he arrived, the head of the hospital served up tea and a good hour of chit chat. When the Americans asked to see the patient they came to examine, they were told the child was sent to Pakistan for treatment a week ago.

This situation is beyond frustrating. I used to walk to work daily along the same streets that he had to travel for his appointment, as driving in downtown Kabul is such a nightmare. We are losing the war in Afghanistan quickly, and one of the reasons for this is that our military prioritizes force protection over everything else. If force protection is the main mission, it would be easier to conduct it back in the United States. The U.S. military has sent a highly skilled orthopedic surgeon here for a six-month tour, yet all he does is go to Bagram once a month. His first trip to Bagram took three days because he had to stage a day early at the Kabul military airfield, which is just half a mile from his base, and wait for a flight. In contrast, we can drive from Kabul to Bagram in just 45 minutes. Civilian surgeons who are here at their own expense—without armored trucks or armed escorts—could operate on hundreds of patients and train many doctors if they could afford to stay for six months. As a retired military officer, it pains me to write this, but it is the truth.

Team Texas in action – this team will operate on dozens of children during the next three days.
Most Afghans have no idea how they receive treatment without paying bribes, but are thankful. This is how you fight a counterinsurgency, fixing one child at a time with honesty, integrity, and compassion

The doctors who volunteer at CURE also work on adults. Team Texas had a great plastic surgeon who replaced the ear of a truck driver who had lost his to a Taliban checkpoint in the south when he was stopped while hauling fuel for ISAF.

 

The Taliban may be able to take ears but could never put one back. This lesson will not be lost on the family and friends of this man

The men and women from France, Germany, and America who come to this war-torn land to help people who are so poor and need so much represent the best of what our countries stand for. Giving so much and asking for nothing in return means something to me, and it should to you, too. They do not get medals, bands, parades, or formal recognition. They are heroes and do the right thing because it is the right thing to do. They make all of us a little prouder and a little better. May God watch over and bless them.

Travelling South: Wardak, Ghazni, Zabul, Khandahar

The southern region of Afghanistan is unstable, dangerous, and a hazardous place to travel by road these days. This is a new development that started about one year ago. Before that, we would routinely make trips down to Kandahar, tracing the same route made famous in James Michener’s excellent book Caravans. Back in 2005 and 2006, it was still a risky trip, but the risks were manageable. We always travel in armored trucks in these contested areas, but unlike 98% of the other security companies in Afghanistan, we opted for the low-profile trucks with firing ports. These rides are not comfortable and noisy, but they perform as advertised.

The War Pig – armored low profile

I hate being stuck in large armored SUVs because you are locked in and cannot use your weapons unless the Taliban opens the vehicle for you. Usually, that is done with an RPG, which disables the vehicle and any survivors inside. People working outside the wire in Afghanistan are like people anywhere; they don’t think that they will be targeted or attacked, and therefore, they value the comfort and false sense of security that large, brand-new, armored American SUVs provide.

 Hope is not a security plan, but it is the most common plan people use. Every second of every day, somewhere in the world, someone is being victimized. The chances that you are the one being victimized are minimal. But that is irrelevant when you find yourself the target of criminals or terrorists. When that happens, the statistical chances for you are now 100%, and at precisely the time you realize they are 100%, you also discover you are dealing with a pack of wolves (terrorists) or a rabid dog (criminals), and they do not respond to reason.

The route to Kandahar runs southwest through the provinces of Wardak, Ghazni, Zabul, and Kandahar. Up until last year, Wardak and Ghazni provinces were pretty safe. Our Panjshir fighters used to pick up their weapons from the police in Ghazni when operating in Kabul city became too difficult due to police harassment. They are a registered company with weapon permits, but that has nothing to do with getting arrested by the Kabul police. The corruption in Kabul is genuinely stunning, and the local cops have gotten bolder in the last few years. They have even locked up internationals from large security companies who had weapons permits, licenses, and letters from one of the generals running the Ministry of the Interior. Our embassy and those of our allies couldn’t care less; security contractors are as popular with them as an ACORN-trained community activist would be with me. Local Afghan security companies have it much worse, depending on who owns them and who is watching over them. I would go on about this rather sore topic, but prudence dictates I leave this sleeping bear alone.

Our team of Tajik fighters from the Panjshir Valley is getting their weapons and body armor from the ANP in Ghazni. The chief of police there is an uncle of the team leader.

Wardak province is now statistically the most dangerous portion of the trip south. Earlier this month, AOG fighters ambushed a convoy guarded by Afghan security contractors in the middle of the day. They killed three guards in the firefight and captured four whom they beheaded, again in broad daylight, on the main ring road. These AOG fighters call themselves Taliban, but they are not the Taliban we read about training and infiltrating out of Pakistan. The “Taliban” elements who routinely attack military units and oil tankers along the route south are local people who may or may not be sympathetic to the Taliban cause.

Many are local criminals whom the Taliban pay to do their bidding, which is most ironic. The Taliban got their start back in the 90’s in Kandahar by hanging an Afghan soldier (and his commander) who had raped a local school girl the day prior. Mullah Omar was the leader of this group of religious students, which entered the Army camp reportedly armed with only the Koran and self-righteous indignation. I guess that makes Omar sort of an Afghan version of Gandhi because showing up unarmed to lynch a few miscreants is as close to nonviolent protest as Afghans are ever going to get. Instead of protecting the faithful from criminals, they are using criminals to prey on the faithful.

The road out of Wardak descends to the plains of Afghanistan and the ancient city of Ghazni. Ghazni was once considered the most incredible military fort of its day, but that fame was short-lived after the British Army arrived in 1839 and stormed it rather quickly with little effort. Here is how it looked when the British first arrived:

Old Ghazni

And here is a picture of the city today

Source: http://avalon.unomaha.edu/afghan/afghanistan/ghazni/bz01pic.htm

The Ghazni PRT, run by the American military, sits outside the town astride the main road. Not all the PRTs are manned by Americans; our NATO allies are responsible for over half of them. Here is a map of the PRTs that I pulled from Wikipedia. Like many things on Wikipedia, it is wrong. The Germans man the PRT in Mazar, not the Swedes. The PRT in Lashkar Gah is British, not Canadian ..

Knowing which country in which PRT is critical for internationals working in Afghanistan is vital because each nation in ISAF has caveats covering which missions their respective governments authorize them to do. This is a fancy way of saying that many of our allies are not allowed to leave their compounds and come to the rescue of internationals in distress. The American PRTs will always respond to calls for help at any time and in any condition. I understand the Brits, Canadians, and Aussies have identical rules and attitudes. As for the others, you are on your own. Needless to say, these caveats have contributed to the glacier-like pace of international reconstruction.

Like many bases situated in unstable areas, the Ghazni PRT has an aerostatic balloon for surveillance and fire control.

Aerostatic Balloon at the Ghazni PRT

These aerostatic systems are impressive. Some friends and I got to see how they work at FOB Lonestar, right down the road from the Taj in the Khogyani district. The technology is impressive, the capabilities unbelievable, and the details best kept on the low, but trust me, this is one piece of technology worth every penny spent developing it.

Ghazni was the last safe place to stop for needed vehicle maintenance, which we did on one of our trips in the summer of 2006. One of our vehicles had a tire problem, and we wanted to fix it before heading into Indian country. There are no tire stores here, just a stand on the side of the road with a compressor. The stand we pulled into was run by a young boy and his younger brother. Here they are diagnosing the problem.

After diagnosing the problem, the younger of the two must remove the tire using a pry bar and tackle rig.

It was well over 100 degrees that day. If we returned during winter, these two boys would wear the same clothes. The people here are that poor, my friends, and if you think this looks sad, you should see the beggars and trash dump kids. Having patched the tire, the younger child filled it while his brother prepared to mount it on the car. This pit stop was over in 5 minutes. The boys worked with the intensity and speed of a NASCAR pit crew.

Afghan pit crew

 

Kids with kites usually indicate limited Taliban in the area.

Heading south out of Ghazni towards Qalat, you run through a series of unsafe villages for foreigners, even back in 2006. One of the most notorious was Shah Joy, and it is the scene of the only attack against us, if you could call it that. I was in the trail vehicle when, out of the corner of my eye, I saw a frag grenade sailing towards the truck. We were doing about 70 kph, so hitting us with the thing would not happen, and the bazaar was packed with people. I watched in utter amazement as it went off, clearly injuring some of the bystanders who did not even react when the grenade landed in the middle of the road. How weird is that?

However, the Taliban is not the only threat to the Kabul-Kandahar road. The terrain and weather conspire to sometimes turn this route into a real pain. The only way to build roads in this part of the country is to make them withstand floods. The easiest way to do that is to allow the water to spill over the road in traditional flooding areas. We discovered during a November trip that there are 23 such spots on the road, and here is the first one you run into when heading from Kandahar towards Kabul.

Decision time – cross or wait? I hate being out in the open like this.

We were already late and not too happy about this. The locals were in good cheer and offered all sorts of advice. Understanding when you are in danger and when you are not is a key skill, and these people were not a threat and seemed to enjoy having us stuck there, too.

If you can’t move, the next best thing is to chat up the locals to make sure everything is on the up and up.

One way to tell if they are a threat is to look for high-water pants and tennis shoes. Afghans wear open-toed sandals; tennis shoes are typically seen only on male children and fighters transiting the area. The high-water trousers seem to be a style statement, but I do not know why. In this situation, if you saw a group of men in tennis shoes, the best thing to do is to walk up and offer a formal greeting. If the men do not immediately break into broad smiles and offer a return greeting, they may be Taliban or associates. When that happens, guys like us get in our trucks and turn around because unless they produce a gun, we can do nothing. We operate with the same rules of engagement as our military, but unlike our military, we are also subject to the laws of Afghanistan. Do not be fooled by the mainstream media writing stories about armed contractors being able to do anything they like in Afghanistan. There are expatriates sitting behind bars in the big house at Pul-e-Charkhi to prove that the media reports are fake news.

This logjam was broken when a large bus plowed through the deep, fast-moving water

The truck was followed by a small passenger car, which triggered a mad rush from our side of the river.

If this little car could make it, we were going too

Qalat is the provincial capital of Zabul Province and the home of another impressive old fortress. It has an American PRT co-located inside an ANA base, and they were always very hospitable when we dropped by. Here is what the town looks like as you drive in from the south. Every hilltop in this country seems to have a fort or outpost built on its crest. The one in Qalat is really cool when you see it pop up on the horizon.

Qalat

Heading south from Qalat, there are just a few isolated compounds and no major bazaars or towns. In sparsely populated areas like that, attacks by AOG fighters are rare. Taliban do not like humping around in the boonies much and confine most of their activity to populated areas. That makes sense because the bad guys cover and conceal the civilian population. Moving out into the desert away from the protection that innocent civilians provide is risky for insurgents.

Our trips south always terminated in Kandahar city, home of the Continental Inn. We could find a bunk out at the Kandahar Airfield, but we would have to leave our escort to fend for themselves, which is uncool. Here is a shot of the Continental, which has slow internet but a super cook who excels at making curry.

The Continental Inn in Khandarhar

Before hitting the Continental, we would usually pull into the Kandahar Air Field (KAF), home to about 15,000 international troops and a rear-echelon establishment extraordinaire. Gyms, restaurants, fast food stands, a boardwalk, stores, a hockey rink, and field music on Sundays.

band at Khandarhar base

Most of the troops on this base will never set one foot outside the wire during their tour. Many from allied nations are obese and have problems, so fat that they have issues with the heat, even though they do not wear body armor or carry weapons on base. KAF means getting a double-double at Timmy Horton’s and Burger King for my Afghan crew. Afghans love Burger King, and we like Tim Horton’s.

We do not run down south without at least one, if not two, escort vehicles filled with Tajik fighters from the Panjshir valley. We use Sediqi Security Services (SSS) exclusively for work in the south and west. They are great fighters who battled the Taliban back in the day, and the bad guys hate them more than they do us. This is an age-old technique for outsiders operating in Central Asia. If the North were as dangerous as the South, we’d travel the North with Pashtun escorts for the same reason.

The SSS Tajik crew

We have used the same guys on all the high-risk trips we have done over the years, and needless to say, we are a tight crew. The owners of SSS are young mid-thirties who, as children, would sneak into Taliban lines to disarm and steal anti-personnel mines. They would then sell them to the Northern Alliance. Below is a picture of them leading the way back to Kabul.

SSS crew in vehicle headed back from Kandahar

That is a PKM machine gun sticking out of the back window, a good piece of kit to bring along on trips south. The new laws being written for private security companies in Afghanistan will prohibit us from owning or using machine guns. That is taking stupidity to new and higher levels, but the laws here are designed for one thing only: to make the people writing them rich. In that respect, the Afghan lawmakers are just like their democratic counterparts in Washington, only a little more upfront about it.

In 2006, Kandahar had many expatriates who lived and worked inside the city. There was even a Starbucks-influenced coffee shop run by an Afghan American that was very popular with the locals. The internationals are almost all gone now; those who remain live in heavily guarded compounds and rarely travel. On our last trip down, we were leaving the Continental to head back to Kabul, and I took this snapshot of the street.

Kandahar street

Suddenly, the next block was empty, the shops shuttered, and the hair on my neck was on end. I took another picture before picking up my weapon. Here it is:

Kandahar EMPTY street

When you roll down a street that looks like this, you are heading for big-time trouble. There was only one way out of the city, so we had no choice but to keep moving north, but Jesus, it was a scary 10 minutes. Nothing happened that day, and I don’t know why the street cleared out like it did, but I’ll tell you what. I don’t think we’ll be heading back to Kandahar anytime soon.

Kala Jangi Fighter Fortress

Mazar-i-Shariff is home to the Kala Jangi Fighter Fortress, the scene of a famous battle in November 2001. Unfortunately, I only have one picture of the fort’s exterior, which does not do it justice. My good friend CC (code-name Cautious Citizen) and I were in the area on a site visit. He is one of the few guys I know who served in the very top tier of our Special Operations establishment, which is why I don’t use his real name. He probably couldn’t care less, but you never know about those tier one guys, and I’d hate to have one mad at me. He and I got a tour of the portion inside Kala Jangi where the fighting occurred. The remainder of the base was off limits when we were there in June 2007.

Just last week, the Shem Bot and Michael Yon tried twice to get inside but were denied entry. The Bot speaks good Dari, which the Afghans appreciate; unusually, he could not BS his way in. The Eid holidays were last week, and the commander was home with his family, which may be why Shem couldn’t get past the gate. It would be a shame if American or British visitors were no longer allowed to see where their special operators fought with such courage and ability. Fortunately, I have spent a few afternoons wandering inside and have plenty of interesting photos to share.

CC and I outside the fortress

On November 25th, 2001, two CIA agents went to the Kala Jangi fortress to interview the Taliban who had surrendered to Gen Dostum’s Northern Alliance fighters the day before. While interviewing a group of prisoners, the Taliban suddenly attacked the agents and their Northern Alliance escort. One of the agents and all the Northern Alliance fighters were killed. The 300 prisoners revolted and armed themselves with weapons and munitions that the Taliban had stored in this portion of the fortress years before. What followed was a three-day battle reported to the world in near real time.

The American military, with a few CIA officers, had arrived in Central Asia mere weeks after the attacks on our homeland. Donald Rumsfeld had pushed the Pentagon and Langley to go quickly. No military professional likes to execute ad-hoc seat-of-the-pants combat operations half a world away. Still, the Pentagon let loose the dogs of war, allowing our SF teams, aided by CIA paramilitary contractors, and advance elements of the US Army 10th Mountain Division to operate independently with mission-type orders and without micro-management. The result of this initial phase of our campaign against the Taliban and Al Qaeda was a brilliant success.

This appears to be what the Marines would term a “Tactical Air Control Party” in action on the north wall of the fortress. They are probably from the 10th Mountain Division. It is interesting to see the old war belt load-bearing rigs, which were being phased out back then in favor of the load-bearing vests in use today.

It is hard to conduct such a fluid, wide-ranging battle where all the targeting and ordinance delivery is based on inputs from ground controllers in contact. The fog of war is a potent performance inhibitor that affects all men on the field of battle, and the fog of war inserted itself into the struggle of Kala Jangi when a 2,000-pound JDAM hit adjacent to the team who had called it in. It was a miracle that this blue-on-blue SNAFU killed none of our troops. Dozens of American, British, and Afghan soldiers were injured, five Americans required medical evacuation, and British casualties are unknown because the UK never releases information about SAS operations. The Northern Alliance reported over 30 KIA from this JDAM strike.

Point of impact of the arrant JDAM crater as it appeared in 2007

 

This is the SF team’s view when calling in the JDAMs. The Taliban occupied the line of buildings to the front, which is 300 meters away. It takes real balls to call in air-delivered ordinance this close to you, and I mean real balls.

I remember watching this unfold through the video of a German TV crew who had the good luck to be on hand when the fighting started. I was amazed that we were conducting such a ballsy mobile warfare style campaign and had gotten there so quickly. Checking out this old battlefield was an opportunity I could not pass up.

“devil Taliban” – have to love that.

 

The portion of the fort where all the fighting occurred is the southeastern quarter, right behind the gate, next to the sign pictured above. The battlefield is essentially untouched since the battle. EOD teams did remove or destroy most of the UXO (unexploded ordinance), but our Afghan Army guide was adamant that we stay on the many paths through the brush, lest we step on some live ordinance or a cobra. We were there in July, and apparently, snakes are a problem in that area during the summer months.

Gen Dostum’s men had not searched the Taliban nor the portion of the fort where they put the Taliban (who had owned the fort until just days before they surrenderd) when American CIA agents arrived to interrogate the captured Taliban fighters they had no idea they were being held in a portion of the fort that the Taliban had used for weapons and ammunition storage. I am certain that they had detected in previous encounters with the Taliban a certain battlefield rhythm, and part of that rhythm was the acceptance of surrendered Taliban of their POW status. For whatever reason, the Taliban in Kala Jangi were in no mood to accept their fate, and they revolted, killing a CIA agent (and former Marine Corps officer), Mike Spann, and a dozen Northern Alliance guards. They then opened the weapons storage containers they had put there previously, and the fight was on.

A CIA agent identified in the media as “Dave” used the sat phone from a German TV crew to call the K2 base in Uzbekistan for reinforcements.

In response to the call made from a CIA agent identified as “Dave,” a mixed group of 9 American special operators, 6 British Special Boat Service operators, and a nine-man advance party from the 10th Mountain Division arrived on the scene.

The Taliban weapons stores remain there to this day, although the Afghan Army has rendered the weapons unusable. The second picture below is of one of the shipping containers that received much attention from an AC-130 gunship during the night of 26 November.

The weapons in this conex were here in 2001 and functional
Inside a weapons conex that got some AC130 love  – it looked like Swiss cheese it was so shot up

Although the battle lasted for three days, it was essentially over after the AC-130s pounded the Taliban on the night of the 26th. On the morning of the 27th, the surviving Taliban retreated into the basements under the mud huts that line the southern wall.

This is a shot from the Taliban perspective, looking north towards the allied positions.

You can still find medicine bottles, primitive field dressings, torn and bloody clothing, and a ton of rusty un-serviceable small arms ammo down in these basements.

\What is left of the stairs leading down to the basement rooms.

Dostum’s men flooded the basement to drive the surviving band of die-hard fighters out. And when they did, out popped Johnny Walker Lindh and another 80 or so surviving fighters. There are few absolutes in life, but the death penalty for traitors to our great land is one of them. Lindh should have been hanged a long time ago in public. Nothing personal, but the same principle applies here as it did to the murdering horse thieves in Lonesome Dove. Gus and Captain Call had to string up the group they caught, which included their lifelong friend Jake Spoon. They didn’t want to do it, but they had to because it was their duty under their code. There are some things a man cannot tolerate if he calls himself a free man. Horse thieves and traitors are two of those things. Again, this is not personal – I can understand the ennui which drove young Walker to Islam. I can admire his courage and fortitude in leaving home at such a young age to venture into the northwest frontier of Pakistan alone. But he turned traitor, and at that point, all the understanding and empathy in the world are irrelevant. The issue becomes black and white, just like a Panda.

Johnny Walker Lindh moments after being recaptured
I lifted a picture taken after the battle from the net. Nobody knew the Taliban had an arms cache inside that portion of the fort because Gen Dostum used it to stable his horses.

I arrived in Afghanistan four years after this battle and can only imagine what it was like for the American and British operators who drove into the breach back in 2001. They were free to operate as they saw fit based on what they developed on the ground. The Afghan people were 100% behind our efforts to rid them of the Taliban scourge. They must have been greeted like liberators everywhere they went, and when the Taliban tried to stand and fight, they were able to defeat them in detail with precision, direct, and indirect fire. What could be better than that?

Travelling North: Salang Pass to Mazar-i-Sharif

The northern regions of Afghanistan are the safest areas in the country. A majority of the population in these provinces is Tajik or Hazara and was not known for supporting the Taliban. We routinely travel in the north without body armor or rifles and occasionally leave the side arms at home out of respect for the local leaders and populace. All my trips into the north have terminated in the fabled city of Mazar-i-Shariff, where our main client, JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), has an office and several programs.

The trip north starts by crossing the Shamali Plain (Shamali means “windy” in Dari), which saw much fighting during the Soviet invasion in the 80s. As a point of interest, the main road from Kabul to Bagram airbase used by our armed forces today was built by the Soviets so they could stay out of the Shamali plain as much as possible. The Soviets fought hard and often all along the main road to the north. After the Northern Alliance and our SF teams drove out the Taliban in 2001, there has been no fighting or attacks on the international or Afghan military on the plain or anywhere else along the route to Mazar-i-Shariff.

Shamali plain just north of Kabul

In 2006, an American army convoy caused a fatal traffic accident where the roads above terminate inside Kabul. They opened fire on the crowd that gathered at the accident site, sparking an entire day of rioting in Kabul. Unruly and agitated crowds are a staple at Afghan traffic accidents, which occur frequently and tend to be gruesome given the speeds at which Afghans drive and their propensity for stuffing extra women and children in car trunks or on roof racks. Firing into the crowd that day (I saw it live on Tolo TV) is a symptom of the big base, big army mentality that infected our efforts here as soon as the regular army took over the fight. The soldier I saw unleash his 50 cal into the Afghan crowd at point-blank range was scared. He was scared because he did not understand Afghanistan or its people, and he thought the crowd was after him and his fellow soldiers. This was four years after we first set foot in the country. Today, some seven years into the fight, a majority of the soldiers are just as clueless about the Afghan people and their customs as the knucklehead on the machine gun that day. But I digress.

Istalif Pottery

Halfway across the plain is the town of Istalif, famous for its pottery. With a bit of haggling and good humor, you can buy any of these pieces for just one dollar, although after haggling and completing the sale, I always give a tip. Haggling is fun, but a couple of extra dollars thrown in at the end of the deal is fun too. Afghans seem to enjoy foreigners who are funny and fair.

After getting through the Shamali, you have to climb up the Salang Pass, which is 12,723 feet up into the Hindu Kush Mountains, making it one of the highest roads in the world. Here is a view going up the pass and looking back towards Kabul.

Kabul side of the Salang Pass

The Soviet Union built a tunnel through the pass back in the 60’s, which is 2.6 kilometers long and scary. The roadbed is pitted and often filled with slush, the evacuation fan system stopped working decades ago, it is dark, and the Afghans cannot deal with vehicle accidents or any serious injuries. In 1982, an explosion in the tunnel caused the Soviets to block both ends as they thought there was an attack in progress. Those trapped inside kept their vehicles running to avoid freezing, the resulting buildup of carbon monoxide and smoke killed as many as 700 Soviet troops and over 2,000 Afghans.

Northern entrance to the Salang Pass

Once you’re through the Salang tunnel, it is a steep drop down into the valley floor where one can find the best fresh fish in Afghanistan. Here is my favorite seasonal fish stand seen from the road above:

Approaching the valley floor on the northern side of the Salang Pass

Like I said, it is a step grade down the north side of the Salang

The guys sitting behind me in the picture above are truck drivers who wandered over just in case I ate like an Afghan, which is to share food and drink automatically. I have been here long enough to understand that, so the three of us tucked into the excellent fish and engaged in conversations using a mix of basic Dari, American slang, and sign language.

The drive from the Salang Pass to Mazar is pleasant and fast over good roads. The largest city along the route is Puli Khumri, which has little international presence but few AOG (armed opposition group) incidents. One of the more interesting aspects of driving around the country is discovering how the industrious Afghans can be with found objects. The picture below demonstrates that point well and is the best use of old Soviet BTRs I’ve yet to see.

A fuel station a few miles south of Puli Khumri is built on top of old Soviet BTR 72s that were stacked into the river, covered with dirt and rock, compacted, and leveled. One way to get a land title in Afghanistan is to create your own land.

From Puli Khumri, it is about three hours of driving through one small hamlet after another. Moving off the main road in areas with no villages or towns is not a good idea. Every natural choke-point has an old Soviet command post, and the terrain around them could still be seeded with anti-personnel mines. Most of these areas have been cleared, but the sign below provides a warning that remains applicable today to the savvy traveler.

This is a warning from HALO Trust (a de-mining NGO) in Dari and English, explaining that the land off of the main highway in this pass contains an active minefield.

The Afghanistan state-controlled media back in the Soviet days called Soviet soldiers Quay Dhost, which means “friendly forces”. When we rolled up to Afghan police checkpoints, we’d smile and introduce ourselves as Quay Dhost, which generated a look of surprise followed by a big belly laugh.  Afghans love jokes and funny foreigners who make an effort to speak Dari.

Mazar-i-Sharif is a small city famous for the Blue Mosque, which is supposed to contain the remains of Hazrat Ali, a son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammad. Islamic scholars believe Ali’s grave is in the Imam Mosque in Najaf, Iraq.

 

Checking out the Blue Mosque in Mazar

I have read and heard from the locals that the Mosque was buried to prevent its sacking by Genghis Khan in 1220 and not uncovered until the 1480s. I have no idea how the locals could have done that back then, but I also don’t know how the Egyptian Pyramids were built, so maybe it’s a true story. For us foreigners, this is as close as we can get to the Mosque, which is fine because the real treat when visiting the North is checking out the Kala Jangi fortress, which was the scene of a big fight on 25 November 2001.

There is also work in Mazar, which means looking after Ms Tani san of JICA, who runs the women’s empowerment program. The picture below shows Tani-san criticizing one of her women’s groups for slacking on keeping the cows and barn that the people of Japan provided clean and functional.

JICA’s Women’s Empowerment Program in action. The woman huddled in a school circle is catching hell for being behind in maintaining their new cattle barn.

While she is in the villages, the police guard and I hang out with the village’s males, often sitting in the closest field for some nan and yogurt. If we check up on five villages, that’s five lunches of nan and yogurt and sometimes kabob that you can’t not eat because it’s impolite for guests to refuse hospitality. The life of an independent international security operative often looks like this:

I’m going to get fat if I keep doing this. The cold mint yogurt tea is damn good though and I’ve never tasted anything like it.

The eggplant we eat with the nan (bread) is called Borani Banjan and is delicious. It is greasy, as the day is long, but tasty. Our next stop will be the Fortress, but it deserves a post.

The Afghanistan Travel Series

One of the advantages of working outside the wire is the ability to travel. Internationals can move freely through most of Afghanistan without taking elaborate or expensive security measures. Due to the extent of armed criminality, being armed is always a good idea. One reason criminals rarely target internationals is the universal belief among Afghans that we are all armed and capable with those arms. That is not always true, but it is conventional wisdom.

My oldest daughter Megan came over last summer and worked for us when we had a few bomb and drug dog contracts. Like her father, she is an excellent dog handler/trainer and thrives on travel and adventure. Here she is with her friend Sarah, formerly of the Australian Army and at the time the Kabul coordinator for ANSO (Afghan NGO Safety Office.)

Megan and Sarah exploring the Panjshir Valley.

The picture above was taken in the Panjshir Valley, where the girls had visited with Sarah’s driver’s and interpreter’s families. Neither I nor my colleagues considered this to be unusually risky. My daughter is competent with a sidearm after taking multiple four-day handgun courses at Front Sight in Las Vegas when I was on the staff there. Sarah has a few years of experience and is very capable, too, but they were perfectly safe on this trip because of the Afghan people.

Megan and I at the Taj in Jalalabad

One of the facts of life on the ground here, which has not translated well in the media coverage, is the acceptance of internationals by the vast majority of the Afghan people. Without their active support, the various international organizations involved in the reconstruction fight could not stay here or operate. Afghanistan is a poor country with little infrastructure, a spotty track record of central government control, and no ability to extract the valuable natural resources (which are considerable) that have been identified to date. The people have little and expect little, so they respond so positively to internationals who have come to help them. This includes the international military. There are few places in this country happier than an isolated village that just had a platoon of Americans roll in with plans to stay for a while.

I took this picture of a kid who was working a one-person vehicle maintenance stall on the Shamoli Plain just north of Kabul in the summer of 2006

The more the average Afghan interacts with internationals, specifically the international military, the more they like us. We have tens of thousands of troops deployed here but a vast majority spend their entire tour behind the wire on gigantic military bases. These bases are called FOBs (forward operating base). Still, when there are restaurants, American and Canadian fast food stands, coffee shops, gigantic bazaars, and massage parlors, it is hard to think of a base as being forward or operating. The words rear and supporting are better descriptors.

We cannot continue to rely on technology to solve tactical problems. When you do that, you end up with the MRAP, a vehicle so tall it will rip out the electrical wires from every street it drives down if it moves off a main road into a village or town. It is also so heavy it cannot maneuver well on the local dirt roads, cross local bridges, or climb the many mountain passes in Afghanistan.

MRAP’s – not as helpful as one would think. Not good on narrow canal roads or inside villages due to their width and height

Yes, it will protect the troops inside from most of the mines and IEDs used by the AOG, but as a student of history, I know it is easier and cheaper to defeat new technology than to develop it. The AOG will develop IEDs big enough to beat this improved armor. All the players in the game know that.

There will be additional posts covering the north, south, east, and west of Afghanistan. They include lots of pictures, which I hope everyone will enjoy. Many of the places pictured are no longer safe for internationals. It will be decades before another Westerner can photograph them again. We are losing terrain to the bad guys, and with the terrain goes the people. In a counterinsurgency fight, the people are the center of gravity; we cannot allow this current trend of ceding terrain to the Taliban to continue, or we will lose. It is that simple.

Talking with the AOG

There are many names used in Afghanistan to describe the groups hostile to the central government. Taliban, insurgents, Anti Government Elements (AGE) and Armed Opposition Groups (AOG) are the most common descriptors. AOG can be Taliban, criminal gangs who cooperate with the Taliban, rent-a-Taliban (mostly teenage boys who need money and want adventure) or militias controlled by warlords. Every armed group has its own agenda and few cooperate with each other. This is their principal weakness -the inability to operate with unity of command or purpose. Our big weakness is that we cannot take advantage of their weakness because most (not all) of our military is confined to large bases and most (not all) have a limited understanding of tribal dynamics in their areas of operation.

We were asked by a journalist if we could set up an interview for a story he’s working on. Here he is talking with the village Malik from Spur Kunday and an AOG fighter up in the hills above Surobi.

It is not comfortable for us being out in the open like this. We are at the mouth of the Uzbin valley up in the foothills just off the dirt track which is the only road in the area. The valley has seen much fighting since the French ambush last month. The chances of a predator or some other American surveillance platform zooming in on us to determine friend or foe status is high. We are certain that the American ROE would prohibit attacking us as long as they do not see weapons. But who wants to chance that? Not us which is why we tried to hurry the interview along as best we could.

Shem and I left the weapons and body armor in our vehicle and pulled security for the hour or so it took to conduct the interview. It is a strange situation to be in – we could not put a US flag or an air panel on our roof because we know there are bad guys in the hills above us. We also could not walk around with our rifles which would offer protection from local AOG but open the door for a visit from Mr. Predator.

Friday morning we got organized and set off for our interview – here is a shot of us getting jocked up in the local garb. Shawal Kameez, pakol hat, scarf and vest over the body armor. On the road we take off the sunglasses because Afghans don’t wear them. We do not fool any locals who get a good look at us as we scream by in our vehicle but that is not the point. The point is to be inside the OODA loop of anyone looking to cause mischief. If a bad guy wants to ambush internationals on the Jalalabad – Kabul road he has to Observe the target, Orient his weapon systems on the target, Decided to attack and then Attack the target. Observe Orient Decide Act (OODA.) That loop takes much longer then most people realize because most people received their tactical combat training via Hollywood movies. In the real world understanding the OODA loop theory and how to apply it is the fundamental building block upon which an accurate threat assessment is made. Unless AOG spotters have identified us and radioed ahead to an ambush team (something we have never seen on the Jbad road to date) it would require superhuman decision making ability to ID us and decide to attack us as we scream by in a vehicle that looks just like every other local SUV on the road.

 

The meeting took a long time but that is a story for our journalist friend to tell.

 

This is what I mean about being exposed, sitting on the topographical crest like this is no good but what are you going to do? The trip back was uneventful and smooth.

The Caves of Little Barabad

We recently took a trip across the river into Beshud District to the village of Little Barabad to photograph the old caves that line the northern shore of the Kabul River.

When we show up at this village, we often pick up and escort local kids – they tend to segregate by gender, and here are some of the girls from Little Barabad.

The people of Little Barabad are Kuchi tribesmen who are dirt poor and from a different tribe than the Shinwari’s who live up the river in the village of Big Barabad. Because the elders from these two villages cannot agree on anything, Little Barabad suffers and cannot spend its NSP (National Solidarity Program) funds on building a well or making other infrastructure improvements. The NSP money comes from the World Bank, and each household receives $2,000. However, this money can only be spent on projects that collectively benefit the village. The only recognized village in this area is Big Barabad.

The San Diego sister cities project is scheduled to build a foot bridge over the Kabul River, which would allow the kids from Little Barabad to attend school. There is a large school located just 300 meters away on the Jalalabad side of the river, but it is a one-hour drive by road. The people of Little Barabad do not have a vehicle or much of a road, for that matter, so their children are unable to attend school.

San Diego and the La Jolla Rotary Club have been very active in Jalalabad, which is a sister city to San Diego. How that happened remains a mystery, but they have invested a substantial amount of money in Nangarhar University and Jalalabad. Here is the current method of crossing the Kabul River, and the reason why a footbridge will be such a good deal. When you look at this float, keep in mind the river is swift, and these folks aren’t swimmers.

Fording the river Afghan style

One goal of today’s trip was to get a proper picture of my new SOMA FM t-shirt to send to their website. Inshallah, they will post it, so getting the pistol in frame was important. From looking at my fellow donors at the Soma FM site I’m sure to be the only one who even owns a gun. Soma is based out of San Francisco, so I’m sure they’ll find the pic of an armed American to be innately disturbing. Guns = authority = bad to them. To me, guns represent keeping authority in check, and are good. Plus, there is a war going on here, and even though it is easy to avoid drama, one must be prepared. Be friendly to everyone you meet, but always have a plan to kill them. That’s a Marine motto that is worth remembering in this line of work.

Some of the boys who escort us around the area

Chai with the locals

The village kids love to have their pictures taken and always enjoy it when we come by to hike up to the caves. We hook them up with a bottled water and a dollar each for being our guides. See how blond the kid in the middle of the photograph above is? You see that a lot of that is in Nangarhar Province. The Soviets kept their presence relatively quiet while they were here and even had an R&R camp in Jalalabad. They also allowed their troops to leave the base and enter the bazaar, where they could support the local economy. I go to the bazaar all the time myself, and the local merchants seem to enjoy it when an international visitor stops in to chat with them and buy their goods.

Many of the locals think our troops are cowards because they only see them in armored trucks racing through the town and pointing weapons at anyone who they think is too close to them.  The Soviets flooded the bazaar when they were off duty, and I believe our troops and the Afghan people would both benefit if our military adopted the same liberty policy as the Soviets. Getting close to the locals is a good thing, and it is a basic tenet of our counterinsurgency doctrine. Judging from all the blond and red-headed kids we see in Jalalabad, some of the Russians got a little too close to the locals, which is a dangerous game to play in Pashtun lands.

Little Barabad is a collection of compounds belonging to one extended family. They have goats and sheep, three cows, plus a little corn and wheat but that is about it.

Last July the caves were full of bats.

The bats were “nishta” or all gone this time because they seem to occupy the caves during the heat of summer. We will have to wait until next year to get a good picture of the bats. I

Kabul Re-up Run

Today, the Bot and I had to run to Kabul for a re-up. We started our journey by striking a pose for our sponsor. Well, not a real sponsor, but they sent us some hats, bumper stickers, steak rub, and a generous assortment of candy, so we feel sponsored. Here is Shem (a.k.a. Shem Bot a.k.a. Bot) and I at the start of the day with our signature La Rue Tactical hats. We’ll have to do this again, as the resident expert has told me that this picture lacks technical merit due to failure to use proper lens filters.

The drive was smooth and fast. We rent SUVs and frequently switch them up to avoid standing out on the road. We stop at all checkpoints and chat up the ANP (Afghan National Police), who appreciate that we speak some Pashto and are polite. In this country, a little Pashto or Dari and a big smile will win you a ton of goodwill from the local officials and people.

 The problem with traveling in low-profile mode is that running into an ISAF or American military convoy can cause drama. I was shot at by the American Army in downtown Kabul back in ’07 while driving a brand new Armored Land Cruiser with diplomatic plates identifying it as belonging to the Government of Japan. A rear gunner in a five-truck convoy thought I got a little too close to them as they were exiting a traffic circle. I may well have strayed too close, but it never occurred to me that the young trooper would not recognize a large brand-new armored SUV as being on his side. The startled gunner unleashed a good 6-round burst into the hills above my truck (where about 3000 people live packed into squalid mud huts). I was out of the driver’s door and running down the road yelling at this idiot before I realized what I was doing. That startled the five hundred or so Afghan pedestrians who stopped and watched this unfold in utter amazement.

That was an embarrassing incident. Getting too close to the convoy was sloppy on my part; getting shot at was bad, bolting out of the driver’s door without even letting the vehicle stop was awful, but it elicited one of the more memorable quotes from my favorite Japanese client. He was a senior diplomat whom I consider a great man and with whom I was very fond and proud to work. When I came back to the truck, he looked at me, shaking his head and muttering Tim san, I do not understand how you people beat us.

 We were jamming up the Mahipar Pass, passing a slow-moving truck, when up pops the American Army in MRAPs, and the Bot swears the turret gunner has his pistol pointed at him. The kid did have his pistol out, but as the more experienced professional, I opined that the chances of him even hitting the car from up on top of that giant armored vehicle were remote. Plus, the soldier was switched on and lowered his pistol once he saw we were expats. The Bot took no comfort from that and unleashed a torrent of invective (as we high-speed writers say) which seemed to calm him down.

 Here are the guilty bastards (I say that in good humor) as they moved further down the pass, note the futility of attempting to keep all civilian traffic away from you, which the military tries to do with their convoys. Only once have I seen a convoy of obviously very experienced French soldiers, who moved with the traffic and allowed local vehicles to mix in with their convoy. Solid thinking on their part.

As you can probably tell, the pass is a long series of hairpin switchbacks, and one can always count on an old truck to be broken down and blocking one lane of the road. The fuel truck in this photo is broken down which is why the buses are stacked up behind it. I have spent hours sitting on the road here because a car broke down and blocked one of the four tunnels. Here is another good shot of the Mahpair pass.

After that brief excitement, we headed to Kabul to stock up on essentials, including pasta, seafood, beer, wine, and spirits. We visited our favorite Italian place for a proper sit-down lunch and spent the next few hours exploring Kabul without body armor or long guns. The Kabul PD gets crappy with civilian expats wearing body armor and carrying long guns.

Here is what the ole Haji ride looked like after our last stop in the greater Kabul area:

It was smooth sailing back to the Taj. We made it from Camp Warehouse to here in 85 minutes. There was little traffic on the road, no ISAF convoys, thank god (they can double or triple your trip time and often jam up traffic for 5 to 10 miles behind them because they move so slow), and the weather was perfect. The Taj is now stocked and ready for the arrival of Baba Ken, the leader of the Jbad geek squad. One of the wonders of the third world is the number of young men in these places who are scary proficient with computers.

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